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Executive summary
This working paper deals with land use policy and spatial development dynamics
in the Swiss region of Oberaargau from 1990 to 2014. It aims to evaluate the redis-
tribution of economic and ecological added and reduced value in land policy at two
different scales.
The regional analysis showed that contextual factors such as demographic evol-
ution, location, economic condition, polity setting and political context strongly in-
fluence land use. Important subregional disparities exist and current land use policy
does not always take them into account: while some easy accessible communes ex-
perienced an important increase in terms of population and constructions and would
have benefited from additional development rights, others fostered outsize growth and
promoted the extension of building zones despite a shrinking population level.
The local analysis dealt with the politics of policy instruments implementation
in the communes of Wiedlisbach, Huttwil and Niederbipp. It showed that existing
redistributive instruments were marginally implemented, sometimes even applied to
unforeseen purposes: zoning was used in order to circumvent legal restrictions on
the extension of the building zone, the tax on added land value created by zoning
and the land service tax are were levied through lump sum taxation, or, in another
case, the amount taxed was subject to important variations. In all cases, the existing
instruments did not allow the redistribution of value beyond communal borders.
However, redistributive instruments may help to reduce subregional disparities in
the future. Therefore, the following issues should be addressed by policy makers:
1. A building obligation, particularly for already zoned-in plots is essential, as the
gap between zoning and effective land use remains important;
2. The calculation method for building zone dimensioning, as it grants until today
each commune the right to zone regardless of their demographic evolution;
3. Instruments allowing the redistribution of value at supra-communal or regional
levels in order to compensate advantages and disadvantages resulting from insti-
tutional changes, such as zoning restrictions for communes, development rights
transfer for landowners, or the remediation of contaminated sites.
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Foreword
Part of the National Research Program 68 financed by the Swiss national science
foundation through the grant number 406840_143057, the SUstainable Management
of SOil as a Resource (SUMSOR) project asked five main research questions (Nahrath
et al., 2012):
1. What are the main economic, demographic, as well as institutional, political and
fiscal drivers of spatial development in different types of spaces in Switzerland
(urban, peri-urban, mountainous)?
2. What are the impacts of spatial development on economic and ecological soil
added and reduced values in the different types of spaces?
3. What are the existing policy instruments currently dealing, in Switzerland and
abroad, with the question of added(reduced value redistribution?
4. What are the most relevant (sets of) policy instruments that allow to integrate
objectives in terms of soil quality into densification strategies? To what extent
are the (sets of) policy instruments able to create "win-win" situations?
5. What are the main institutional conditions (or changes required) for the im-
plementation of these policy instruments in the Swiss institutional regime of
soil?
In order to answer these questions, one of the means chosen by the research team
was to elaborate working papers that analyse the different types of spaces in Switzer-
land: the present working paper focusses on the peri-urban region of Oberaargau
(Viallon, 2016a); two other working papers analyse urban dynamics in the region of
Lausanne (Viallon, 2016c,b). The present document structures the results obtained
for Oberaargau in four chapters:
Chapter 1 describes spatial development dynamics from 1990 to 2014 in Oberaargau
and compares them with national and cantonal development in order to:
− Describe the evolution of land use and zoning;
− Identify the main factors influencing land use and zoning;
− Characterize the peri-urban specificities of the region Oberaargau.
Chapter 2 provides analytical concepts from political and administrative sciences
as well as the main elements of the analytical framework used in the analysis,
i. e. the institutional resource regime framework. The chapter also provides a
provisional classification of available land policy instruments.
Chapter 3 analyses the politics of land policy instruments implementation. Three
case studies in the communes of Wiedlisbach, Huttwil and Niederbipp show past
and present spatial development dynamics and analyse how local authorities
have used policy instruments in order to implement land policy objectives and
overcome land policy challenges they faced.
Chapter 4 analyses and evaluates the regulatory and redistributive capacities of the
current and potential future1 institutional regime of soil.
This document summarizes the results gathered by the SUMSOR research team
on the region of Oberaargau, in particular the results of the qualitative case studies
conducted by the author. The other team members have provided data and maps
used in the first chapter dealing with the regional analysis. The document’s content
has been discussed with the Ph.D. supervisors of the author, Prof. Stéphane Nahrath
(University of Lausanne) and Prof. Géraldine Pflieger (University of Geneva). The
proof reading has been done by Daniel Baumgartel, teaching assistant at the English
Department of the University of Lausanne. I would like to thank my supervisors and
proof reader for their comments on previous versions of this document. I would also
like to thank the persons who granted me time for an interview.
1The Bernese land use planning act is currently in the consultation procedure and thus might
incur changes. Therefore, no final statement can be made on the effective future law.
Chapter 1
Spatial development
dynamics at regional level
from 1990 to 2014
This chapter provides an overview of main land use and zoning changes in the region
of Oberaargau and identifies the main factors influencing them. Regional specificities,
as well as its representativeness of peri-urban regions are presented in order to explain
zoning and land use changes. Based on the project design (section ), the following
sections and chapters present the evolution of land use and zoning as dependent
variables (section 1.1) and the contextual factors influencing them (section 1.2).
1.1 Evolution of land use and land value in Ober-
aargau from 1990 to 2014
This section presents zoning and effective land use at the regional level from 1990
until today. The first subsection (1.1.1) shows the evolution of the ecological value of
the region, primarily through an analysis of land use changes. The second subsection
(1.1.2) deals with economic value creation within the same time period, paying special
attention to past and present building zone capacity. The third subsection (1.1.3)
summarizes the main rivalries resulting from land use, and evaluates the type and
location of conflicts that are likely to be observed on a local scale.
Part of the Swiss plateau, the region of Oberaargau is the north eastern district A region in the middle of
the Swiss plateauin the Canton of Berne. It is located between the cantons of Solothurn, Aargau
and Lucerne. Its northern limit is the Jura mountains, and its southern limit the
Emmental. The motorway and the national train lines cross the northern central part
of the region, where the major of economic activity and population are located. Over
the last decades, these areas of the region experienced higher growth and urbanization
than the southern part, which declined slightly.
1.1.1 Evolution of the ecological value of land
The assessment of the ecological value of land is a complicated task, as one can rely Which ecological
indicator is relevant?on various indicators, and hardly evaluate the quality of different natural elements
or assess the services they provide for humans. The Millennium ecosystem assess-
ment (VV. AA., 2005a, 51) mentions the following examples of indicators describing
ecosystem condition:
In terms of soil, one central factor driving ecosystem condition or ecological value Land cover change as
central indicatoris land cover change (VV. AA., 2005b, 86). As one can read from the data provided
by the Arealstatistik (tables 1.2 and 1.3), land cover change is happening and it
increased from around 324 to 336 ha between the 1980s and 1990s in Oberaargau.
Land surface used by buildings account for 73% of overall urban sprawl while new
transport infrastructure (such as the new high speed train track between Mattstetten
and Rothrist) accounts for 23% of the artificial surfaces. Compared to the national
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Ecosystem condition Examples of indicators
Condition of vegetation Landscape fragmentation
Condition of soil Soil nutrients
Soil salinization
Condition of biodiversity Species richness
Threatened species
Visibility of indicator species
Condition of fresh water Presence of contaminants
Table 1.1: Examples of indicators to assess ecosystem condition according to the Millennium
ecosystem assessment (VV. AA., 2005a).
Figure 1.1: Land uses and land cover in Oberaargau based on data from the Arealstatistik
1981 and 2006. Data: BFS (VVYY).
level, land cover change slowed down from 32,471 ha in the 1980s to 25,951 ha in the
1990s.
Figure 1.1 shows a regional dominance of agriculturally used open land, followedIncrease of settlement
under national average by forest and settlement. Comparing the two maps, one can see that the increase
of settlement area occurs essentially where built areas already exist. Numerical data
(table 1.2) gives a more detailed overview of these land use changes: between the first
and the last inventory period of the Arealstatistik (BFS, VVYY), there is an increase
of the settlement area of approximately 23% in Oberaargau . A more important
increase of 32% can be observed over the entirety of Switzerland (table 1.3). Further,
one can notice that between the three inventory periods, the absolute and relative
growth of the settlement area remains constant in Oberaargau at approximately 15
ha per year, whereas it has slowed down in Switzerland as a whole.
The forest area is less dominant in Oberaargau than in the rest of Switzerland.No increase in forest
surface In Oberaargau, it even declined between 1979/85 and 2004/09, while increasing by
more than 3
(ha) 1981 ∆ 1994 ∆ 2006 Σ ∆ in %
Building area: 1,641 +207 1,848 +165 2,013 +23%
Other sealed areas: 1,647 +117 1,764 +171 1,935 +17%
Agriculture: 19,084 –339 18,745 –271 18,474 –3%
Forest: 10,431 — 10,413 — 10,352 —
Other: 299 — 332 — 328 —
Table 1.2: Land use/land cover surfaces in Oberaargau based on data from the Arealstatistik
1979/85, 1992/97 and 2004/09. Data: BFS (VVYY).
Figure 1.2 shows the intensity of surface change from “agriculture” to “building
area”. Between 1981 and 2006, almost 3% of farmland lost its productive use in3% loss of farmland over
25 years Oberaargau; this quantity is below the national average of 5.4%. These changes
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(ha) 1979/85 ∆ 1992/97 ∆ 2004/09 Σ ∆ in %
Building area: 114,993 +20,483 135,476 +16,533 152,009 +32%
Other sealed areas: 134,482 +11,988 146,470 +9,418 155,888 +16%
Agriculture: 156,674 –5,208 151,466 –3,300 148,166 –5%
Forest: 125,452 — 128,192 — 129,306 +3%
Other: 105,775 — 104,996 — 104,587 —
Table 1.3: Surface of land use/land cover surfaces in Switzerland based on data from the
Arealstatistik 1979/85, 1992/97 and 2004/09. Data: BFS (VVYY).
occur, notably, in the form of an increase of impermeable surfaces and extension,
as well as densification of built surfaces (Lambelet-Haueter et al., 2011, 222ff): they
induce a reduction of the soil’s ecological value through the destruction of biodiversity
and fertility, and soil compaction and pollution.
Figure 1.2: Evolution of farmland com-
pared to the size of the commune
between 1981 to 2006 in Oberaargau.
Farmland includes orchards, vineyards,
pastures and fields outside the forest
area. Standard deviation. Data: BFS
(VVYY, 2014b).
Figure 1.3 shows where the effective land use changes have been most frequent Frequent land use
changes in the centre and
north
during the last 30 years. I observe that there is high pressure in the centre west of
Oberaargau, particularly in the commune of Niederönz (west of Herzogenbuchsee)
and the surrounding area. This same tendency exists in the communes around Lan-
genthal: in the timespan between 1985 and 1997, construction is especially frequent in
Aarwangen (north), Thunstetten (west), Roggwil (east) and Madiswil (south). How-
ever, during the second period of observation, activity is more scattered and strongly
decreases in Madiswil. In Bipperamt, Niederbipp and Oberbipp new construction
has been frequent, and is ongoing. Between 1997 and 2009, construction was more
concentrated around Niederbipp. On the contrary, construction frequency has (in
comparison with the past) lowered in the southern, center and northern parts of the
region.
The categorization of communes made by the Federal Statistical Office (figure 1.4) Rural north becomes
residential and industrialconfirms the pressure of construction on land use in the center and north: relying
on the statistical definition of the typology (Schuler and Joye, 2000), the switch
of two communes from "industrial/tertiary" (purple) to "suburban" (red) and five
formerly "rural commuter communes" (green) become “peri-urban" (yellow). This
can be explained by the development of industry in the north and the increase of
residents1 (with commuters to regional, cantonal or national centres for work). The
southern part of the region remains predominantly agricultural.
Another relevant the presence or absence of contaminants is another indicator to Contamination of soil as
additional relevant
indicator
assess the ecological value of soil. (VV. AA., 2005a, 51). Brownfields and landfills
are soils whose ecological value has been at least partly destroyed. These sites hold
the potential to spread the pollution, causing further damage to the ecosystem. In
1The building statistics show that in the five peri-urban communes, 50% of the constructions
between 1995 and 2012 were single family homes, 20 to 30% were semi-detached houses and at most,
12% apartment buildings (BFS, 2012).
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.
Figure 1.3: Frequency of changes from agricultural land (Landwirtschaftsfläche) to settlement
(Gebäudeareal) between 1985 and 1997 respectively 1997 and 2009. Data: BFS (2014b,
VVYY).
Figure 1.4: Communes of Oberaargau in 1990 and 2000 according to BFS typology. Data:
BFS (2014b); Schuler and Joye (2000).
the canton of Bern, the Bernese cadastre of polluted soils registers 4,862 sites as
polluted. The majority of the contamination (2,256) is found on operating sites.
The remainder is divided among disposal sites (1,859), shooting ranges (692) and the
locations of former accidents (55). Among these polluted sites, the law2 distinguishes
two broad categories:
• In the first category, the pollution has no further impact on the environment
because its contents are inert, (i.e.e.g. certain construction materials) or its
toxicity does not reach the values fixed by law. In these cases, the site does not
require monitoring, whereas in the others, specific treatment and/or surveillance
is required;
2Federal act of the 7 October 1983 on environmental protection, SR 814.01.
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• Within the second category, there are three types of soils:
– Those that need to be analysed to determine the type and amount of
pollution present;
– Those that require surveillance, because the contamination exceeds legal
values and could spread (e.g. into groundwater);
– Those that require intervention in the form of decontamination or other
physical intervention measures.
As figure 1.5 shows, many various sites in Oberaargau are registered in the ca-
dastre. The major ones (in red), are primarily landfills filled with construction mater-
ial and other inert waste and are therefore part of the first category of sites mentioned
above.
Figure 1.5: Cadastre of polluted soils in Oberaargau. Data: AWA (2014). Map: BFS
(2014b).
1.1.2 Evolution of the economic value of land
In regard to land prices, the scarce data available allow us only to assert that there is Constant land prices over
the last ten yearsprice reduction between 2003 and 2014 on serviced land for single family homes (Wüest
and Partner, VVYY): these prices lowered from 260 francs/m2 to approximately 190
francs/m2 for the median plot.
As land prices are derivatives of real estate transaction prices3, real estate prices House price increase
covered by construction
costs increase
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are also relevant. According to SRED (2014), average supply prices for a single family
home in Oberaargau was around 611,030 francs in 2004. In 2013, the price was around
700,400 francs (SRED, 2014), which corresponds to an increase of 12.8% over the last
nine years (SRED data) or 1.42% per year. Nevertheless, if one takes into account the
change in construction costs, real estate prices have been slightly shrinking: in fact,
the BFS (2014c) records an increase of 13.8% of construction costs over the same time
period. This implies that during this time period, land hoarding was not profitable.
In comparison with the Bernese agglomeration, average supply prices for singlePrice increase in the city
of Berne family homes were around 758,530 in 2004 and 906,100 francs in 2013 (SRED, 2014).
This corresponds to an increase of 16.29% over nine years or 1.8% per year. Thus, even
if one subtracts construction costs, an added value of approximately 5% is generated.
In regard to agricultural land, data for the Canton of Berne is not readily available.Agricultural land price
back to normal? Land prices are around 8 francs/m2 in the Canton of Zurich, the most expensive in
Switzerland (Giuliani and Rieder, 2003; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 2008)4. Land prices
have been dropping since the 1970s and reaches nowadays a level comparable to the
1930s (Giuliani and Rieder, 2003).
As figure 1.6 shows, some communes have important building zone reserves. TheImportant building zone
reserves. . . minimum and maximum scenarios correspond to the lower and upper estimates of
building zone reserves made by the ARE according to the legal criteria defining the
needs of building zones5. In the case of Niederbipp and Thunstetten, these reserves
are predominantly working zones. As a cantonal priority development area, Nieder-
bipp proceeded to initiate important zoning operations in the 1990’s and 2000’s in
order to develop the industrial zone; some of this designated land is still available
for development. This industrial area benefits direct connection to train tracks and
to the motorway. Thunstetten is adjacent to Langenthal and can be compared to a
suburb of the city. It also has an important industrial zone located alongside the train
line that connects Berne to Zurich, as well as the cantonal road connecting Berne to
Olten.
Figure 1.6: Percentage of unused building zones in comparison to total building zones in
Oberaargau (Data and map: ARE (2012). Figure: IWSB (2014)).
In the case of Langenthal, Roggwil, Oberbipp, Wiedlisbach and Huttwil, these. . .mainly scattered
across the settlement
area
building zone reserves are predominantly housing zones. These zones were defined in
the 1970s and remain undeveloped since then. Most of these reserves are scattered
across the building zone, i.e. they consist of single undeveloped plots. Wider un-
developed perimeters are rather uncommon. One can find them in Langenthal, Hut-
twil and Roggwil. The undeveloped areas of Huttwil and Wiedlisbach are analysed
3In order to obtain land prices, Wüest and Partner (VVYY) subtract the construction costs from
the transaction price .
4The works of G. Giuliani are amongst the few publications mentioning agricultural land prices
5The size of the undeveloped building zone must correspond to the anticipated needs of the
subsequent fifteen years; these needs are calculated on the basis of the cantonal population variation
prognosis, of an average land surface use per person and of the average land use coefficient. See
subsection 2.2.2 for further details.
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further in the second part of this working paper. Further, as no data on past dimen-
sions of building zones is available6, only a smaller scale comparison of its evolution is
possible, (found in chapter 2). These zoning patterns are of central concern, not only
to understand the development dynamics in peri-urban spaces, but also because they
are a decisive element for evaluating the relevance of future redistributive instruments.
Compared with the evolution of land prices over time, and taking into account Obvious incentive to put
land into the building
zone
that the average price of agricultural land is eight francs per square meter (the price
for land for development is between 200 francs and 300 francs per square meter), the
strong economic incentive to zone land becomes clear. The incentives include, for the
communes, higher tax revenues7, or for landowners in order to increase the value of
their property.
1.1.3 Main rivalries and conflicts
The brief analysis in section 1.1.1 shows that since the 1980’s, land use changes (in Ecological vs.
economic value?terms of construction) have occurred at a constant pace in Oberaargau. As land
cover change is a central indicator of the ecological value of land, one can assert that
the overall ecological value has diminished. However, development has taken place
in rather localised areas, close to already developed parts of the regional territory.
Subsection 1.1.2 shows a correlation between land value and zoning and emphasizes
the strong incentives that exist for landowners, as well as for authorities, to have
building land. Nevertheless, the development of land over the time period of the
study does not allow us to conclude that the value of building land has increased. In
fact, land as an asset has not been particularly profitable over the last ten years.
Based on the classification of anthropic uses of the resource soil established by Rivalries between
services provided by
building land
Nahrath (2003, 127), these findings can be described in terms of rivalries and con-
flicts between different land uses. The conflict between building land and natural
areas is the most fundamental one behind the two dimensions of value discussed.
However, there are also conflicts between different categories of goods and services
provided by building land itself: for example, investment and land hoarding versus
urbanisation or housing, or industry and handicraft versus housing, or waste disposal
versus urbanisation.
Without considering external factors (discussed in section 1.2 below), there is Evolution of services
provided by building landthe possibility to reuse parts of building land that no longer provide services. Swiss
federal authorities estimate that former brownfields constitute an unused land reserve
of approximately 1700 hectares (Swiss Confederation, 2008). These areas have already
been serviced and benefit, in certain cases, from an optimal location (Jaccaud et al.,
2008). Another example is the densification of already developed areas which allows
for additional uses (ARE, 2013).
However, these change of uses are constrained by law and can require significant Redistribution of value
for decontaminationsums. In the case of former brownfields, landowners are obligated to finance soil ana-
lysis, potential interventions and/or surveillance measures, depending on the degree
and amount of pollution. As these operations might be very costly, compensation via
added economic value generated by future use might not be sufficient. This partic-
ularly applies to peri-urban regions where the financial burden for decontamination
that landowners or potential investors are ready to shoulder is smaller. Moreover,
overall difficulties in compelling polluters to pay for their actions (actions that may
have occurred decades ago), can be a cat-and-mouse game impeding quick rehabil-
itation of the polluted perimeter8. In the end, the available public funding cannot
6First statistics on building zones from the Federal spatial planning office (ARE) dated back to
2007.
7The arrival of new inhabitants, in particular, on middle or upper class homeowners, leading to
higher income tax revenues for the commune. However, this has to be put into balance with additional
costs such as construction and maintenance costs of serviced land, as well as public infrastructure
like schools, nurseries, sports facilities, etc.
8Practitioners cite examples of companies that have polluted in the past and transfer their as-
sets, filing for bankruptcy and avoiding payment for their damage. The recent introduction of
article 32dbis of the environmental protection act tries to circumvent this problem by introducing a
cost cover guarantee. Various parliamentary interpellations (14.3042 - Interpellation form Mathias
Reynard; 12.3298 – Interpellation from Thomas de Courten; 12.3221 – Interpellation from Daniela
Schneeberger) and a recent revision of the Environmental protection act and the Ordinance on pol-
luted soils concerning the funding of depollution underline the importance of this issue.
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entirely compensate for the reduced economic value9. Further redistributive issues in-
clude revitalization projects, such as river beds, the artificial creation of biodiversity,
and even reforestation programs.
Other issues, such as the reduction of oversized building zones, are also linked toLand use planning issues
requiring redistribution the redistribution of value. In regard to the dimension of building zone, the withdrawal
of development rights attached to a plot provides, under specific conditions, the right
to compensation for restrictions on ownership. With the last revision of the spatial
planning act, cantonal authorities now levy a tax on added value created through
zoning operations in order to finance other land use planning measures (i.e. the
reduction of building zone or other land use planning measures). This instrument
introduces a redistributive mechanism at the core of land use planning policy that
directly targets the rent created by public authorities. Further, land hoarding is also
a redistributive issue: the rarefaction of available building land might lead to higher
rents10 which in turn fosters the creation of additional building zones in order to
compensate the scarcity of supply.
In order to understand the evident rivalries and conflicts, it is necessary to first
understand how economic and ecological value is created or destroyed, and second,
if and how it is captured and redistributed. Having presented the main trends in
land use and land use planning, the following sections aim to identify and explain the
main factors influencing these trends: section 1.2 presents an analysis of contextual
variables; section 2 is dedicated to policy factors determining land use planning and
land use in a regional context.
9The federal waste fund is credited yearly with approximately 30 million francs in order to finance
decontamination operations. For the period 2012 to 2015, the Bernese cantonal waste fund has an
annual budget of between 2.5 and 5 million francs (Kanton Bern, 2012).
10However, the literature remains ambiguous on the matter (Napoléone and Geniaux, 2011).
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1.2 Contextual factors
This section presents the contextual variables chosen by the project team which have
strong influence on land use on a cantonal and regional scale. The first subsection
(1.2.1) shows that transport infrastructure, topography, and view are correlated with
land use.
The second subsection (1.2.2) exposes general economic constraints, such as the
evolution of growth and employment rates. Subsection 1.2.3 presents major trends
in regard to demographic evolution and urbanization. Subsection 1.2.4 deals with
central polity aspects regarding the communes and political elements showing general
tendencies of the region.
1.2.1 Geographic and spatial factors
Figure 1.7 shows the criteria of accessibility via public transport, as well as the fre- Higher accessibility in
the centre and north of
the region
quency of land use changes. The accessibility criteria shows that the center and
northern parts of the region are more accessible than the southern parts. In matters
of public transport, only the centres of Langenthal and Herzogenbuchsee achieve the
second highest class of accessibility because they are located on Interregio train lines
connecting them directly to Berne, Burgdorf and Olten. The Bipperamt remains
relatively well connected, in the sense that the train line at the base of the Jura
mountains grants them access to Solothurn in less than 30 minutes, to Oensingen,
the neighbour commune of Niederbipp in canton Solothurn, in a few minutes, and
to Langenthal, the regional centre, within 30 to 40 minutes. From Oensingen and
Langenthal, Interregio trains offer connections to Berne in 60 and 35 minutes, and
Zurich in 50 and 45 minutes (SBB, 2014).
In regard to land use changes, the superposition of land use changes and public Coordination of public
transport and settlementtransport accessibility shows that an important part of development occurred close
to existing public transport infrastructure. Further, development of settlement away
from any public transport, (in particular in the south), appears to be less frequent
in the time period of the second study. This can be interpreted in different ways:
a better land use planning coordination through the tightening of restrictions, the
exhaustion of building zone reserves in these communes, or punctual developments
linked to agricultural use. In fact, if one compares the frequency of changes in these
southern communes with the size of their building zones (1.6, it is inconceivable that
entire neighbourhoods have been erected there. Another issue are the scattered light
blue dots belonging to the transport categories E and F: they consist of bus stops
probably established after the land was developed. Therefore, it is probable that there
is a partial reverse effect, where land use determines transport accessibility.
Further analysis also shows sub-regional contrasts (see figure 1.8): the highest Side effects of
infrastructure
development
urban sprawl occurs in communes accessible by train, which means that urban sprawl
is linked to the construction and existence of major infrastructure. In fact, one cor-
relative effect of these transport infrastructures is an increase in the attractiveness
of land for new businesses and residents, and encourage municipalities to open up
more land for development. This tendency is confirmed by two interviewees who
speak of the "Ableder" of the Bahn 2000 project, that is to say the consequent zoning
operations filling small non developed areas close to the new train line.
In regard to motorised private transport (figure 1.9), While the north and center A rather isolated south
have close access to the motorway, the south is rather isolated: the distance to the
closest motorway entry can be more than 35 km away. From these slip roads, Berne,
Zurich and Basel can be reached approximately within less than an hour. Compared
with the frequency of land uses changes, the relationship is less obvious: one can
observe a high frequency of development close to the motorway access, as well as in
the centre of the region where the biggest towns are.
As figure 1.10 shows, the northern part of the region at the base of the Jura The bottom of the Jura
as optimal housing
location
mountains have a better view than the southern part. In this way, it is more suitable
for the development of housing zones. Further, the map allows us to distinguish the
topographical characteristics of the region. In turn, I can assert that firstly, settle-
ment primarily develops where land is flat (light blue and yellow areas). Secondly,
development occurs close to existing settlement, as noted before (1.1.1). Thirdly,
the northern part of the region does experience important development, but it is not
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Figure 1.7: Accessibility of Oberaargau by frequency and type of service in 2014 crossed-
referenced with frequency of land use changes from agricultural land to settlement from 1981
to 1994 and from 1994 to 2006. Data: BVE (2014); BFS (2014b, VVYY).
Figure 1.8: Evolution of urban
sprawl compared to the size of
the commune between 1981 and
2006 in Oberaargau. This sprawl
includes the following land uses:
buildings, transport, special facil-
ities, recreation areas and urban
green spaces. Data: Schuler and
Joye (2000); BFS (2014b).
possible to attribute this to a unique cause, as on one hand transport is a relevant
explanation, but on the other hand, an important industrial development occurred in
the same area (see section 3.4). Furthermore, finding the source of land use changes
depends heavily on the real estate developer’s choice and people’s lifestyle: some fa-
vour a village house on a hillside with good view, while others prefer a small-town
flat with direct access to metropolitan areas.
This section shows how the main land developments occurred where the surround-
ing land was already built, where land is rather flat or grants a good view, and with
close proximity to transport infrastructure. However, land development also influ-
ences the availability of public transport. By increasing the number of potential
passengers, a reverse effect is induced. Accessibility by car blurs the link between the
two variables, as the regional driving distances to the motorway access do not exceed
30 minutes. In matters of view and topography, flat land is more attractive than a
slope, unless it is well oriented and grants a good view. Of course, development is
also linked to developers’ and individuals’ choices which vary over time.
26 of 127
Contextual factors
Figure 1.9: Distance to access the motorway crossed with the frequency of land use changes
from agricultural land to settlement from 1981 to 1994 and from 1994 to 2006. Data: BFS
(VVYY); Hochschule für Technik Rapperswil (2014a).
Figure 1.10: View quality in Oberaargau crossed with evolution of land use from 1981 to
1994, and from 1994 to 2006. Ratio of the area that is visible from a certain location in
Oberaargau within a distance of 5 km on scale from 0 to 1,000). Data: Hochschule für
Technik Rapperswil (2014b).
1.2.2 Economy, employment and fiscal factors
Economic context is an additional explanation of occurred land use changes. Regional
growth and the national interest rate correlate to land value changes; the presence
or absence of jobs, the fiscal attractiveness of the communes and the population’s
fiscal capacity11, can partially explain the decision of individuals and companies to
establish themselves in a certain location.
Figure 1.11 shows that fiscal capacity is highest in the two biggest communes of A richer north and a
poorer southOberaargau, and that inhabitants in the northern part of the region generally have
higher incomes than those in the southern part. Differences between some communes
are significant, but one has to keep in mind that the communes with low fiscal ca-
pacity (< 700) are mainly agricultural: with the exception of Wyssachen (1,200) and
Eriswil (1,300) – most southern communes with low fiscal capacity have less than
11By fiscal capacity, I understand the tax revenues of a commune, divided by the communal tax
rate, divided by the number of inhabitants (LUSTAT, 2016).
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1,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, I observe that communes with a higher degree of
centrality have a higher fiscal capacity.
Figure 1.11: Average fiscal capacity in Swiss francs per inhabitant per commune in Ober-
aargau between 2009 and 2011. Data: BFS and Kanton Bern (2015). Map: BFS (2014b).
Figure: IWSB (2014).
In matters of communal tax rate, one can observe that besides the general taxOverall lowering taxes
over time rate reduction – and thus general fiscal income reduction per inhabitant – over the
time period considered, southern communes tend to tax their residents more than the
regional average. On the contrary, the communes with a higher degree of centrality,
who are experiencing more growth, push the tax rates lower. Compared to figure 1.11,
one can observe that the communes with the highest fiscal capacity are among those
with the lowest tax rates: Langenthal, Herzogenbuchsee and Niederönz manage to
earn high revenues, with low tax rates, whereas the poorer southern communes face
higher rates and lower incomes. The northern communes also take part in the tax
discount with a mitigated success, as their fiscal capacity corresponds to the regional
average. This allows us to assert that richer citizens of Oberaargau pay proportionally
less taxes than poorer citizens.
In terms of impact on land use, a link between the level of taxation and landNo evident direct impact
use planning cannot be observed, as no data on the evolution of zoning is available
before 2007. In regard the link between the level of taxation and land use, no direct
correlation can be shown. Further, lump sum agreements with medium or big sised
companies that establish themselves in Switzerland are de facto excluded from this
calculation.
Figure 1.13 shows a general tendency to reduce the land tax rate (with exceptionFurther tax competition
of Niederönz – regional tax discount champion). The calculation of the tax paid by
landowners relies on the official value – amtliche Bewertung – of land including its
parts (such as buildings, springs. . . ), its overall condition and its use. Therefore, the
land tax does not strictly consider land value as its object, but includes improvements
as a target. Further, the cantonal administration states that official land values are,
compared to their market value, mostly underestimated (FIN, 2009, 10). Nevertheless,
referring to the tax harmonisation act12, case law prohibits discrepancies of 30% and
more13. Further information is provided in section 2.2.2. In regard to the link between
land tax and land use, as only the tax rate is available, (and not the real fiscal income),
it is not possible to make empirical statements.
In terms of employment, figure 1.14 shows that on a regional level, there is aA centralised job offer
relatively high job to population ratio in the Bipperamt, Langenthal (and its agglom-
eration), and in Herzogenbuchsee/Niederönz. With the exception of Huttwil, where
job supply is relatively high, the southern communes, in comparison with the others,
do not offer many job opportunities. Compared to macroregional14 and with the na-
tion as a whole offering 401 full-time jobs per 1,000 inhabitants and 432 full-time jobs
12Art. 14 of the Federal tax harmonisation act, SR 642.14.
13See BGE 124 I 145
14The macroregion includes the Swiss Mittelland, i.e. the cantons of Berne, Solothurn, Fribourg,
Neuchâtel and Jura. It has been chosen for reasons of data accessibility.
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Figure 1.12: Tax rate of natural persons in the communes of Oberaargau in 2003 and 2013a.
Data: FIN (VVYYa). Map: BFS (2014b).
aThe tax rate is multiplied with the percentage of taxation defined by cantonal law.
Figure 1.13: Land tax rate (as per thousand of official land value) of the communes of
Oberaargau between 2003 and 2013. Data: FIN (VVYYb). Map: BFS (2014b).
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per inhabitant in 2011, respectively, Oberaargau offers 411 full-time jobs, thus falling
between macro-regional and national averages (see table 1.4).
If one takes a look at the evolution of jobs over the last ten years (1.15), employ-Growing job
opportunities in the
north
ment tends to decrease in the south of Oberaargau. The communes around Herzogen-
buchsee also lost jobs, but as the map displaying the commune typology (figure 1.4)
shows, this loss seems linked more to general socio-economic transformation of these
communes from rural industrial status to a residential location for commuters. On
the contrary, the Bipperamt experienced a growth in job opportunities over the last
decade. In the region as a whole, there are slightly more full-time equivalent jobs per
capita than ten years ago, a tendency confirmed on macroregional and national levels.
Nevertheless, the job increase has been higher in Oberaargau than in the macroregion.
Figure 1.14: Ratio of full time equivalent jobs per inhabitant per commune in Oberaargau
in 2011. Data: BFS and Kanton Bern (2015). Map: BFS (2014b). Figure: IWSB (2014).
Figure 1.15: Percentual variation of jobs per inhabitant per commune between 2001 and
2011 in Oberaargau. Data: BFS and Kanton Bern (2015). Map: BFS (2014b). Figure:
IWSB (2014).
Oberaargau Mittelland Switzerland
Population 2001 75,305 1,667,070 7,255,653
Jobs 2001 29,159 665,700 3,134,713
Ratio 0.38 0.39 0.43
Population 2011 77,611 1,770,429 7,954,662
Jobs 2011 31,899 710,800 3,438,683
Ratio 0.41 0.40 0.43
Table 1.4: Evolution of jobs in full-time equivalents compared to regional, macroregional
and national population between 2001 and 2011. Data: BFS (2014a).
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Now, if I cross-examine the employment figures presented above with urban sprawl
(figure 1.18) and the frequency of land use changes (figure 1.3), I see an important
overlap, notably in the centre and north of the region. This means that the existence
and creation of jobs also influences land development. However, as construction is
an important employment sector, the inverse relationship between the two variables
must also be considered.
This subsection shows that the population’s average income is higher in com-
munes with high accessibility and in most communes with higher job opportunities.
Additionally, it shows that fiscal rates for natural persons and landowners have been
shrinking over the last 30 years. As I can identify partial overlap between communes
with low tax rates and higher job opportunities, a link between fiscal rates and land
use is probable. However, important data gaps, namely in regard to the taxation
of moral persons and the amount of tax retrieved from the land tax, do not allow
the production of an accurate description of reality. Besides, I notice an inverted
correlation between income and tax rate.
1.2.3 Demography, urbanisation and housing
Another central variable that must be considered in order to understand land use
changes is demography. Although its evolution depends on factors such as housing
availability and employment opportunities, it can, as such, provide insights into the
regional development dynamics, and help distinguish different communal trajectories.
Between 1991 and 2013 (BFS, 2015), population in Oberaargau grew from 74,802
to 78,508 inhabitants; this corresponds to an absolute growth of 7.88% or an average
annual growth rate of 0.36%. These rates are similar to the cantonal change: pop-
ulation grew from 927,497 to 1,001,281 inhabitants, i.e. 7.96% overall growth and
0.36% average annual growth. However, this growth was inferior to national popu-
lation changes, which grew from 6,842,768 to 8,139,631 inhabitants, a change that
corresponded to a total growth of 18.95%, or annual growth of 0.86%. Over the last
ten years, annual population growth has slightly reduced in Oberaargau to approxim-
ately 0.4%, under both the cantonal average of 0.5%, and the Swiss national average
of 1.05%.
1981 ∆ 1991 ∆ 2001 ∆ 2011
Oberaargau 68,790 +5.8% 72,774 +3.4% 75,305 +3.06% 77,611
C. of Berne 914,753 +2.2% 934,639 +1.2% 946,310 +4.1% 985,046
Switzerland 6,372,904 +7.3% 6,842,768 +6.0% 7,255,653 +9.6% 7,954,662
Table 1.5: Evolution of number of inhabitants in thousands in Oberaargau, the canton of
Berne and Switzerland between 1981 and 2011
A look at the regional population growth (figure 1.16) shows that population
tends to decrease in southern communes where agriculture is predominant, and that
demographics increase in communes close to main transport infrastructure, (i.e. in
the center and north of the region).
The map on the right shows that Oberaargau has one centre, Langenthal. Of Classic demographic
distributionseveral sub-centres, Herzogenbuchsee is of greatest importance. These two communes
are both crossed by the main regional train line. Among the smaller centres are
Niederbipp and Huttwil, both centres of the fourth category (according to the cantonal
structure plan). A significant part of the population lives in the communes around
Langenthal, which suggests a classic demographic distribution: one main centre and
its suburbs.
Figure 1.17 shows that the vacancy rate tends to be higher in communes sur-
rounding Langenthal, although these communes have a higher degree of centrality
compared to less well located ones (more southern communes) southwards. Com-
munes around Herzogenbuchsee (Heimenhausen, Bettenhausen, Niederönz) experien-
cing notable demographic growth have a low vacancy rate.
Figure 1.18 shows that urban sprawl, (the extension of built surfaces), is higher Urban sprawl mainly in
the centre and northaround Langenthal, Herzogenbuchsee, and in the Bipperamt than in other parts of
the region. Some of these communes have wide industrial zones (e.g. Niederbipp.
Thunstetten), while others are characterised by low density housing zones (Wied-
lisbach, Aarwangen, Oberbipp, Madiswil, Roggwil. . . ). The communes with below
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Figure 1.16: Demographic growth rate of the communes in Oberaargau from 1991 to 2011
and population of the communes in Oberaargau in 2011 (Data and map: BFS).
Figure 1.17: Vacancy rate in the com-
munes of Oberaargau in 2011 (Data:
BFS (2015). Map: BFS (2014b). Fig-
ure: IWSB (2014).
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Figure 1.18: Evolution
of urban sprawl between
1981 and 2006 compared
to evolution of demo-
graphy in Oberaargau
between 1991 and 2011.
Data: BFS (2015). Map:
BFS (2014b).
Figure 1.19: Demographic forecast in Oberaargau until 2035. Data: Region Oberaargau and
Kanton Bern (2012, 65).
average demographic change and urban sprawl are mainly agricultural communes
with decreasing working opportunities (see figure 1.18).
Figure 1.18 shows the evolution of urban sprawl from 1981 to 2006 in compar- Highest urban sprawl in
already densely
populated areas
ison with the territorial size of each commune. Those with larger populations ex-
perience the highest rate of soil artificialisation, a point which supports the idea of a
strengthened urban framework, a diagnosis due to the high correlation between urban
sprawl intensity and the number of inhabitants15.
In terms of regional demographic projections, figure 1.19 shows population growth Growth prognosis below
cantonal and national
levels
prognosis of 2,000 inhabitants (2.6%) over the next 15 years, which corresponds to a
yearly increase of 0.17% (Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012). Cantonal and
national prognosis are both above this figure, as they anticipate a 2.75% growth rate
over the next fifteen years (yearly increase of 0.18%) on cantonal level and 7.1% growth
over the next fifteen years (yearly population increase of 0.47%) on the national level
(BFS, 2014d).
Compared with current building zone capacities (figure 1.6), the growth forecast Ample building zone
reservescan be reached entirely by already zoned land. In fact, the undeveloped or partially
developed capacities could support up to 6,300 additional inhabitants16 Therefore,
any building zone increase, at least in terms of housing, does not relate to actual
needs, but to other factors (i.e. the creation of additional rent).
15Person’s r = 0.57, after correction of data distribution with log function.
16Based on the building zone reserves for housing of the entire region – around 131 ha, (Region
Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012, 24), one can calculate its minimum host capacity by applying the
reversed cantonal formula for building zone dimensioning: 130 ha * (minimum) land use coefficient
of 0.3 / 140 m2 per flat * 2.25 inhabitants per flat = 6,300 inhabitants. An additional 32 ha of mixed
zone are not taken into account. See 3.2.3 for a detailed description of the calculus.
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1.2.4 Polity and politics
Polity
Before 2006, the canton of Berne is composed of 26 districts and approximately 400Regional structure
headed by prefect communes17. Districts are essentially administrative subdivisions used by the can-
tonal administration in order to accomplish various decentralised tasks (art. 93 KV).
Each district is headed by a prefect elected directly by the people and under the su-
pervision of the directorate in charge of the communes and land use planning (JGK).
Following a broader cost reduction program and willing to adapt the territorialTerritorial reform in
order to reduce costs administration to the needs of agglomerations and rural regions (Kanton Bern, 2006),
an administrative and judicial reform were voted, in 2006, restructuring the cantonal
territory into ten districts and five regions (art. 3 KV-BE). The communes were not
affected by the process. Figure 1.20 shows the composition of the new district of
Oberaargau based on the former districts.
Figure 1.20: Old and new administrative setting of Oberaargau. Map: BFS (2014b). Figure:
IWSB (2014).
The ten new districts are still headed by prefects, although their tasks are partly
reduced18. They deliver building permits, state oppositions against communal de-
cisions (except in matters of land use planning and building permits), coordinate the
fire brigade, civil protection and police, mediate in civil law matters (ombudsman)
and supervise public services, communes and communal associations19.
From a political perspective, the above mentioned administrative reform was mod-Moderate popular
support erately supported by cantonal voters (58% of approval) and more or less rejected on
the level of Oberaargau20 (figure 1.21 below, left map). Press comments (Berner
Zeitung, 2006b,c,a) mainly cited the transfer (concentration) of cantonal offices and
underlying jobs from Langenthal and Aarwangen to Wangen and Burgdorf (former
district of Emmental). The Swiss People’s party criticised the loss of jobs to an-
other regional centre and the general cantonal withdrawal from peripheral regions,
whereas the Liberal and Socialist parties supported the reform. The location of the
new prefect was subject to debate, as it is located in Wangen and not Langenthal.
On the cantonal level, election results show a cleavage between urban and rural areas:
whereas agglomerations (Berne, Thune, Biel) vastly approve the reform, the entire
Bernese Oberland and in Oberaargau the district of Wangen reject it.
In comparison to the administrative reform (left map), the judicial reform (right
map) is obviously approved, although it follows similar objectives of centralization
(reduction from 13 to 4 judicial districts). Official documents provided for the vot-
ing advance as main argument the underlying federal reform of the penal and civil
procedures, which reduces drastically the work-load of the affected tribunals.
17Number of communes in the year 2000 (Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchendirektion JGK, 2014).
18Other reforms (Federal penal code and federal penal procedure code) take away most of their
competences in matters of penal law.
19Bernese law of the 28 March 2006 on prefects, Bernisches Gesetz vom 28. März 2006 über die
Regiserungsstatthalter (RStG), RS-BE 152.321.
20In the district of Aarwangen, 53% of the voters approved the reform, in the district of Wangen
48% approved, and in the district of Trachselwald (the major part of it is part of the new district of
Emmental), 36% approved it (Kanton Bern, VVYY).
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Figure 1.21: Left map: Percentage of "yes" to the reform of the decentralised cantonal
administration. Right map: Percentage of "yes" to the judicial reform. Data: Kanton Bern
(VVYY). Map: BFS (2014b).
Regional governance
Regional cooperation has a long standing tradition in Oberaargau: the first non- First regional structure
plan from 1980binding regional structure plan was elaborated in 1980 by the planning association
Region Oberaargau, private law structure was founded in 1967. The aim of this plan
was to “slightly deviate from uncontrolled growth and focus development more on
the main centres” of the region (Ischi, 1980, 251). However, central issues fostering
regional cooperation are, after all, waste disposal, traffic, and waste water treatment,
not necessarily land use planning (Wyss, 1987, 297).
In 1992, a revision of the regional structural plan was started (AGR, 2006), fol- Pioneer role in digital
land use modellinglowed by the creation of an electronic simulation tool (SNL-Modell) showing probable
effects of potential land use planning measures. This project was conducted with
communal authorities to calculate the utility of different development options, thus
showing the importance of regional planning as a means to foster growth and optimize
the location of population and jobs. However, up until 2002, it was not possible to
reach a state of development that met the approval of the canton, which in turn led
to the integration of current modelling results into a revised classic structural plan
(Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2004).
In 1993, the new cantonal law on public transport21 created the legal basis for the First binding
coordination of transport
in 1993
establishment of regional transport conferences. These structures sought to bundle
communal interests regarding public transport, and constitute an interlocutor between
the canton and the transport companies. They could derive from private or public law.
Their perimeter is defined by the cantonal executive who emphasizes the relevance of
existing structures, i.e. planning associations (BVE, 1993).
In 2003, communes, public and private institutions, political parties and various
associations elaborated and ratified the Charta Oberaargau. This non-binding docu-
ment was originally launched as a regional agenda 21; it set global development goals
in various domains such as agriculture, economic development, energy and education
(AA. VV., 2003) .
In 2004, an updated regional structure plan called Raumentwicklungskonzept Ober-
aargau Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern (2004) and based on the SNL model
was elaborated. It structured and prioritised various binding measures intended to
coordinate transport and settlement (definition and strengthening of priority develop-
ment areas, reinforcement of public transport), but also created an ecological network,
and ensured landscape protection. It also included preliminary elements of the ag-
glomeration program of Oberaargau that applied to federal funding in 200722.
21Gesetz vom 16. September 1993 über den öffentlichen Verkehr, SR-BE 762.4.
22However, the submitted program was not considered eligible for funding by the fed-
eral land use planning office. For further information, see http://retomueller.blogspot.ch/
2009/04/agglomerationsprogramm-oberaargau-ich.html.
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In 2005, as a response to a parliamentary enquiry23, the cantonal executive de-New regional structure
plan led by Canton cided to establish regional global transport and settlement plans, so called Regionale
Gesamtverkehr- und Siedlungskonzepte RGSK (Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern,
2012). These new regional structure plans were meant to integrate the agglomeration
programs developed for the federal agglomerations policy initiated in 2001. The main
difference between the agglomeration programs and the RGSK is that the RGSK cov-
ers the entire territory, not just cities and their suburbs. The RGSK are supposed
to be elaborated by the regional conferences (see below), and, once in place, substi-
tute the existing regional transport conferences. As for agglomeration programs, one
of the central objectives is to define coordinated measures in terms of infrastructure
(roads and public transport) and settlement. These measures are then verified and
prioritised by the canton.
The underlying necessary constitutional and legal modifications were approvedWide popular support for
new regional structure. . . in 2007 by a vast majority of the Bernese people24. These conferences are public
law structures with a set of attributed competences such as the elaboration of the
regional structure plan (RGSK), the coordination of transport and urbanization, the
coordination of culture, of regional politics and of energy. Their perimeter is based
on the administrative regions defined by the Canton. They form a new political and
institutional level, as their structure has an executive and a legislative body composed
of all the communes within their perimeter. Members have voting rights proportionate
to the population of their commune. Their shape is supposed to match the functional
spaces on the cantonal level.
However, their individual creation is subject to regional approval by the people. . . which is rejected after
all in each region. In the case of Oberaargau (see figure 1.22): in 2012 this failed: the
majority of voters approved the new institutional level (53.8%), but the majority of
the communes rejected it (28/47). This might be surprising if compared to the over-
all approval of the underlying necessary institutional modifications five years earlier
(Kanton Bern, VVYY). According to the press (Berner Zeitung, 2012a,b), reasons for
the rejection include fear of autonomy loss (particularly in the smaller communes),
refusal of centralization towards Langenthal, the binding nature of the decisions made
by the conference, as well as a general resistance to propositions from Berne. Although
internally divided on the matter, the Swiss People’s party, eventually took a position
against the conference. From an analytical point of view, one could characterize the
discrepancy between the two votes as not in my back yard phenomenon: the problem
is politically and socially recognised and the will to solve it is present, but when bind-
ing decisions implying changes in terms of coordination and competences on lower
levels are to be taken, the involved actors step back and withdraw their support.
In order to compensate for refusal of the regional conference, the private lawModification of the
regional association’s
status as middle path
planning association’s statutes were modified shortly after the vote. Currently the
association is in charge of (Cantonal commercial register office, 2014):
− elaboration and approval of the regional structure plan, coordination between
settlement and transport infrastructure (RGSK);
− elaboration of public transport supply;
− decisions on regional programs and strategies supported by the Confederation;
− advice to the communes on energy policy;
− promotion of culture;
− Creation of regional structure plans;
− coordination of other activities such as economic development or tourism.
From an institutional point of view, the main difference between the associationNor forced membership
nor effective majority
voting
and the regional conference that was rejected by the voters is its private law status
which impedes majority voting and forced membership. In fact, the binding character
of decisions are dependant on the goodwill of each of the association’s members, as
23Enquiry Hoffmen 164/06 (Kanton Bern, 2007).
2480% approval on the cantonal level; between 71% and 76% approval in the districts of the future
Oberaargau.
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Figure 1.22: Left map: Percentage of "yes" to the agglomeration strategy and regional
cooperation reform in 2007. Right map: Percentage of "yes" to the creation of a regional
conference for Oberaargau in 2012. Data: Kanton Bern (VVYY). Map: BFS (2014b).
no delegation of competency is possible. The current association has an assembly
composed of the chief executives of each commune, and an executive committee. Both
the assembly and committee apply majority voting, but their decisions are limited
to the willingness of each member to cooperate and implement the decision, as each
commune can leave the association at any time.
Currently, all communes of the district are members of the association, as well
as four communes from the Canton of Lucerne, the prefect of Oberaargau (presid-
ent of the assembly), local members of the cantonal parliament, as well as several
representatives of the regional economy (Häusler, 2012).
Communal autonomy in a general legal perspective
Whereas the old Federal Constitution only sparsely referred to communal autonomy, Limited relationship
between Confederation
and communes
the current one guarantees it within the limits set by cantonal law (art. 50-1 BV).
One reason behind this change is the will of politicians close to the Swiss Union of
Cities to foster the role of the commune as a member of the federal state and as a
partner of the two other state levels Kägi-Diener (2008). However, there is no direct
partnership between the federation and the communes. Instead, the federal state is
supposed to involve the communes in earlier stages of the decision-making process in
order to respond to growing internationalisation.
A violation of the autonomy of the communes is subject to constitutional com- Limited judicial control
of violation of communal
autonomy
plaint (art. 189-1-e BV). In order to respect cantonal competence in defining com-
munal autonomy, only the Federal Court controls the arbitrariness of implementation
of cantonal law (Kägi-Diener, 2008, 930). This court ensures that the cantonal enact-
ment is based on serious objective reasons, and not severely incoherent or purposeless
(Tschannen and Zimmerli, 2005, 166).
The cantonal Constitution and laws legally determine the existence of the com- Wide communal
autonomy in the Canton
Berne
munes, their creation and their autonomy/competency on specific matters (Zimmerli,
1995). In the Canton of Bern, this is stated in art. 3 al. 2 KV, which divides the
cantonal territory into administrative units and communes. Further, article 109 KV
guarantees autonomy and as wide a margin of manoeuvrability as possible, which
should reflect the way cantonal laws are made. However, this principle cannot be
brought to trial in court, because it is not recognised by the federal constitution (Zi-
mmerli, 1995, 204). Nevertheless, article 111-1 KV provides that the Canton only
determines the basic organisational rules of the communes.
The same provisions figure in art. 3 of the act on the communes (GG). The
autonomy principle also applies to regional conferences, within the limits of their
competencies (art. 137-4 GG). As defined by case law (Kuttler, 1992, 47), the cantonal
authority is not allowed to cancel a justifiable communal decision, as this would
correspond to a cantonal discretional control, in contradiction to the principle of
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communal autonomy. One can add that communes are bound to the principle of
legality, in particular in regard to acts limiting rights and liberties of the individual
(Zimmerli, 1995, 210).
Competencies of the Canton and the communes
The cantonal constitution allows the communes to accomplish a task as long as it isNo explicit subsidiarity
principle not of the exclusive competency of the canton. It does not require a constitutional
basis in order for a commune to accomplish a (new) specific task (Zimmerli, 1995,
209). Nevertheless, as the subsidiarity principle is not mentioned in the constitution,
the canton can fulfill tasks that it can handle better than the communes and further
tasks not in hand of the communes that it deems relevant.
Competences shared between canton
and communes (art. 31ff KV)
Environmental, animal and plant protec-
tion, landscape and heritage protection,
land use planning, transport, water and
energy supply, water and waste disposal,
public order and security, health, education,
leisure, sports and economy.
Exclusive competences of the
federal and cantonal level
Agriculture, forestry. . .
Table 1.6: Competences shared between the canton and the communes in the canton of
Berne.
Coordination in matters of tax law: Real estate gains tax (2-1-d StHG) Land
property tax (2-1-a StHG) Income tax (2-1-a StHG)
Communal autonomy in land use planning
In regard to land use planning, the federal law states that the planning authoritiesCommunes are granted a
wide decisional autonomy must grant to subordinate authorities (the communes) the needed discretion to fulfill
their obligations (art. 2-3 RPG). This guarantee is a factor in the cantonal construc-
tion law, where discretion of subordinate authorities (communes, prefects), communal
autonomy, and individual freedom (in terms of construction) can be restrained only
when public interest (Gemeinwohl) requires it (art. 54-3 BauG). Furthermore, article
65 BauG states that the communes are, within the limits of the law, free to define their
building regulations. In case they fail to do so, the cantonal authority can refuse their
approval, set a deadline for adapting them, or act through substitutive execution.
Few cases of opposition of the commune against a cantonal decision can be cited.Few judicial conflicts
between Canton and
communes
Most concern effective use of zones: the conformity of building or exploitation permits
to zoning regulations. In this domain, communes enjoy a wide decisional discretion
within the limits of superior law. They are allowed to define their own zones and reg-
ulations, and interpret the regulations they make, as long as their argument is legally
defensible (Bernese cantonal administrative tribunal, 2000). One of the few Bernese
cases where a conflict emerges, dates from 1988: the canton established a reserved
zone25 in the middle of a constructed area still used for agriculture. The cantonal
objective was to impose on the commune a higher density for future construction in
the concerned area. The commune relied on the notion of communal autonomy as a
means to contest the cantonal decision, the court ruled that the establishment of a
reserved zone in this area contradicted the purpose of the zone, to protect agricultural
land, as well as the decisional autonomy of the commune (BGE 114 IA 295).
Intercommunal cooperation and horizontal constraints
Article 110 KV states that cooperation between communes relies on free will, the
possible legal forms of cooperation being determined by law: contract, association,
public or private law structure (art. 7 GG). The participatory rights of citizens and
communal authorities must be preserved. The Canton fosters cooperation through
financial/infrastructural incentives, or by being member of a cooperation structure.
25A reserved zone (Planungszone) is a localised restriction prohibiting any use that could hamper
the future use of the concerned perimeter. It is used temporarily while the regular zoning and
building regulations are being modified.
38 of 127
Contextual factors
Finally, the parliament can further decide upon mandatory cooperation e.g. for waste
water treatment (110-2 KV, 8 GG). Matters of land use planning, regional coordin-
ation of communal building regulations (particularly zoning plans), are managed by
the regional structure plan which lists the main housing and working areas of the
region (Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012, 124).
Binding regional structure plans
With the revision of the Baugesetz in 2004, article 57 BauG makes regional structure
plans binding for communal authorities (Kanton Bern, 2004, 1424ff). Before 2004,
there was no legal obligation for the communes to integrate the regional structure
plan into their local policy. However, in terms of development, their content is es-
sentially a transposition of communal land use planning policy into an overarching
document. For example, the regional structure plan of Oberaargau lists the main
undeveloped building zones and their development capacities as well as general de-
velopment objectives such as "foster development alongside existing public transport"
or "foster availability of building zones". In the regions where a regional conference
has been approved, the option for creating regional development plans which override
communal regulations and are binding for landowners, has not yet been used.
Voluntary regional structure plans
Furthermore, in the Bipperamt, an inter-cantonal partial regional structure plan In-
terkantonale Gesamtstudie Siedlung, Verkehr, Wirtschaft Raum Wangen a/Aaare –
Oensingen (GWO) is currently under development (AGR and AfR, 2010). It is su-
pervised by the canton and involves the communes from Oensingen (SO) to Wangen
an der Aare. Until now, only a convention between the cantons and the involved
communes has been signed (Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012). However,
the plan’s process depends on the degree of cooperation between the communes. In an
example of the low inter-communal cooperation, it has taken more than four years to
get all of the communes to sign the convention26 (Aargauer Zeitung, 2010; Solothurner
Zeitung, 2014). Nevertheless, a closer communication and an embryonic cooperation
do exist.
Currently, the city of Langenthal and the surrounding communes, under the lead- Langenthal’s minimum
cooperation project
already difficult to
implement
ership of the regional association, are working together to define shared specialised
working zones (Agglomerationskonferenz Langenthal, 2010): the definition, coordin-
ation and promotion of new working zones are their only joint tasks. The actual
zoning operations and plot equipment as well as other costs or fiscal revenues remain
in communal hands. The ideas behind this are to delimit fixed working areas, (each
potentially hosting specific types of companies), avoid zoning other working areas,
and deny acceptance to companies which contradict the development objectives of
each working area27. Although the requisite cooperation levels have been reduced to
a minimum, the project’s implementation is blocked by the contradictory views of the
communes and now mainly focuses on a common working zone for Langenthal and
Thunstetten only (Commune of Langenthal, 2013).
Other forms of cooperation
There are various domains of intercommunal cooperation in Oberaargau. The year-
book of Oberaargau (Lerch, 1999, 181ff) mentions 20 associations, companies, and
other structures where communes work together in the former district of Aarwangen.
The most important of these are: water supply (Gemeindeverband WUL), civil pro-
tection (ZAR AG), water treatment (ZALA AG) fire surveillance/protection, waste
management, management of shooting ranges, and administrative and information
technology support during elections.
26In 2010, Oberbipp, Wiedlisbach and Wangen an der Aare refused to sign the convention.
27Each working area has been attributed one or several development tendencies according to its
location, existing equipment and surrounding population: job oriented, transport oriented, retail
oriented or food retail oriented (Agglomerationskonferenz Langenthal, 2010, 19)
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Fusion of communes
Since the 2012 revision of the Constitution (art. 108 KV) and the law on the com-NIMBY-like problem for
fusions munes (art. 4bff GG), there has been the possibility for cantonal authorities to force
fusion between communes. As the voting results in figure 1.23 show, popular will
to merge the two biggest regional centres with their suburban communes is present.
However, the idea was not pushed forward politically. he vote results on the regional
conference do not bode well for the support of a decisive vote on fusion.
Figure 1.23: Percentage of "yes"
to the revision of the cantonal law
on the communes in 2012. Data:
Kanton Bern (VVYY). Map: BFS
(2014b).
Additional political results
Figure 1.24 shows the election results of the cantonal legislative elections in Oberaar-Dominance of right wing
parties gau and in the entire canton over the last 25 years. One can see the dominant position
of the right wing parties, in particular, the Swiss people’s party, with between 40 and
55% of the votes. Over the studied time span, the socialist party lost about 10% of
their votes, currently leaving them with around 20% of the voters’ preferences.
Figure 1.24: Percentage of vote for main parties for the elections of the Bernese legislative
between 1990 and 2014. Left: results for the entire Canton of Berne. Right: Results for
Oberaargau. Data: Kanton Bern (VVYY). Map: BFS (2014b).
In regard to voting, the 2012 revision of the federal spatial planning act was widely
approved, notably in the two biggest (urban) communes. The results of the vote on
secondary homes (Weber initiative) provided more of a contrast, although the region
is not directly concerned by the problem of secondary homes.
As this subsection shows, recent territorial reforms reshape the administrative
setting, but lack actual political support. One example of this lack of support is the
refusal by popular vote of the creation of a new regional body. Regional cooperation
has existed for several decades, but the regional structure plan has been binding for
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Figure 1.25: Left: percentage of "yes" on the revision of the federal spatial planning act.
Right: percentage of "yes" on the initiative on secondary homes (Weber initiative). Data:
Kanton Bern (VVYY). Map: BFS (2014b).
the authorities only since 2004. The plan’s approval requires unanimous decision by
the 47 communes of the region, a fact that hampers coordination. Further, case law
shows that communal autonomy in land use planning is high and that most conflicts
are settled during the approval procedure of planning documents. Therefore, even if
the communes cooperate in numerous domains, and a decisive step towards regional
governance has been taken by the canton, the communes’ autonomy, in terms of land
use planning, remains strong.
1.2.5 Synthesis
The contextual factors analysed in this section have shown several links with land use Main factors influencing
land useplanning and land use. This subsection intends to summarize this information.
− First, Spatial factors are central in the explanation of land use. A location’s to-
pographic characteristics play a central role in the evolution of its use: flat land,
existing settlement and view are important explanatory factors. Further, trans-
port infrastructure, specifically public transport, correlates with the extension
of settlement.
− Second, economic factors show that urbanisation correlates with higher em-
ployment, lower tax rates and higher fiscal capacity: Langenthal and Herzogen-
buchsee, the two main regional centres, which also benefit of the better public
transport connection, clearly demonstrate this phenomenon.
− Third, the demographic variable shows a positive link with land use. Further, it
allows us to appraise whether certain communes managed demographic growth
with less urban sprawl than others.
− Fourth, polity elements show the highly decentralised decisional structure in
land use planning policy. Despite a progressive regional coordination of trans-
port and settlement, binding measures for communal authorities and landown-
ers remain scarce. Political analysis shows a voting paradox where consolidated
regional structures are wanted, but not in one’s own region.
The joint appraisal of these elements might provide a rather deterministic view Increased land
consumptionof the evolution of land use. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, the impact of
these factors on the evolution of land use planning, particularly on the evolution
of undeveloped building zones, cannot be analysed in a similar way. Nevertheless,
one can assert that there is a general tendency to increase land consumption, which
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can be explained by transport accessibility, a growing economy, lower taxes, growing
demographic and decentralised decision-making.
Having analysed contextual variables, I move on to the legal-institutional aspects
regulating land use planning and land use. These elements influence both indirectly
and directly, the attribution of use rights to landowners and the evolution of land use.
They consist of the different laws regulating the use of the resource soil.
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Institutional regime of soil
This section presents the institutional regime of soil as intermediary variables (see
appendix), composed of the property rights system as well as the public policies
dealing with land use planning and land use as well as the institutional rules and
procedures applying to the resource soil.
2.1 Property rights
The property rights system is defined as "all of the formal property rights, as well A private definition of
propertyas all of the rights of disposal and use arising from them, that apply to a resource"
(Knoepfel et al., 2007, 481). The content of formal, disposal and use rights depend
on the definition of property used by society and applicable to the resource. For
Switzerland, it is given by article 641 of the Civil code from 1912 and is formulated as
follows: "the owner of an object is free to dispose of it as he or she sees fit within the
limits of the law. He or she has the right to reclaim it from anyone withholding it from
him or her, and to protect it against any unwarranted interference". This definition is,
from a legal perspective, private (Leimbacher and Perler, 2000): notwithstanding the
type of owner (state, collective, individual), the same and only definition of property
applies. However, the state’s activities are based on and limited by law1 and its
freedom of contract is bound to public interest (Moor, 2002, 375, 388).
Table 2.1 shows the main modifications of the property rights system and restric- Few legal changes over
timetions through public law since its introduction on federal level. One can observe that
the formal rights associated with property have not changed much since the second
world war: they were extended to condominiums/freehold apartments in 1963 and
introduced into public law in 1969 with the attribution to the federal state of a com-
petency in land use planning. Based on the Civil code and Code of obligations, table
2.2 lists the existing property rights instruments applying to the resource soil.
1Art. 5 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, SR 101.
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Formal rights Disposal rights Use rights
1911 to 1965
1912: Introduction of the
Swiss civil code
1930: Federal
expropriation act
1963: Introduction of
condominium property into
civil code
1911: Swiss code
of obligations
1951: Revision of agri-
culture act and modific-
ation of land betterment
provisions
—
1965 to 1980: Emergence of federal land use planning policy
1969: constitutional
articles 22ter and 22quarter
regarding guarantee of
private property and
principle of land use
planning
— 1970: Cantonal
constructions act
1971: New federal
water protection act
1972: Emergency federal
decree on land use planning
1979: Federal spatial plan-
ning act
1980 to today: Environmental policy,
restrictions for agricultural land and foreigners
— 1983: Federal act on
acquisition of prop-
erty by foreigners
1991: Federal act
on rural land rights
2012: Limitation of
secondary homes to
20%
1983: Federal environ-
mental protection act
1985: Revision of the
cantonal construction act
1987: Constitutional article
22sexies regarding the pro-
tection of swamps (popu-
lar initiative Rothenthurm)
1999: Revision of fed-
eral spatial planning act
in regard to constructions
in the agricultural zone
2012: Revision of the fed-
eral spatial planning act and
reintroduction of a compensa-
tion mechanism
Table 2.1: Evolution of the property rights system of the resource soil according to S. Nahrath
(2003, 151ff).
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Instrument Description
Private law contract (1, 216 CO) Can contain any obligation that is not prohibited
by law. Has to be done as a public deed.
Land exchange (237 CO) Swap of land for something that is not money.
Same rules as for contracts apply.
Land buy/sell (656, 666, 184 CO) Same rules as for contracts apply.
Repurchase right (216 CO) Seller’s right to re-buy sold land at a predeter-
mined moment. Same rules as for contracts apply,
except that its duration is limited to 25 years and
that it can only be inherited but not assigned.
Emption right (216 CO) Holder’s right to buy land at any moment. Its
duration is limited to 10 years and must be done
as a public deed.
Preemption right
(216 CO, 681 CC)
Holder’s preferential right to buy a property when
the owner sells it. Can be defined by contract or
by law, e.g. co-owner, emphyteutic lease holder, a
farmer’s family member under specific conditions,
State of Geneva.
Distinct and permanent building
right/emphyteutic lease (779 CC)
Holder’s right to use the land according to the
conditions specified in the contract with the
landowner. Transferable and inheritable, unless
otherwise agreed, only valid if done as a public
deed.
Land improvement/betterment
(703 CC)
Redefinition of property geometry, service and de-
velopment. Requires the approval of the majority
of landowners owning more than half of the land
involved. Cantonal legislation regulates the matter
further.
Real burden (782 CC) A real burden is a monetary obligation of a
landowner towards a third party for services
provided to his/her land. It can be defined by con-
tract or by law.
Gift/donation (239 CO) Can be made within the limits set by matrimonial
property law and inheritance law.
(Legal) Mortgage (824 CC) Charge on immovable property guarantee-
ing a debt. It can be defined by contract or
by law (legal mortgages). Mortgages are con-
stituted through their land registry entry.
Bernese specificity: legal mortgages are valid
without inscription in land registry (109ff EZGB)
Mortgage certificate (842 CC) Personal debt secured by a charge on an immov-
able property and all personal belongings. It is
incorporated into a exchangeable security.
Land charge certificate (847 CC) Credit in form of a charge on immovable property.
It is disconnected from any personal obligation.
Encroachment (art. 674-3 CC) Construction using a neighbour’s land.
Right for pipes (art. 691 CC) Pipes crossing a neighbour’s land.
Rights of way (art. 694 CC) Right to pass through a neighbour’s land to access
one’s own land.
Right to use an essential water
source (art. 710 CC)
If access to water requires excessively high costs, a
landowner can claim access to one’s part of water
that is unused.
Usufruct (art. 745 CC) Use rights of land granted to a natural person or
legal entity that cannot exceed 100 years.
Table 2.2: Property rights instruments of the resource soil. Data: Haefliger (nd); Convers
(2012); Canton de Neuchâtel (2015).
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2.2 Policy design
This subsection presents the general policy design of the resource soil. As definedPublic law affecting the
use of a resource in the literature, the policy design contains "all of the substantial and institutional
elements relative to the programming and implementation of all use and protection
policies affecting the management of a resource" (Knoepfel et al., 2007, 475). It is
composed of four elements analysed thereafter:
1. The definition of the collective problem(s) to be solved and the causal and
intervention hypotheses (see 2.2.1) as well as the target groups and beneficiaries
(figure 2.1);
2. The political administrative program (see 2.2.2), which itself includes the legal
objectives of the public policies, the evaluative elements, instruments at hand,
the political-administrative arrangement and the procedural constraints;
3. The action plans;
4. The public policy outputs.
2.2.1 Collective problem and underlying hypotheses
Figure 2.1 provides a framework in order to identify the main actors involved in landConflict between public
policies and property
rights
use planning policy, i.e. the ones causing the public problem the policy aims to
solve (target group), the ones bearing the consequences of the public problem (end
beneficiaries) and the political-administrative authorities intervening on the target
group. As the attribution of rights on land are defined by a private property regime,
the main target group of the policy are the landowners and the persons holding rights
associated with the ownership of land, i.e. formal property title holders, disposal and
use rights holders. These parties oppose public intervention, often with success, as
the relation between unconditional private ownership and more and more restrictive
public intervention remains ambiguous (Knoepfel and Nahrath, 2014, 771).
Third party winners
Urban planners, 
architects, remediation 
companies, residents, 
shop owners
Third 
party losers
Specialized cons-
truction companies,
 local authorities, 
land owners
Target group
Land owners
Public problem
to be solved
Political administrative authorities
Federal administration (ARE, BAFU/OFEV)
Cantonal administration (land use planning 
office, economic office, agriculture office, 
environmental office...)
Regional entities (Region Oberaargau, PALM, 
SDOL)
Communal authorities and administration
End beneficiaries
Human beings and 
living species
Intervention 
hypothesis
Causal hypothesis
Figure 2.1: Triangle of actors of land use planning policy. Based on Knoepfel et al. (2006,
62)
In matters of soil, state intervention is directed towards the target group respons-A collective problem that
is twofold ible for the public problem to be solved, which is twofold: on one hand, the "economic
use of land and its properly ordered settlement"2, on the other hand the "protection of
the population and its natural environment against damage or nuisance"3. The three
tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 sum up the successive definitions of the collective problems;
causal and intervention hypothesis based on the work of S. Nahrath (2003).
2Art. 75 of the Constitution of 18 April 1999 of the Swiss Confederation, SR 101.
3Art. 73 Cst, SR 101.
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Policy design
1. Concrete objectives
2. Evaluative elements
3. Operational elements
(instruments)
4. Political-administrative arrangement
5. Procedural elements
Substantive elements Institutional elements
Figure 2.2: The five elements of the political administrative program according to Knoepfel
and Weidner (1982).
2.2.2 Political administrative program
In order to more precisely comprehend the definition of the collective problem(s),
the causal and the intervention hypotheses presented above, one has to analyse in
detail the legal elements on which they rely. Together, these legal elements consti-
tute the political administrative program: i.e. "the set of regulatory acts and norms
that parliaments, governments and the authorities charged with execution consider
necessary for the implementation of a public policy" (Knoepfel et al., 2011). This
set of regulations vary according to their level of detail, centrality, and coherence.
Theory distinguishes between substantial elements and institutional elements. Sub-
stantial elements consist of objectives, evaluative elements and operational elements,
while institutional elements include procedural aspects and political-administrative
arrangements (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 153ff). This section presents the five layers con-
stituting the political administrative program of the policy design of the resource
soil.
Policy objectives
Article 2, 73 and 75 of the Federal Constitution4 state that the Confederation pursues Federal objectives: the
Constitutiona sustainable development and "an appropriate and economic use of the land and its
properly ordered settlement". Further, article 74 foresees that the state protects
"population and its natural environment against damage or nuisance" and that those
causing the damage or nuisance bear the costs of avoiding or eliminating it.
The federal spatial planning act5 aims to separate building zones and non-building Spatial planning act
zones in order to prevent urban sprawl, to preserve the landscape and reduce the loss
of fertile land, in particular of cropland. This act requires coherence between zoning
and localization of actual uses, an optimization of building zones (in terms of size
and density), a decentralised concentration of urbanization, and the preservation of
regional equilibria (Nahrath, 2003; Bovay, 2005).
The environmental protection act aims to make the polluter bear the costs of Environmental protection
actthe pollution, ensure the environmental compatibility of land development projects,
limit emissions and imissions, restrain the use and disposal of dangerous products,
organisms and waste, and remediate contaminated sites6.
The nature protection act7 aims to protect landscape and localities, natural sites Nature protection act
and monuments (art. 1) as well as floral and faunistic species8, promote their conser-
vation and foster their maintenance.
In cantonal legislation, these objectives are implemented through the cantonal Bernese objectives
structure plan, which has to be approved by the Confederation9, the constructions
act, as well as the environmental and nature protection acts. For the canton of Berne,
the structure plan further specifies the aim of an "economic use of soil" through three
central elements (Kanton Bern, 2011):
4SR 101.
5Art. 1 and 3 RPG, SR 700
6Art. 1, 2, 11, 13, 16ff EPA, SR 814.0.
7Nature protection act of the 1 July 1966, SR 451.
8Art. 18 NPA, SR 451.
9Art. 6ff RPG, SR 700.
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− The coordinated development of transport and settlement, which can be achieved
by the correct location, dimension and density of building zones as well as their
connection to public transport;
− The creation of conditions for economic development, mainly through the cre-
ation of well coordinated and located strategic working zones and priority de-
velopment areas10;
− The preservation and development of nature and landscape, mainly through e.g.
the protection of cropland and the definition of sites, landscapes and buildings
worthy of protection.
In the region of Oberaargau, the regional structure plan, the global transport andObjectives of Oberaargau
settlement plan, and the landscape protection plan, are all approved by the cantonal
authority, mention following elements:
− The definition of regional centers;
− The definition of housing and working zones
− The definition of areas subject to potential restructuring and densification;
− The definition of supra-communal limits of urbanization;
− The betterment transport infrastructure, particularly intermodal links.
In regard to the protection of nature, the plans foresee the creation of an ecological
network and the financing of renaturation measures, in addition to the elaboration of
a shared water provision and wastewater treatment systems. Further, the depollution
of soils located in groundwater perimeters is also anticipated.
On communal level, each entity has their own spatial planning regulations detailedNo common denominator
on communal level in communal legislation: these regulations concern mainly prescriptions in regard to
zoning, construction – in particular for the core village – and protected areas.
Evaluative elements
Evaluative elements allow for assessment of the extent to which the policy objectivesRevision of the cantonal
structure plan have been achieved. In regard to land use planning, federal legislation anticipates in
art. 911, a revision of the cantonal structure plans every ten years in order to adapt
to new circumstances12.
Further, art. 15 let. b RPG13 states that building zones must be dimensioned ac-Dimension of the building
zone cording to the development needs of the subsequent 15 years, and serviced within this
time period, which implies a regular revision of the underlying communal development
plans.
Since the 2014 spatial planning legislation revision, a cantonal building zone useCantonal building zone
use coefficient coefficient estimates the aggregate density of building zones in each canton by dividing
all existing building zone surfaces by the number of inhabitants and jobs. Art. 30
of the federal spatial planning ordinance14 specifies that the cantonal calculation of
future building zone needs cannot exceed the Swiss median building zone surfaces per
10In 1989, the Canton of Berne launched the priority development areas program, conceived as a
set of well-located areas dedicated to intense economic use. Their development was fostered by the
canton: primarily through a close collaboration between the directorates involved in the land use
planning process (VOL, JGK, BVE) and economic stakeholders. Additionally, this was accomplished
through facilitated or accelerated approval procedures for underlying building regulations (AGR,
2014).
11RS 700.
12To put it more precisely: the first part consists of a diagnostic of the current state of development
and land protection. It determines which areas have been urbanised, where infrastructure has been
developed, where precious farmland is located and protected, which landscapes, ecological reserves
or recreational areas are considered important and which areas are defined as hazardous (6 RPG).
The second part defines how the future development of the canton should take place, how activities
with spatial impact are coordinated, what means are used for steering development, and at which
temporal scale these defined tasks will be performed (8 RPG)
13SR 700.
14SR 700.1.
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inhabitant/job15. Further specifications, such as the evolution of demography and
jobs, also have to be taken into account for the calculus, but they do not figure in the
ordinance and are specified in the action plans (see 2.2.5).
Cantonal legislation further specifies the requirement that building zones comply Compliance of building
zones with foreseen
service
with foreseen services16 and the notification to landowners of their contribution to
service costs within two years17.
Instruments of the policy design
Within the political administrative program, the policy instruments listed in tables
2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 are tools used by authorities to influence the behaviour
of target groups (Knoepfel et al., 2011, 156). The table below briefly describes the
main instruments available to the Bernese public authorities – instruments available
through federal and cantonal laws – to manage the resource soil, implement land
use planning and environmental policy, and induce behavioural changes on landown-
ers. For an exhaustive list of the 158 Swiss federal public law restrictions on (land)
property, one can refer to Knoepfel and Wey (2006).
15The median values are calculated according to three different types of zones – central, mixed
and housing zones – and 22 different types of communes. The categorisation of communes displayed
in figure 1.4, subsection 1.1.1 is elaborated by the BFS .
16Art. 72 and 108 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
17Art. 155 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
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ib
le
re
-
gi
on
al
zo
ni
ng
pl
an
s
(B
E)
an
d
ca
nt
on
al
zo
ni
ng
pl
an
s
(B
E
an
d
V
D
),
bu
t
us
ed
m
ai
nl
y
fo
r
pu
bl
ic
bu
ild
in
gs
an
d
sh
oo
t-
in
g
ra
ng
es
,i
nd
us
tr
ia
lz
on
es
an
d
qu
ar
ry
in
g,
la
nd
sc
ap
e
an
d
na
tu
re
pr
ot
ec
tio
n,
eq
ui
pm
en
t
of
re
cr
ea
tio
na
la
re
as
as
w
el
l
as
pr
io
rit
y
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
ar
ea
s.
B
ui
ld
in
g
re
gu
la
tio
ns
(a
rt
.
69
B
au
G
,a
rt
.
86
LA
T
C
)
D
et
er
m
in
e:
•
R
es
tr
ic
tio
ns
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
to
di
ffe
re
nt
zo
ne
s
(t
yp
e
of
(n
on
)
us
e
an
d
ge
ne
ra
ls
iz
e
of
bu
ild
in
gs
,n
oi
se
re
st
ric
tio
ns
);
•
R
es
tr
ic
tio
ns
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
to
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
(c
on
ne
c-
tio
n
du
tie
s,
he
ig
ht
,t
yp
e
an
d
pr
ofi
le
,d
ist
an
ce
s,
sh
ap
e
of
su
rr
ou
nd
in
g
ar
ea
,p
ar
ki
ng
,i
nf
ra
st
ru
c-
tu
re
sh
ar
ed
be
tw
ee
n
bu
ild
in
gs
);
•
O
bl
ig
at
io
ns
in
re
ga
rd
to
na
tu
re
pr
ot
ec
tio
n;
•
C
om
m
un
al
po
lit
ic
al
-a
dm
in
ist
ra
tiv
e
ar
ra
ng
em
en
t
w
ith
in
th
e
ob
lig
at
io
ns
se
t
by
su
pe
rio
r
la
w
;
•
C
om
m
un
al
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
w
ith
in
th
e
ob
lig
at
io
ns
se
t
by
su
pe
rio
r
la
w
.
Lo
w
,b
ec
au
se
it
on
ly
di
st
rib
-
ut
es
va
lu
e
an
d
is
no
t
co
up
le
d
w
ith
a
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n
m
ec
ha
n-
ism
.
C
om
m
un
al
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n,
w
ith
in
th
e
ob
lig
at
io
ns
se
t
by
su
pe
rio
r
la
w
.
Zo
ne
w
ith
m
an
da
to
ry
pl
an
ni
ng
(a
rt
.
73
-2
B
au
G
,
ar
t.
66
LA
T
C
)
Es
ta
bl
ish
es
de
ro
ga
tio
ns
(in
m
at
te
rs
of
de
ns
ity
,h
ei
gh
t,
ty
pe
of
bu
ild
in
g,
et
c.
)
to
th
e
ge
ne
ra
lb
ui
ld
in
g
re
gu
la
-
tio
ns
fo
r
sp
ec
ifi
c
pa
rt
s
of
th
e
bu
ild
in
g
zo
ne
lik
e
ci
ty
ce
nt
re
s,
ne
w
ne
ig
hb
ou
rh
oo
ds
,c
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
on
hi
lls
.
Lo
ca
lis
ed
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
or
w
ith
dr
aw
al
of
va
lu
e
on
ly
.
C
an
to
na
ld
efi
ni
tio
n,
im
pl
e-
m
en
ta
tio
n
by
co
m
m
un
al
ex
ec
-
ut
iv
e.
Lo
ca
ld
ev
el
op
m
en
t
pl
an
(a
rt
.
88
B
au
G
,a
rt
.
64
LA
T
C
)
D
et
ai
lp
la
n
of
a
ne
ig
hb
ou
rh
oo
d
in
cl
ud
in
g
m
ai
nl
y
eq
ui
pm
en
t,
nu
m
be
r,
ty
pe
an
d
as
pe
ct
of
bu
ild
in
gs
,
de
ta
ile
d
us
e
of
so
il,
fin
an
ci
al
as
pe
ct
s,
et
c.
It
ca
n
be
su
bs
tit
ut
ed
by
ar
ch
ite
ct
ur
al
co
m
pe
tit
io
n
or
sin
gl
e
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
pr
oj
ec
ts
an
d
ca
n,
un
de
r
sp
ec
ifi
c
co
nd
i-
tio
ns
,e
qu
al
a
bu
ild
in
g
pe
rm
it
(9
3-
1-
c
B
au
G
an
d
69
a
LA
T
C
).
Lo
ca
lis
ed
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
or
w
ith
dr
aw
al
of
va
lu
e
on
ly
.
C
an
to
na
ld
efi
ni
tio
n,
im
pl
e-
m
en
ta
tio
n
by
co
m
m
un
al
ex
ec
ut
iv
e
(a
nd
le
gi
sla
tiv
e)
,
ap
pr
ob
at
io
n
by
ca
nt
on
al
au
-
th
or
ity
.
Ta
bl
e
2.
6:
Po
lic
y
de
sig
n
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
of
th
e
re
so
ur
ce
so
il.
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T
yp
e
N
am
e
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
R
ed
is
tr
ib
ut
iv
e
ca
pa
ci
ty
Sc
al
e
of
ac
ti
on
C
ro
pl
an
d
pr
ot
ec
tio
n
pl
an
(a
rt
.1
an
d
3
R
PG
)
Fe
de
ra
lly
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
qu
ot
a
of
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
ll
an
d
th
at
fu
lfi
lls
ce
rt
ai
n
st
an
da
rd
s
in
te
rm
s
of
cl
im
at
e,
so
il
qu
al
-
ity
an
d
to
po
gr
ap
hy
.
T
he
ca
nt
on
s
ar
e
re
sp
on
sib
le
fo
r
th
e
ca
rt
og
ra
ph
y
an
d
pr
es
er
va
tio
n
of
th
ei
r
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
sh
ar
es
.
C
an
to
na
lm
ai
nt
en
an
ce
of
ec
o-
lo
gi
ca
lv
al
ue
.
In
ca
se
of
de
ve
l-
op
m
en
t,
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
ec
o-
no
m
ic
va
lu
e
in
B
er
ne
(h
ig
he
r
de
ns
ity
ob
lig
at
io
n)
.
Fe
de
ra
lq
uo
ta
,c
an
to
na
ll
oc
-
al
isa
tio
n
an
d
de
fin
iti
on
of
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
fo
r
po
te
nt
ia
lu
se
ch
an
ge
.
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
li
m
pa
ct
as
se
ss
m
en
t
M
an
da
to
ry
fo
r
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
pr
oj
ec
ts
th
at
ca
n
po
te
n-
tia
lly
ca
us
e
m
aj
or
da
m
ag
e
to
th
e
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t;
th
e
im
pa
ct
as
se
ss
m
en
t
(1
0ff
U
SG
)
ai
m
s
to
pl
an
pr
ot
ec
tio
n
m
ea
su
re
s,
an
d
es
tim
at
es
th
e
re
m
ai
ni
ng
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l
da
m
ag
e.
Pa
rt
of
th
e
bu
ild
in
g
pe
rm
it
pr
oc
ed
ur
e,
it
co
-
or
di
na
te
s
an
d
in
te
gr
at
es
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
lp
ol
ic
y,
bo
th
in
te
rn
al
ly
an
d
ex
te
rn
al
ly
(K
no
ep
fe
la
nd
N
ah
ra
th
,
20
14
,7
54
).
Pr
ev
en
t
w
ith
dr
aw
al
of
ec
ol
o-
gi
ca
lv
al
ue
.
C
an
to
na
ls
ca
le
.
B
ui
ld
in
g
ob
lig
at
io
n
O
bl
ig
at
io
n
to
de
ve
lo
p
ow
ne
d
bu
ild
in
g
la
nd
w
ith
in
a
gi
ve
n
tim
e
pe
rio
d.
W
ith
dr
aw
al
of
ec
ol
og
ic
al
va
lu
e.
C
om
m
un
al
sc
al
e,
ca
n-
to
na
l/
re
gi
on
al
sc
al
e
fo
r
ar
ea
s
su
bj
ec
t
to
ca
nt
on
al
/r
eg
io
na
l
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
pl
an
s.
Su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e
an
d
in
ve
st
ig
a-
tio
n
ob
lig
at
io
n
(a
rt
.
32
cff
U
SG
)
B
as
ed
on
th
e
ca
da
st
re
of
po
llu
te
d
so
ils
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
by
th
e
ca
nt
on
s,
th
e
po
llu
te
r
or
,i
n
ca
se
th
ey
do
no
t
or
ca
nn
ot
co
m
pl
y
w
ith
th
ei
r
ob
lig
at
io
ns
,t
he
ca
nt
on
,
ha
s
th
e
ob
lig
at
io
n
to
in
ve
st
ig
at
e
an
d
su
rv
ei
lp
ol
lu
te
d
sit
es
.
T
he
po
llu
te
r
be
ar
s
th
e
un
de
rly
in
g
co
st
s,
an
d
th
e
au
th
or
ity
ca
n
re
qu
ire
a
co
st
co
ve
r
gu
ar
an
te
e.
Pr
es
er
va
tio
n
of
ec
ol
og
ic
al
va
lu
e.
C
an
to
na
ls
ca
le
.
R
em
ed
ia
tio
n
ob
lig
at
io
n
T
he
ow
ne
r
of
a
co
nt
am
in
at
ed
sit
e,
a
po
llu
te
d
sit
e
on
w
hi
ch
co
nc
en
tr
at
io
n
va
lu
es
of
on
e
or
se
ve
ra
lt
ox
ic
el
e-
m
en
ts
ar
e
ab
ov
e
le
ga
ll
im
its
,h
as
th
e
ob
lig
at
io
n
to
in
-
ve
st
ig
at
e,
m
on
ito
r
an
d
re
m
ed
ia
te
(a
rt
.
20
A
ltl
V
).
T
he
ow
ne
r
al
so
be
ar
s
th
e
co
st
s
of
th
e
ne
ce
ss
ar
y
m
ea
su
re
s
(a
rt
.
32
d
U
SG
).
D
ist
rib
ut
io
n
of
ec
ol
og
ic
al
va
lu
e.
Fe
de
ra
ld
efi
ni
tio
n,
ca
nt
on
al
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n.
M
ax
im
um
em
iss
io
n
(a
nd
im
iss
io
n?
)
va
lu
es
In
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
ll
eg
isl
at
io
n,
a
se
t
of
va
lu
es
fix
ed
by
la
w
,a
bo
ve
w
hi
ch
em
iss
io
ns
an
d
im
iss
io
ns
ar
e
pr
oh
ib
-
ite
d
an
d
ac
tio
n
m
us
t
be
ta
ke
n
(V
B
B
oa
,A
ltV
b )
.T
he
re
gu
la
te
d
do
m
ai
ns
ar
e,
fo
r
ex
am
pl
e,
no
ise
,s
oi
l(
e.
g.
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
,c
on
ta
m
in
at
ed
sit
es
..
.)
,a
ir
an
d
w
at
er
(e
.g
.
flo
w
ra
te
s
of
riv
er
s)
.
Pr
es
er
va
tio
n
of
ec
ol
og
ic
al
va
lu
e.
C
an
to
na
ls
ca
le
.
Ta
bl
e
2.
7:
Po
lic
y
de
sig
n
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
of
th
e
re
so
ur
ce
so
il.
a S
R
81
4.
12
.
b 8
14
.6
80
.
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T
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N
am
e
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
R
ed
is
tr
ib
ut
iv
e
ca
pa
ci
ty
Sc
al
e
of
ac
ti
on
Vo
lu
nt
ar
y
Se
lf-
co
nt
ro
lo
fp
ro
du
ce
rs
In
re
ga
rd
to
ch
em
ic
al
an
d
da
ng
er
ou
s
su
bs
ta
nc
es
,f
ed
-
er
al
la
w
pl
an
s
a
se
lf-
co
nt
ro
lo
fp
ro
du
ce
rs
an
d
im
po
rt
-
er
s
(a
rt
.
26
U
SG
)
in
or
de
r
to
pr
ev
en
t
th
e
ci
rc
ul
at
io
n
of
su
bs
ta
nc
es
th
at
en
da
ng
er
hu
m
an
s
or
th
e
en
vi
ro
n-
m
en
t
w
he
n
us
ed
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
in
st
ru
ct
io
ns
(K
no
ep
fe
l
an
d
N
ah
ra
th
,2
01
4,
75
4)
.
Pr
ev
en
tio
n
of
lo
ss
of
ec
ol
o-
gi
ca
lv
al
ue
de
pe
nd
in
g
on
th
e
go
od
w
ill
of
th
e
ta
rg
et
gr
ou
p.
Fe
de
ra
ls
ca
le
.
Ec
on
om
ic
an
d
fis
ca
l
W
ea
lth
ta
x
(a
rt
.
13
St
H
G
,a
rt
.
46
an
d
65
St
G
,a
rt
.
59
LI
)
La
nd
pr
op
er
ty
an
d
an
y
ki
nd
of
w
ea
lth
w
ho
se
va
lu
e
ex
ce
ed
s
97
,0
00
fr
an
cs
is
ta
xe
d
up
to
1.
35
%
in
th
e
C
an
to
n
of
B
er
ne
an
d
up
to
3.
15
%
if
it
ex
ce
ed
s
50
,0
00
fr
an
cs
in
Va
ud
.
La
nd
m
ai
nt
en
an
ce
co
st
an
d
de
bt
in
-
te
re
st
is
de
du
ct
ed
.
T
he
va
lu
e
of
re
fe
re
nc
e
is
th
e
offi
-
ci
al
va
lu
e
se
t
by
th
e
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n.
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
hi
gh
,b
ut
in
to
da
y’
s
se
tt
in
g,
it
m
ix
es
th
e
va
lu
e
of
la
nd
w
ith
ot
he
r
va
l-
ue
s,
an
d
th
e
co
lle
ct
ed
ga
in
s
ar
e
no
t
di
re
ct
ly
lin
ke
d
w
ith
a
di
st
rib
ut
iv
e
co
un
te
rp
ar
t.
Fe
de
ra
lo
bl
ig
at
io
n.
C
an
to
na
l
de
fin
iti
on
an
d
co
lle
ct
io
n.
R
ea
le
st
at
e
ga
in
s
ta
x
(a
rt
.
12
St
H
G
,a
rt
.
12
6
St
G
ar
t.
61
LI
)
Ta
x
on
th
e
re
ve
nu
es
ge
ne
ra
te
d
fr
om
th
e
ac
qu
isi
tio
n
an
d
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
sa
le
of
an
im
m
ov
ab
le
pr
op
er
ty
.
A
c-
co
rd
in
g
to
fe
de
ra
ll
aw
(a
rt
.
12
St
H
G
),
th
e
su
m
co
n-
sid
er
ed
fo
r
ta
xa
tio
n
is
th
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
be
tw
ee
n
th
e
ac
-
qu
isi
tio
n
an
d
sa
le
pr
ic
es
of
a
pl
ot
.
Va
lu
e
ad
di
ng
di
s-
bu
rs
em
en
ts
m
ad
e
by
th
e
ow
ne
r
ar
e
su
bt
ra
ct
ed
fr
om
th
e
ta
xe
d
am
ou
nt
(L
an
ge
ne
gg
er
,2
00
2,
18
5ff
)a
.
N
ot
di
re
ct
ly
lin
ke
d
w
ith
a
la
nd
va
lu
e
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
pr
o-
ce
ss
.
Fe
de
ra
lo
bl
ig
at
io
n.
C
an
to
na
l
de
fin
iti
on
an
d
co
lle
ct
io
n,
di
s-
tr
ib
ut
io
n
of
in
co
m
e
be
tw
ee
n
ca
nt
on
an
d
co
m
m
un
e.
La
nd
pr
op
er
ty
in
co
m
e
ta
x
(a
rt
.
25
St
G
)
Ta
x
on
th
e
re
ve
nu
es
ge
ne
ra
te
d
by
la
nd
pr
op
er
ty
.
Ta
xe
d
to
ge
th
er
w
ith
re
gu
la
r
re
ve
nu
es
.
N
ot
di
re
ct
ly
lin
ke
d
w
ith
la
nd
va
lu
e
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
pr
oc
es
s.
C
an
to
na
ls
ca
le
,d
ist
rib
ut
io
n
of
ga
in
s
be
tw
ee
n
ca
nt
on
an
d
co
m
m
un
e.
La
nd
va
lu
e
ta
x
(a
rt
.
25
8
St
G
,a
rt
.
19
LC
o)
Ye
ar
ly
ta
x
on
offi
ci
al
la
nd
va
lu
e
lim
ite
d
by
ca
nt
on
al
la
w
s
to
1.
5%
.
It
is
co
lle
ct
ed
at
th
e
en
d
of
ea
ch
ye
ar
on
th
e
offi
ci
al
va
lu
e
of
th
e
pr
op
er
ty
.
D
eb
ts
ar
e
no
t
su
bt
ra
ct
ed
fr
om
th
e
va
lu
e
of
th
e
pr
op
er
ty
b .
Po
te
nt
ia
lly
hi
gh
,b
ut
in
to
da
y’
s
se
tt
in
g,
it
ta
xe
s
a
lim
ite
d
am
ou
nt
of
va
lu
e
an
d
th
e
co
lle
ct
ed
ga
in
s
ar
e
no
t
di
re
ct
ly
lin
ke
d
w
ith
a
di
s-
tr
ib
ut
iv
e
co
un
te
rp
ar
t.
C
om
m
un
al
sc
al
e.
Ta
bl
e
2.
8:
Po
lic
y
de
sig
n
in
st
ru
m
en
ts
of
th
e
re
so
ur
ce
so
il.
a F
ed
er
al
la
w
al
so
ob
lig
es
th
e
ca
nt
on
s
to
ta
x
hi
gh
er
sh
or
t-
te
rm
ga
in
s
(a
rt
.
12
St
H
G
).
B
er
ne
se
ta
x
la
w
(a
rt
.
12
6ff
St
G
)
fo
re
se
es
a
m
ax
im
um
ta
x
ra
te
of
8.
1%
.
T
hi
s
ra
te
is
in
cr
ea
se
d
du
ri
ng
th
e
fir
st
fiv
e
ye
ar
s
of
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
by
10
%
to
70
%
.
T
he
ta
x
pr
od
uc
t
is
th
en
di
vi
de
d
be
tw
ee
n
ca
nt
on
(7
0%
)
an
d
co
m
m
un
e
(3
0%
).
In
th
e
ca
nt
on
of
Va
ud
,t
he
ta
x
ra
te
is
de
gr
es
si
ve
,s
ta
rt
in
g
at
30
%
fo
r
le
ss
th
an
on
e
ye
ar
of
ow
ne
rs
hi
p
un
to
7%
fo
r
24
ye
ar
s
or
m
or
e
of
ow
ne
rs
hi
p.
T
he
ye
ar
s
du
ri
ng
w
hi
ch
th
e
ow
ne
r
re
si
de
s
at
th
ei
r
pr
op
er
ty
co
un
t
do
ub
le
.
b I
t
is
se
t
ev
er
y
ye
ar
to
ge
th
er
w
ith
th
e
ap
pr
ov
al
of
th
e
co
m
m
un
al
bu
dg
et
.
A
cc
or
di
ng
to
th
e
la
w
,b
ui
ld
in
g
la
nd
is
ta
xe
d
at
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e.
H
ow
ev
er
,a
s
m
en
tio
ne
d
in
1.
2.
2,
th
e
ov
er
al
lt
ax
at
io
n
le
ve
l
is
be
lo
w
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e.
Fu
rt
he
rm
or
e,
la
nd
in
pu
bl
ic
ow
ne
rs
hi
p,
as
w
el
la
s
la
nd
be
lo
ng
in
g
to
a
fa
rm
or
co
nt
ri
bu
tin
g
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
to
th
e
fa
rm
er
’s
or
le
as
eh
ol
de
r’
s
in
co
m
e,
is
ta
xe
d
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
its
ca
pi
ta
lis
ed
in
co
m
e
va
lu
e.
T
hi
s
ta
xa
tio
n
po
lic
y
do
es
no
t
ap
pl
y
if
th
e
la
nd
is
so
ld
(a
rt
.
58
St
G
).
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Policy design
T
yp
e
N
am
e
D
es
cr
ip
ti
on
R
ed
is
tr
ib
ut
iv
e
ca
pa
ci
ty
Sc
al
e
of
im
pl
em
en
ta
-
ti
on
/a
ut
ho
ri
ty
in
ch
ar
ge
ta
x
on
ad
de
d
la
nd
va
lu
e
cr
ea
te
d
by
zo
ni
ng
(a
rt
.
5
R
PG
,1
42
St
G
)
Ta
x
le
vy
in
g
be
tw
ee
n
20
%
an
d
up
to
60
%
of
th
e
fin
-
an
ci
al
ad
va
nt
ag
es
co
nc
ed
ed
to
la
nd
ow
ne
rs
th
ro
ug
h
zo
ni
ng
op
er
at
io
ns
.
T
he
su
m
co
ns
id
er
ed
fo
r
ta
xa
tio
n
co
rr
es
po
nd
s
to
th
e
di
ffe
re
nc
e
of
la
nd
va
lu
e
be
fo
re
an
d
af
te
r
th
e
zo
ni
ng
op
er
at
io
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Policy design
Implementation of the tax on added land value created by zoning in the
canton of Berne
Currently, in the Canton of Berne, the collection of the tax on added land value Collection method and
communal sharecreated by zoning is regulated by tax law (art. 142 StG), and operates through the
collection of the real estate gains tax: the tax on added land value created by zoning
is deducted from what is collected through the real estate gains tax. This means that
for the commune, the collection of the tax on added land value created by zoning is
not an entirely new income: only the extra amount of money that would not have
been collected through the real estate gains tax is new income. 30% of the real estate
gains tax income is allocated to the commune, 70% to the canton.
With the revision of the federal spatial planning act, the cantonal calculation Modification of the
calculation methodmethod is slightly modified: the tax on added land value created by zoning is now
separated from the real estate gains tax. This increases communal income, because
the tax on added land value created by zoning is now collected systematically and
because the communes now accumulate gains from the collection of the tax on added
land value created by zoning and the real estate tax. Overall gains from the real
estate tax are reduced, because the taxable gains are less. This can be explained by
the fact that a part of these gains are collected through the tax on added land value
created by zoning. Thus, cantonal income from the real estate gains tax is slightly
reduced18. The end result is overall higher taxation for the landowner.
The tax generally operates through its implementation in communal building reg-
ulations, may mention a taxation percentage, and takes effect through a plot-specific
contract (Infrastrukturvertrag) between commune and landowner before the zoning
operation. This contract states that the owner returns a part of the added value
created by the zoning operation to the commune.
Figure 2.3: Old and new calculation method of the tax on added land value created by
zoning in the Canton of Berne. Adapted from FIN (2013). N.B.: indicated proportions are
for illustrative purposes only.
Weaknesses of current collection method
However, the case studies analysis (3.2.4, 3.3.4, 3.4.4) shows that the current im- Reduced tax amount
plementation of the tax on added land value created by zoning has a number of
weaknesses. First, the taxed amount is negotiated rather freely: for the communes
which do not establish a fixed taxation percentage in their building regulations, the
amount of collected tax relies entirely on private negotiations between the communal
executive and the concerned landowner. For the communes which do have a fixed
taxation percentage in their building regulations, the land prices on which the calcu-
lation of the tax relies do not necessarily reflect market value, and tend to minimize
the amount of money taxed.
Second, the collection time of the tax depends on the contract’s content. Thus, the Delayed payment
18A proposition from the cantonal fiscal administration foresees attributing 10% of the gains from
the tax on added land value created by zoning to the canton in order to compensate the loss from
the real estate gains tax.
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tax on added land value created by zoning does not stand for a guarantee that zoned
land is effectively developed or sold. Empirical research shows that this incentive
is given by an emption right included in the contract (see 3.2.4). This difficulty
might persist with the new cantonal construction act, in that article 142b nBauG still
foresees a payment due when the plot is developed or sold.
Third, as other costs (such as equipment costs and other fees) also partially rest
on the landowner, observed practices show that communes tend to sign one contract
consisting of the different costs, fees and taxes, and thus diluting the amount owed
(see 3.3.4).
As figure 2.4 shows, the implementation of the communal tax on added land valueLimited implementation
until today created by zoning in Oberaargau is partial: out of 47 communes, 18 have a legal
disposition in their building regulations mentioning the potential use of the tax on
added land value created by zoning when conceding advantages to landowners through
zoning operations. For two communes, the building regulations could not be found.
As these are small communes, it is probable that their building regulations are similar
to the model of regulation proposed by the canton. This model does not regulate the
tax on added land value created by zoning. For the communes that have implemented
the tax on added land value created by zoning, the date of implementation dates back
to the last revision of their building regulations (after 2000).
As figure 2.4 shows, there is a tendency for communes with oversized buildingUse of tax as reaction to
zoning implementation
deficits
zones to implement the tax on added land value created by zoning. Communes with
highly oversized building zones such as Niederbipp, Thunstetten, Seeberg, Walterswil
and Wyssachen have implemented it, and only the small communes of Walliswil bei
Niederbipp, Reisiswil and Hermiswil have not. However, because the date of imple-
mentation was less than 15 years ago, and the oversized building zones date back
to before this period19, one can assert that the tax on added land value created by
zoning has been implemented as a reaction to building zone problems, namely their
oversize and/or their availability. In fact, as the cantonal authority blocks new zon-
ing processes20, the communes must either develop existing ones or relocate them to
places where future development is desired. Yet the communal will to extend the
existing building zone is not given as such; rather, it is linked to internal politics and
the will of certain landowners to locate their plot(s) in the building zone.
Further, one can see that the instrument’s implementation is at least partly loc-Anticipation of or
reaction to development? alised: most of the communes from the Bipperamt – from Wangen an der Aare to
Niederbipp – have implemented it, as well as the southern communes of Walterwil,
Huttwil, Wyssachen and Eriswil. This phenomenon can be linked to different factors,
such as the similarity of the problems experienced by geographically close communes.
As an example, the Bipperamt, in particular its eastern part, experienced rather
strong economic and demographic growth over the last decade. The "development
pressure"21 coming from the east, the favorable housing criteria, and the flat and
easily developable agricultural land speak in favor of an anticipation of or reaction to
land use change. Further, the intercommunal cooperation through the inter-cantonal
regional plan, even if not formalised until recently, supports an enhanced commu-
nication or exchange between the authorities of these communes. In the southern
communes, the situation is linked to financial constraints, as the fiscal analysis (fig-
ures 1.11, 1.12 and 1.13) and the case study 3.3 show.
An additional element worth mentioning, is the absence of a formal implement-Diversion of the tax on
added land value created
by zoning
ation of the tax on added land value created by zoning in the two main regional
cities, Herzogenbuchsee and Langenthal. The communes’ building regulations do not
mention this; nevertheless, protocols of the communes’ respective authorities mention
negotiation with landowners during recent zoning procedures (Commune of Herzo-
genbuchsee, 2014; Commune of Langenthal, 2013). These communes use it to ensure
the payment of land service and infrastructure by the landowners benefiting from
the zoning operations. Yet, they proceed without its formal implementation in the
building regulations.
19As shown in chapter 3, major zoning operations in the three studied communes date back to the
1970s and 1980s. As the cantonal formula for the dimensions of building zones (see 2.2.5) became
highly precise in the 2000s, the hypothesis that the oversized building zones existed before the years
2000 is highly probable.
20The canton’s veto position is confirmed by the case studies analysed in chapter 3.
21R. Wyss, heritage and landscape activist, interviewed in Attiswil the 26 March 2014.
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Figure 2.4: Communes with oversized building zones (living and mixed zone) and imple-
mentation status of the tax on added land value created by zoning in Oberaargau. Data:
Communal building regulations. Map: BFS (2014b).
If one compares with the situation in other cantons, the example of Wohlenschwil An underused margin of
maneuverability?in the Canton of Aargau has shown (Metropolitankonferenz Zürich, 2013, 158) that
the communal implementation of the contractual tax on added land value created
by zoning does not require a cantonal legal basis. Consequently, the existence of
an instrument on the federal level does not require both cantonal and communal
implementation in order to be used. If I compare with the tax on secondary homes,
the commune of Silvaplana has shown that an instrument does not even require a
formal legal basis at all in order to be used. Its contribution to the fulfilment of
overarching land use planning objectives is sufficient for validation by the court (Swiss
Federal Tribunal, 2014). This brief analysis shows that the potential in terms of
regulation and, particularly, the definition of financial incentives is not widely used for
the steering of the target group’s behaviour. In order to grasp plausible explanations,
chapter 3 studies, in detail, the land use planning policy in three case studies.
2.2.3 Procedural elements
Cantonal approval procedure
Since 1997, the cantonal authority (AGR) has verified the legality – their conformity Cantonal involvement in
communal land use
planning bound to legal
review
to superior law – of building regulations and plans, and offered counselling22. In case
of opposition to the planning documents, the office has proceeded to an opportunity
check, where it has verified the purposefulness and suitability of plans, and building
regulations in order to achieve the desired land use planning objectives. However, the
underlying modifications fall under the responsibility of the commune (JGK, 1997).
With this reform, cantonal subvention to communal planning was abolished. As a
consequence, the communes have a wider decisional autonomy, because the cantonal
control excludes an opportunity check of communal building regulations23. Further,
the communes also have higher expenses, and are thus more subject to pressure from
landowners24. In case of non-compliance to superior law, the canton can act as a
22 Art. 61 al. 1 BauG, SR-BE 721.0 and art. 118 of the Bauverordnung vom 6. März 1985, SR-BE
721.1.
23Until 1997, the cantonal authority proceeded to an opportunity check during the preliminary
exam of the planning documents. In the past, the cantonal office discussed (with the commune
and their planner) the location and density of building zones, whereas today it only checks for legal
compatibility.
24According to C. Schneider, planning advisor for the commune of Huttwil, interviewed 16.09.2014.
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substitute for the commune’s authority and execute plan modifications25.
The current approval or revision procedure for communal building regulations is
as follows (AGR, 2014):
1. The commune identifies the need for planning/regulation;
2. It clarifies the project to be realised, based on a pre-inquiry addressed to the
cantonal office;
3. It sets planning objectives and contracts a planner to realize the project;
4. It leads the planning process, balancing the parties’ interests;
5. The results of analysis (plans, regulations, reports) are opened up for particip-
ation;
6. The results are submitted to the canton for a preliminary exam;
7. After negotiation with the Canton, modifications are made by the planner and
the commune, and the project is opened up to public opposition;
8. Building regulations are approved by the communal authorities with justification
for the inhabitants’ oppositions that are not considered;
9. It is submitted to the canton for approval;
10. Opponents whose opposition has been rejected can appeal against the cantonal
authority’s decision to approve the building regulations.
Communal rights of appeal
Communes are allowed to appeal against the cantonal structure plan within a limitedAppeal against cantonal
structure plan time period. Because the canton is given, by federal law, the duty to establish a
structure plan (binding for all authorities), the communes have, in case they appeal a
decision, to justify how the cantonal structure plan arbitrarily and intolerably neglects
their land use planning competency (Kuttler, 1992, 51).
Communes can also appeal against the zoning plan of a neighbour commune byAppeal against plans
from other communes showing that during the approval procedure, the canton did not sufficiently take into
account the consequences of the zoning plan in the neighbour commune, infringing in
an inadmissible way the appealing commune’s planning competency. This shows the
limits of communal autonomy which are dictated by the obligation to collaborate and
coordinate in matters of land use planning (Kuttler, 1992, 52).
Finallyt, they can appeal the cantonal rejection of their building regulations orAppeal against decisions
of the Directorate other cantonal decisions at the legal office of the JGK directorate26.
Right of opposition of environmental protection organisations
Based on environmental legislation, environmental protection organisations active for
more than ten years at the national level, and pursuing strict ideological objectives,
can oppose planning decisions and the delivery of permits for which an environmental
impact assessment is mandatory27. This right has been used with success for example
in order to implement remediation obligations (Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015).
Individual rights of appeal
The legal procedure states that authorities must allow popular participation in plan-Public involvement
ning matters at an early stage28. This can happen, for example, through discussion
during the communal assembly and/or through public access to documents during at
least 30 days for a local development plan or building regulations29. Results from the
consultation are public and should be transmitted to the decisional authority.
Oppositions to planning documents must be provided in written form along withCantonal opposition
procedure
25Art. 65 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
26Art. 40 VRPG, SR 700.1 and art. 61a BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
27Art. 55 EPA, SR 814.0
28Art. 58 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
29Art. 60a and 95 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
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evidence30. These appeals can be made by directly affected individuals who have
an individual interest deemed worthy of protection. The authorities protecting the
public interest are in charge of non-profit legal entities whose statutory aims, during
the prior ten years, addressed matters of land use planning or environmental protec-
tion31. The cantonal authority is in charge of deciding on these oppositions during
the approval procedure of planning documents32. Individuals and organisations which
have provided an opposition in front of the commune, local authorities and regional
authorities can oppose the canton’s approval decision. This suspends the application
of the legal dispositions until the legal office of the JGK directorate rules on the
matter33. Further appeals are addressed to the cantonal administrative tribunal34.
Oppositions in regard to land service are to dealt by the prefect35; appeal court is the
cantonal administrative tribunal36.
2.2.4 Political administrative arrangement
P. Knoepfel et al. (2011, 159) define the political-administrative arrangement as "the
competent authorities and administrative services (public actors) as well as all of the
other institutional rules specific to the implementation of a policy. In addition, they
provide some of the (categories of) resources necessary for these new activities [and]
identify other administrative bodies that will be involved eventually or consulted".
On the federal level, the arrangement is composed of the federal spatial planning Approval of cantonal
structure plans by the
federal executive
office, which supports and advises each canton in the elaboration and adaptation of
the cantonal structure plan37. The office also leads the verification procedure and
writes the examination report38. The plan is approved by the Federal Council at
the request of the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and
Communications DETEC39.
The cantonal structure plan is developed by the Justiz-, Gemeinde- und Kirchen- Cantonal structure plan
elaborated by the
cantonal executive
direktion JGK40, which hosts the cantonal planning office, and by the Cantonal Coun-
cil in the canton of Vaud41. Even though not mentioned as such in the laws, technical
development is, in both cases, most probably done by the respective cantonal office
in charge of land use planning, which is the Amt für Gemeinden und Raumordnung
(AGR) in the canton of Berne and the service du développement territorial (SDT) in
the canton of Vaud.
The respective Directorate of each canton is responsible for the preliminary exam Approval of regional and
communal building
regulations
and the approval of regional and communal structure plans and building regulations.
In the canton of Berne, is the section Communal and regional planning of the
The cantonal spatial
planning officeCantonal planning Office, in charge of checking the legal conformity of communal
building regulations and approving them. The section is composed of urban planners
and legal advisers, each group in charge of approximately 40 to 50 communes. As
the authority’s competence is limited (since 1997) to a legality check of the build-
ing regulations42, its control on the commune’s activity is limited to formal aspects:
calculation of building zone reserves, use of the correct legal terms in the building reg-
ulations and compatibility issues with the cantonal structure plan. It does not take a
position on the location of a zone, the type of construction it hosts or the relevance (or
lack of) of the content of the building regulations. Further, it is in charge of gathering
the positions and potential oppositions of all cantonal offices included by law in the
revision process of communal building regulations (e.g. Office of economic promotion,
waste and water Office, forest Office, agricultural Office, archaeology Office. . . ).
As mentioned in 1.2.4, the commune is the central authority implementing land The communal
representative
30Art. 60 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
31Art. 35ff BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
32Art. 61 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
33Art. 61a BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
34Art. 61b BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
35Art. 113 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
36Art. 114-1 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
37Art. 9 RPV, SR 700.1.
38Art. 10 RPV, SR 700.1
39Art. 11 RPG, SR 700.
40Art. 104 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
41Art. 9 LATC, SR-VD 711.
42With the exception of cases of formal opposition against revised building regulations or local
development plans where the canton may still formulate remarks on the content of the regulation.
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use planning policy in the canton of Berne. The communes chosen are of average size,
i.e. between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Within the elected communal executive
body (Gemeinderat), there is at most, the president and one other person in charge
of land use planning. Depending on the commune, the communal executive boy is
not necessarily the leading force behind the conduct of the policy. The head of ad-
ministration (Gemeindeschreiber or Gemeindeverwalter) can also have a key position
in conducting land use planning policy, as they have a better knowledge of the com-
mune’s spatial planning activities. Administrative staff does not always have planning
abilities43 and essentially deals with construction matters and building permits44.
The urban planner is contracted by the commune to elaborate and revise its build-The urban planner
ing regulations, which essentially consists of:
− construction prescriptions (Baureglement) for each zone (use, density, type of
constructions), spacing between buildings, aesthetic aspects (type of roof, ap-
pearance. . . ) and other obligations or restrictions;
− a zoning plan where each plot or part of plot is attributed to a zone defined in
the building regulations.
The contracted planner counsels the commune on spatial planning matters and
often remains associated with it over a longer period of time – those contracted by
the communes considered in this research have been working with the commune for
more than ten years. Moreover, they have mainly a regional working area, and thus
inside knowledge of surrounding communes and the overall problems and constraints
they face. They also help the commune to meet legal requirements of the Canton.
In case of appeal against a decision of the cantonal planning office (e.g. decisionThe cantonal Directorate
concerning the rejection of opposition against communal building regulations), the
first instance dealing with the matter is the legal Office of the JGK Directorate. It is
the direct supervisor of the spatial planning Office.
2.2.5 Action plans
Action plans consist of all decisions considered as necessary in order to produce co-Definition
ordinated and targeted outputs (Knoepfel et al., 2011). They are characterised by
five criteria:
1. explicitness;
2. degree of aperture;
3. discriminativeness;
4. restructuration/reformulation of the political administrative arrangement;
5. distribution of resources.
On federal level, the new technical directives on building zones (ARE, 2014) con-Cantonal building zone
use coefficient cern housing, mixed and central zones, and require the calculation of a cantonal
soil-use coefficient, i.e. (the ratio between the sum of communal building zone capa-
cities on one hand and demographic and jobs forecasts on the other hand). This ratio
corresponds to a maximum surface use per person, or job45 calculated for each type
of commune according to the BFS classification (Flückiger, 2014); the demographic
and jobs forecast can be based on the “high scenario” of the Federal statistical Office.
The forecast takes into consideration undeveloped plots as well as partially developed
plots.
In the Canton of Berne, the current structure plan sets a calculation methodCalculation of communal
housing needs for housing zone needs (A01 KRP). According to cantonal practitioners, the criteria
43Some interview requests with the administrative staff were redirected to the political leader,
because the staff was not involved in the revision of building regulations.
44Niederbipp and Huttwil have the full competency to deliver building permits, whereas Wiedlis-
bach only deals with small permits.
45art. 30a RPV, SR 700.1. This is equivalent to a minimum number of persons, or jobs, on a
determined surface (Flückiger, 2014, 46). Both the minimum number of person per surface and the
maximum surface use per individual are relative values. They are not fix the maximum surface of
constructible land is (Flückiger, 2014, 86).
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have gradually expanded. The following factors are taken into account in the current
calculation method: cantonal population forecast, evolution of home occupancy rate,
development bonus for regional or cantonal centres, evolution of average home size
in square meters, minimum density coefficient of new housing zone, percentage of
housing in regard to other uses (for mixed zones), minimal building zone needs and
percentage of population living outside the building zone.
The structure plan demands that the building zone capacity be calculated with a Minimum density
requirementsminimum density of 0.3 in rural communes and between 0.4 and 0.7 in more central
communes46.
Once the need for a new housing zone is given, its connection to public transport Connection to public
transporthas to be guaranteed47. The structure plan foresees that 80% of the newly zoned
area has to be connected to public transport, and areas bigger than one hectare have
the obligation to fulfill higher connection standards48. For housing zones located in a
cropland protection area, higher density and public transport connection are required
(A06 KRP).
Concerning the size of working zones, the structure plan does not foresee a specific Development of working
zonescalculation method. It distinguishes between local and regional zones defined by the
communes and cantonal main development areas. Strategic working zones are also
defined by the canton (A05 KRP). Zoning of local working zones (< 1 ha) does not
have to fulfill specific criteria, whereas zoning operations bigger than one hectare have
to be connected to public transport. For the cantonal main development areas, those
focused on services (e.g. commercial centres) have to fulfil higher standards in terms
of public transport connection than those only hosting jobs49.
Regional action plans are derived from the cantonal structure plan (A05 KRP) Regional action plans
based on cantonal
structure plan
and deal mainly with the creation (zoning, equipment and connection to public trans-
port, availability of land) of priority development areas, public buildings and shooting
ranges, industrial zones and quarries, landscape and nature protection and the equip-
ment of recreational areas. The priority development areas are subject to specific
cantonal or regional development plans and their respective development status is
updated in regular control reports. These plans contain specific measures in terms
of service, connection to infrastructure, transit regulation and air quality. The main
objective is the spatial concentration of land uses generating important traffic. The
Gesamtstudie Wangen an der Aare – Oensingen is part of a development area. As
mentioned before (1.2.4), the document has not yet been approved by the concerned
communes nor published by authorities.
On the communal level,, the communal structure plan50 determines the future Communal structure plan
parts of the communal territory that should be developed or subject to zoning changes
and consequent land use modifications. Communal authorities use this as a guideline
for the subsequent zoning plan revision. Its binding character is not applicable to the
target groups.
2.3 Synthesis
The previous sections on property rights and the policy design have exposed the
institutional framework which steers land use in the two studied cantons, and in
Switzerland as a whole. Within a regime where land is private property, the target
group addressed by public regulations are the landowners (2.2.1). The use of their
property has to follow the central land use planning policy objective of an economic
and appropriate use of soil (2.2.2). To achieve this aim, public authorities have a
range of private law and public law instruments which cover wide areas and act as
means of intervention. Yet, the brief presentation of these instruments shows that
only few links leading to a redistributive process exist between them. Notably, the
main instrument aimed at the fulfilment of this task – the tax on added land value
created by zoning – does not seem to have been used for this purpose (2.2.2 and 3.2.4).
The regional analysis conducted in this chapter has provided a rough overview
of land use planning policy and land use changes in Oberaargau. But a detailed
46A density of 0.3 means that for a plot of 1,000m2, 300 m2 of gross floor area have to be built.
47Art. 74 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
48Minimal connection requirements defined in measure B10 of the cantonal structure plan.
49Art. 26 BauV, SR-BE 721.1.
50Art. 68 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
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knowledge of the policy instruments’ implementation processes and the effects they
have on landowners is omitted . Most policy instruments affect the distribution and
withdrawal of economic and ecological value, but it has yet to be determined exactly
how they do this, and how the concerned actors react to it. These are elements that
chapter 3 deals with.
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Case studies
The two previous chapters provided a general regional overview of land use changes in
Oberaargau, and detailed the existing policy design and property rights (institutional
regime) regarding soil, and focussed, necessarily, on policy instruments. The present
chapter focusses on the local (communal) level and on the interactions that take place
between political-administrative authorities and the land use planning and land use
policies’ target group.
The objectives of this chapter are threefold. First, the aim is to show how the cre- Case studies’ objectives
ation of added and reduced economic and ecological values occur in empirical land use
planning processes and their subsequent impacts on land use value creation processes.
Secondly, to understand and explain actors’ formal and informal instrument imple-
mentation strategies and arrangements in regard to redistribution issues. Thirdly, the
results from these analyses are meant to help us qualify the redistributive capacity
of the Swiss institutional resource regime of soil between 1990 and 2014. In order
to reach these objectives, I analyze three case studies with important and specific
redistributive challenges:
1. A building zone transfer in Wiedlisbach in section 3.2;
2. Oversized building zones in Huttwil in section 3.3;
3. The reuse of polluted soil in Niederbipp in section 3.4.
The three selected cases are located in the peri-urban region of Oberaargau (see Three peri-urban cases
figure 3.1). Wiedlisbach (1) and Niederbipp (3) are two communes located at the
bottom of the Jura in what is referred to as “Bipperamt.” These communes are on
the east-west axis of the Swiss Mittelland, and are well-connected to transport infra-
structure. Huttwil (2) is located in a hilly landscape, and is more remote than the
two other case studies.
3.1 Methodology
3.1.1 Case studies’ selection criteria
In accordance with the research group, case studies are defined as narrow perimeters
within the case study which demonstrate localized land use and land use planning
issues characteristic of the studied region, in addition to effective use of policy in-
struments. These areas may occupy a single, or several locations, depending on the
redistributive issue at stake. The following criteria have been used for selecting the
case studies for analysis:
1. Important changes in land use planning;
2. Presence of oversized building zones;
3. Different property rights settings;
4. Major land use changes;
5. Important issues around ecological and economic added/reduced value;
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Figure 3.1: Regional overview map highlighting the three selected case studies. Map: Swis-
stopo (2014a).
6. Presence of conflicts;
7. Evaluation of local redistributive arrangement (use of an instrument).
All three selected case studies face redistributive challenges common to Swiss
peri-urban areas: low density development and urban sprawl (Perregaux Dupasquier,
2013), oversized non-serviced building zone (specifically, its removal from the building
zone (Kissling, 2014; Jeannerat and Bühlmann, 2008) and the financial risks that
accompany the withdrawal of rights), (Bühlmann and Jäger, 2010; Jäger, 2006), and
the unavailability of building land (Bühlmann and Perregaux Dupasquier, 2013), and
the unadapted choices of location (Griffel, 2006). Some of the challenges faced by these
case studies are also common to general Swiss land-use planning issues: the lack of
communal funds in order to service building land (Bühlmann, 2007), regional planning
matters, such as planning coordination and the imposition of binding measures to the
communes (Perregaux Dupasquier, 2013; Inderbitzin, 2003; Bühlmann, 2002), but
also the reuse of polluted soils (FOEN, 2015).
3.1.2 Documental research
For each of the case studies selected, the initial step is to review all documents sub-
mitted by the commune to the cantonal authority for approval during the last 25-30
years. These documents relate to the preliminary exam, the final approval and the
approval ordinance. Among these:
− building regulations (structure plans, construction regulations, zoning plans,
landscape and nature protection plans, land service plans);
− (preliminary) reports on past and future communal development;
− reports on new building regulations explaining the changes in context and how
the revised regulations are tackling these changes;
− relevant protocols of the communal executive body and communal legislative
body;
− oppositions raised by landowners, organizations and other permitted persons;
protocols of negotiations (if available);
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− cantonal planning office reports, and other offices involved in the approval pro-
cedure;
− written and oral correspondence between canton, commune, urban planner and
other actors;
− report on public consultation procedure;
− approval documents such as approval decisions or decrees of the cantonal au-
thority, final building regulations;
− potential oppositions and appeals against communal and cantonal decisions.
The analysis of this data gives an overview of the zoning evolution and instrument
implementation in the commune as well as the main reasons behind the changes
over the time period considered. It also reveals part of the target group’s and third
parties’ preferences and strategies (legal remedies used, type and intensity of conflict,
negotiated elements, etc.).
In order to retrace the evolution of construction, I relied on the "travel through
time" function that the federal office of topography provides on its website1. The
maps are elaborated in time intervals of 6 to 10 years at a scale of 1:25,000, which
allows us to trace back through the construction of all new individual buildings since
the end of the 19thth century.
3.1.3 Interviews
The second step consists in conducting a series of interviews with persons involved
directly in the planning process, as well as third parties and other stakeholders. These
persons provide complementary information to the administrative documents and of-
fer different viewpoints inside and outside of the political-administrative arrangement.
Interviewed persons are principally:
− the planner contracted by the commune for establishing the local development
plans and revising the building regulations;
− the political head of the commune and/or the communal administrator in charge
of construction matters or general administration of commune;
− the cantonal planner responsible for approving the communal land use planning
policy and her/his co-workers (legal officer, planner from the section dedicated
to cantonal or regional land use planning);
− other cantonal offices involved, the waste and water office (AWA) in the case of
Niederbipp;
− third parties, such as environmental organizations, landscape protection associ-
ations and journalists.
3.1.4 Cases’ structure
The analysis of the three cases is structured in five sections in order to facilitate
comparisons:
1. the first section consists of an analysis of land use planning and land use changes
on the communal level;
2. the second section offers a brief review of main contextual factors such as demo-
graphic evolution, economic and fiscal factors, and topographic and locational
elements;
3. the third section contains an analysis of legal constraints that have influenced
communal land use planning, actors’ strategies and effective land use;
1http://map.geo.admin.ch
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4. the fourth section analyses the specific instruments mobilised by actors, the
strategies actors have pursued, the means and resources they used and the
resulting decisional output;
5. the fifth section examines the impact of the use of instruments on value redis-
tribution.
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3.2 Transfer of building zone in Wiedlisbach
Located in the northern part of Oberaargau, called Bipperamt, Wiedlisbach is a small
Bernese commune delimited in the north by the Jura mountains, and the Canton of
Solothurn, and in the south by the Aare river. As shown by figure 3.2, the mountain-
ous northern part of the communal territory is covered with forest and grazing lands
and remains – with the exception of a hospice center and a farm – undeveloped. The
central part of the commune consists of agricultural land and settlement. A train line
connecting Solothurn to Niederbipp and Langenthal crosses the village. Three small
widely-piped brooks converge at the southern limit of the village. From there, the
waters flow towards the Moos, a flat land close to the Aare. The Moos is bisected
by the N1 motorway and a slip road, ( this slip road grants access to Attiswil, Wied-
lisbach and Oberbipp in the north and Wangen an der Aare and Herzogenbuchsee
in the south). An important part of the Moos is a military zone designated by the
Canton as a (future) strategic working zone. The communal territory also includes
a widely developed island on the Aare. The south-eastern part of the commune is
covered with forest, whereas the western part is primarily dedicated to agriculture.
This case study analysis of Wiedlisbach demonstrates how from the end of the
1970s on, the commune building zones were oversized and badly designed, which
contributed to a disorganised process of urbanisation. After a significant period of
demographic growth during the 1990s, the commune faced a sudden stagnation since
the 2000s. Currently in Wiedlisbach, building zone reserves are fragmented, and land
hoarding is a widespread phenomenon, effectively leaving very few plots available for
development. Wiedlisbach’s main land use planning challenge is to rationalise its
building zone through the mobilisation of existing development rights. The commune
uses an innovative "green zone" in order to temporarily suspend unused and hoarded
development rights, and shows communal creativity in the combined emplyoment of
existing land use planning instruments (i.e. building regulations, zoning, emption
right and contractual agreements).
3.2.1 Land use planning and land use changes
The last revision of Wiedlisbach’s building regulations (in 2013) introduced two main Conflictual revision
processtransformations which led to the emergence of conflicts (AGR, 2013b,a): the tem-
porary suspension of development rights for certain landowners and the planned ex-
tension of the housing zone in two potential locations. Both elements produced con-
troversy among the inhabitants and 34 oppositions were filed. The opponents feared
increased traffic, a obstructed views, and a cost increase born by a tight communal
budget(Commune of Wieblisbach, 2013; AGR, 2013a). Dozens of landowners refused
to allow (a portion of) their plots allocated to a green zone which would prohibit
development. This reaction led, in turn, the communal executive body to reduce the
number of plots affected by the temporary suspension of development rights and to
withdraw temporarily the two building zone extension projects. However, these were
inscribed into the non-binding communal structure plan. The revision process was
continued finally approved by the canton in 2013. In 2014, a partial revision was star-
ted in order to realise one of the planned building zone extension. It was submitted
to popular vote, and accepted by the inhabitants in June 2014.
One of the main reasons for selecting Wiedlisbach as a case study is the diversion Diversion of the
instrument "zoning"of the instrument zoning, transformed to meet the local challenges of unused building
zone reserves and land hoarding: a green zone was introduced during the 2013 revision
of the building regulations. This green zone temporarily suspended the development
right from an undeveloped or parttially plot located in the building zone. Then, the
reduced surface of building zone reserve was subtracted from the overall communal
building zone reserves, which, according to the cantonal authority, exceeded the upper
limit. This allowed to gain a margin of manoeuvre towards the canton in order to
create a new building zone in a future revision of building regulations.
In order to understand how the revision of a zoning plan created such a high level of
conflict and how the situation was finally resolved, it is necessary to trace the evolution
of land use and land use planning policy over the last decades. The following analysis
focuses on the core of Wiedlisbach’s village and excludes the previously mentioned
island and hospice center, as these areas were not affected by the issue of building
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Figure 3.2: Main neighborhoods of Wiedlisbach. Dot lines correspond to former ZPP peri-
meters.Yellow marked zones are farms; grey zones correspond to zones dedicated to public
use and green zones include forests, agricultural protected areas, and groups of trees, veget-
ation, or land temporarily excluded from the building zone. Map: Commune of Wiedlisbach
(2013).
zone transfer.
Figure 3.3 shows the described land use planning evolution from 1978 to 2013, the
state of land use before 1979, and its evolution from 1978 to 1987 and 1987 to 2011.
The years considered for tracing the evolution of land use were chosen according to
the Federal Office of Topography’s map actualisations, and as as a way to correlate
with zoning plan revisions. The fine dot line on the right side of figure 3.3 shows the
communal border between Wiedlisbach and Oberbipp. As one can observe, the two
settlements are nearly joined. The following paragraphs refer to the map in order to
describe land use planning and land use changes over time.
Major land use planning changes in 1979, and land use changes from 1979
to 1987/1989
The oldest available zoning plan dates back to 1979. Compared to established con-A sprawl that dates back
to the beginnings of land
use planning policy
struction, the zoning plan shows wide building zones (brown surfaces on the map)
with already scattered buildings. In fact, from the 1960s on, the settlement area ex-
tended significantly, and had already delineated some of the current limits between
developed and undeveloped land. Construction (dark grey on the map) is spread
along the roads and the railway lines, downhill and southwest from the core of the
village and uphill in the Gerzmatt. The working zones of Niderfeld and Einisbüel
were created during the development period of the 1960s.
Major land use planning changes in 1989, and land use changes from 1989
to 2013
With the zoning plan revision of 1989, three building zone reductions occurred simul-One zoning out decision
taneously (marked light purple and numbered "1" on figure 3.3). With the exception
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Year Land use planning changes Land use changes
1979 Revision of the building regulations and repeal of
the provisory protected areas established by emer-
gency federal decree in 1972 (AGR, 1979b)
Partial development
of Büelen and Nider-
feld
1989 Revision of the building regulations: reductions of
building zone (AGR, 1989)
Construction of the
bypass road, devel-
opment of Neumatt
and Riebeli, par-
tial development of
Büelen
1995 Extension of the southern working zone in Niderfeld Progressive develop-
ment of Niderfeld
2002 Partial revision of the building regulations: modi-
fication of the map of protected areas, modification
of the inventory of protected buildings, delegation
of small building permit authorizations to the ad-
ministrative and buildings commission (mentioned
in AGR (2013b)), approval of the local development
plan Stierenweid
Development of
Stierenweid in the
following years, par-
tial development of
Büelen
2010 Partial revision of the building regulations: imple-
mentation of the hazard map, adaptation of build-
ing regulations regarding the old town (mentioned
in AGR (2013b)
–
2011 Launch of the revision process of the building regu-
lations and zoning plan. Conflict over the creation
of a green zone and theextension of the building
zone
–
2013 Approval of the revised building regulations by the
canton: creation of the green zone, and temporary
suspension of development rights (AGR, 2013b).
Refusal by inhabitants and neighbours of two build-
ing zone extensions in December 2013.
–
2014 Partial revision of the building regulations and
zoning plan: adoption of one building zone exten-
sion (Gerzmatt). Approval by cantonal authority
blocked by federal moratorium in April of that year.
–
Table 3.1: Main land use planning changes in Wiedlisbach since 1979.
of the zoning outside of the Moosrain (southwards from town in the direction of the
motorway), the size of the building zone did not change substantially. According
to the scarce available data, 2, the success of law suits and potential compensation
were improbable. At the same time, on the western hillside in the upper Moos, in an
already partially-developed location, the commune zoned a patch of building zone.
However, the owner of two of the plots threatened to file for compensation if his
development rights were removed. The cantonal authority considered the communal
decision "not inadequate" (AGR, 1989, 4).
Additionally to the Moosrain, the cantonal authority suggested, during their pre- One compromise?
liminary exam, an additional building zone reduction in Stierenweid, located on the
hillside at the northern border of the settlement area. However, the plots located on
the west part of the zone (area that is developed today) were already serviced (AGR,
1988), only the eastern land stripe was taken out of the building zone3.
In addition to the building zone extensions, (marked light brown and numbered
"2" on figure 3.3), there are several "filling of gaps" within the existing building zone, a
small extension of the sports zone (up north along the forest) and a rather important
(approximately 2 ha) extension of the working zone east of Weiermatt.
2Archive documents (AGR, VVYY) the original developer wanted to build a giant complex in-
cluding: two 15 story towers, a dozen houses, several flats and around fifty single-family homes.
However, the area was minimally connected to roads, and entirely outside of the settlement area.
3As the recently developed area remaining in the building zone required the construction of an
access road, the communal decision was to zone only some of the plots. This decision does not
appear to have taken into account the eventuality of compensating the landowner for a withdrawal
of rights, but rather on a compromise negotiated to prevent opposition during the building zone
revision process.
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In terms of land use, the main changes up until 2011 (light grey on figure 3.3)
were: the construction of the village’s bypass road, the development of the housing
area Neumatt (at the junction of the piped brooks), the development of Büelen (in
the south western part of the settlement area), and the development of Stierenweid
(on the north-western hillside). All of this housing construction occurred in un-built
building zones.
Land use planning changes until 2013
With the last minor revision (1995) and the last major revision (2013) of buildingBuilding zone extensions
that match existing land
use. . .
regulations, a minor extension of the building zone is observable, (marked yellow and
numbered "3" on figure 3.3), but initiated in order to match retroactively the zoning
plan with pre-existing uses. The extension up north of Wiedlisbach at the limit of
the forest was for the sports zone, the extension of Stierenweid (on the hillside) was
due to the recently modified local development plan, and the extension at the western
settlement boundary extended the small, preexisting working zone. In 1995, another
important extension of the building zone occurred in Niderfeld, close to the motorway
( to host a garden centre and a swimming pool).
Of particular interest are the dark purple surfaces numbered "4" on figure 3.3:. . . and reduce building
zone reserves
− two of these purple surfaces correspond to effective zoning (and a return to
an agricultural zone): the slim purple rectangle under the Gerzmatt (north
east) and a smaller purple rectangle from Niderfeld (northwards), the major
industrial zone. Both occurred with consent by the owners and were meant to
reduce match zoning with effective land use and thus reduce "fictive" building
zone reserves;
− another dark purple area in the Neumatt, next to the brooks, is now zoned as
a park;
− all other dark purple areas were part of the building zone and not built on; they
are now, in accordance with the owners, designated part of the newly created
green zone.
One zoning "hole" (numbered "5" on figure 3.3) is present between Weiermatt and
the historical town centre: this plot was never put into the building zone and is now
part of the green zone.
The free plots (beige on the map) include only undeveloped plots (according to the
map elaborated by the communal planner and the commune, and submitted during
the building regulations revision procedure in 2013). All plots have been serviced and
are within the building zone. They do not include the potential for densification on
already developed plots.
Gab between zoning and actual land use
The comparison between actual constructions and zoning plans shows that as an in-
strument, zones which separate constructible area from non-constructible area works:
all construction dedicated to housing or working has been built in the building zone.
Further, one can infer an overall will to match zoning with effective land use. How-
ever, a deeper analysis of the 2013 situation is needed to more fully understand the
existing gap between zoning and actual land use.
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Progressive fill of the building zone
The cross time comparison shows that development mainly "filled the gaps" betweenDevelopment that fills
the gaps previously established settlement limits: land for housing developed during the last
35 years has remained in the building zone, or in other words, no major residential
zoning occurred during this period.
The spread of construction began before data on zoning is available. However, withUrban sprawl within the
building zone the revision of 1978, the new zoning plan drew a large line around existing construc-
tion, so that huge, oversized building zones were created, (sometimes even against
the landowners will)4 . During the 1980’s and 1990’s, only marginal building zone
reductions were made, and portions of the zoned plots were built without local regula-
tion exceeding the communal zoning prescriptions. The primary form of construction
was the single family home, (with exception of the Neumatt area where several three
floors buildings were erected). The working zone of Niderfeld also experienced strong
development over the last decades.
The remaining un-built portions of the building zone are strongly fragmented,Numerous un-built
surfaces and spread across the entire building zone. Un-built housing plots accounted for
5.7 hectares of the building zone in 20135. According to cantonal calculations, this
corresponds to the upper allowable limit (AGR, 2013a). As the map shows, these
plots are scattered across town6, some of them with unconventional shapes or limited
access hindering their full development. However, this concerns only a minority of
the plots.
The hoarding phenomenon can be explained by different factors. One landowner,Land scarcity as a main
reason for not building the Burgergemeinde, explicitly states their intentions to save land for future gener-
ations. More generally, the organisation conceives land as as a heritage, referred to
as Kulturgut (Burgergermeinde Wiedlisbach, 2014). These plots are located in the
middle of already developed plots, so they cannot be rezoned as agricultural. For the
Burgergemeinde, sale of land occurs in very few cases, the preferred disposal being
long term leasing through the attribution of building rights. During the information
session on new building regulations, inhabitants argued that they save land for future
generations; others consider it their personal retirement fund (Berner Zeitung, 2011).
A 1996 survey of these owners sought to determine whether owners building in-Hoarding behaviour
tentions (Commune of Wiedlisbach, 2011b, 50). A brief look at the un-built plots in
1996 and 2014 shows that the owners who stated their intent to build in 1996, have
still not built. Thus, it appears these owners did have the necessity themselves to
construct a home.
In addition to these considerations, one can also find explanations for undevelopedUrban sprawl within the
building zone plots within the development process itself: the construction process in the building
zone took the form of a small sprawl of construction: time after time, plots are sold and
houses are constructed. Land service followed the needs of construction and there was
not always a coordination with the land property structure. Consequently, a group
of plots where for example land betterment measures would have been necessary in
order to optimize land uses are now impossible, as some owners have already built their
homes. In certains cases, local development plans have been adopted, but the they
lack of coordination with underlying property rights and thus never implemented7.Non available building
land Even for constructible plots (where no further land betterment measures are ne-
cessary), authorities cannot force the owners to build, and this creates a paradox:
building reserves exist within the current building zone, but they cannot be used. In
order to circumvent this problem of availability, the only option left to local authorities
willing to grow – regardless of their motives8 – is to zone new land.
4R. Grogg, journalist for Berner Zeitung, interviewed in Langenthal 25 March 2014.
5If plots of the working zone are taken into account, this totals 9 hectares
6Here the beige and the dark purple surfaces (with the exception of the cases of building
zone reduction and the creation of a park) should be considered building zone reserves, as both are
un-built and within the building zone.
7The case of the Friedhofsweg is a good example,where several successive development plans were
adopted, but never put into practice. One should take note of the partial construction of the local
development plan Ribeli in the Neumatt (see figure 3.3).
8Press articles mention the contested communal growth strategy aiming to attract new rich in-
habitants in order to higher tax revenues and better the financial situation of the commune (Berner
Zeitung, 2011).
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As federal and cantonal legislation prohibit new land zoning as a “strategy”, the
only solution to the current problem is to transfer unused rights to locations where
landowners are willing to build. This leads to the search for the most appropriate
instrument to solve the problem. As section 3.2.4 below shows, the solution chosen by
Wiedlisbach is quite innovative, but hardly fulfills federal land use planning objetct-
ives. Prior to the in-depth analysis of the used instruments, section 3.2.2 presented
contextual factors, and section 3.2.3 presented the legal constraints that have been
identified as most relevant.
3.2.2 Contextual factors
In regard to the context, I analyse the case of Wiedlisbach in terms of demographic,
economic and topographic aspects.
Demographic evolution
Over the last 22 years (1991 to 2013), the commune’s population increased from 1,927 Strong demographic
growth in the 1990sto 2,181 inhabitants, an overall increase of 13.2% or 0.6% annualised (BFS, 2015).
Compared to the surrounding communes, this growth falls between that of Oberbipp,
Niederbipp and Wolfisberg on the east (between 23 and 28% over the same period or
1.3% annualized), and the slight decline in Attiswil or Farnern in the west (around
3% over the total period). Compared to the regional, cantonal and Swiss average,
Wiedlisbach is far above regional and cantonal growth rates (7% and 6.2% respective
total growth or 0.34% and 0.28% annual growth) and near the national average of
17.5% (0.8% annual growth).
Over the last 15 years – the time period considered for the revision of the building Demographic stagnation
in the 2000szone regulations (1997-2012), nominal population growth has equalled 40 inhabit-
ants:1,8% over the whole period for an annual growth rate of 0.12%. These numbers
are under the regional (3,46% overall and 0.23% per year), cantonal (5,75% and
0.38%) and national averages (13.28% and 0.89%). From 2001 to 2011, the vacancy
rate remained around 2%. Low construction rates during 1995-2005 contributed to
a stagnation in growth, a pace which persists, as seen in an almost total absence of
housing construction between 2005 and 2011 (Swisstopo, 2014b).
Economic and fiscal evolution
Compared to other communes of the region, inhabitants of the commune have an Middle class commune
above average fiscal capacity9 (925CH per month compared to an average of 825CHF
per month). With almost one job for every two inhabitants, the job supply is also
above average (30 jobs for each 100 people regionally). Tax rates for natural persons
corresponds to the regional average (1.59) (FIN, VVYYa), and the land tax rate is
also slightly above average (1.2 instead of 1.12) (FIN, VVYYb).
In terms of land prices, no local data is available for Wiedlisbach. I can only rely Overall decreasing land
priceson regional numbers which show an overall price decline of serviced building land
for single family homes from 300CHF/m2 in 1999 to 200CHF/m2 in 2014 (Wüest
and Partner, VVYY). If one considers sale prices of single family homes of 5 rooms,
a price drop from 605,000CHF in 1994 to 539,000CHF in 2012 is recorded (Wüest
and Partner, VVYY). This downturn is put in perspective when compared to other
price data (SRED, 2014): based on transaction prices of single family homes between
2003 and 2014, the SRED data shows a slight price increase (from 620,000CHF to
700,000CHF). These moderate or shrinking prices are one factor in explaining the
blocked construction of single family houses in the commune (single family homes are
the main type of construction on the communal territory). An alternative explanation
provided by the Herdgemeinde is the landowners’ intentions to "keep land for future
generations" (Herdgemeinde Huttwil, 2014).
Topographic and spatial characteristics
Wiedlisbach has been considered a town since 1386 when it was granted the right Well preserved historical
centreto host a weekly market as compensation for its services during the war of Sempach
9I understand fiscal capacity as the potential
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against the House of Habsburg (Commune of Wieldisbach, 2014). Its historical centre
is well preserved and its roofs are among the last of the region without any skylights10.
As shown in the first chapter of the working paper, the location of WiedlisbachView on the Alps and
good transport
connections
is attractive in terms of housing: views are desirable, in particular for houses on the
hillside of the Jura. The accessibility by public transport is, for a large part of the
housing zones, ranked in category C or D by the cantonal structure plan( meaning
most inhabitants have a train connection every half an hour to Solothurn, Niederbipp
and Langenthal). A dedicated motorway onramp offers connections within less than
an hour to Bern, Basel and Zurich.
On a whole, the statistics show Wiedlisbach as a rather attractive location for
middle to upper income families looking for private individual housing.
3.2.3 Constraints of superior law
Another central factor contribute to explain the land use planning process resulted in
such an oversized and scarcely used building zone: the cantonal constraints and their
implementation.
Building zone calculus of the 1989 revision
Documents on the 1989 revision of building regulations do not offer any demographicConcious cantonal
approval of oversized
building zones
growth calculations11, mentioning only previous building zone capacity (1,000 in-
habitants) (AGR, 1988). Without further precision in the calculation methods, no
detailed comparison can be made. The lack of data limits the conclusion to the fact
that the effective nominal population growth of 254 persons that took place during
the 15 years after the revision fell well short of the building zone’s capacity. Even with
growing surface needs for individuals and lower occupancy rates of flats, the current
building zone remains oversized.
Cantonal building zone calculus in 2013
In the 2013 revision, the following parameters were used in the calculation of the
building zone size. They are combined as follows:
− Current population: the data used in the revision documents differs slightly from
official data (2,227 inhabitants according to the commune, 2,181 inhabitants
according to the canton);
− the current population is multiplied with the cantonal growth factor : According
to the revision documents (Commune of Wiedlisbach, 2011a), the population
growth over the last 15 years is 7.6%, which differs from the growth data presen-
ted above (3.2.2);
− the prognosticated nominal population growth is divided by the average flat
occupancy rate: 1.7 for central communes, 2.1 for all the other communes. This
shows the number of flats needed to absorb growth;
– because statistically the average flat occupancy rate tends to decline (2.28
persons per flat in the year 2000, 2.2 in 2020), additional housing is needed
to maintain current population level. Therefore, the future population per
flat ratio is subtracted from the current population per flat r to obtain the
number of flats needed to maintain the current population;
– both numbers of flats are then added together;
− the number of total flats is then multiplied with the average gross floor area per
flat: 140m2. This gives the overall needed gross floor area;
10In 1974, Wiedlisbach was granted the Wakker price by the Swiss heritage society for its exemplary
care of the historical center site.
11The communal report and calculation elements could not be found in the cantonal archives.
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− the overall gross floor area is then divided by the minimum density coefficient12:
0.3 for rural communes, maximum 0.7 for central and agglomeration communes.
This gives the surface of land that is needed for housing development.
In Wiedlisbach, the calculus results in housing zone needs of 5.7 ha for the next Exceeding reserves block
any further development
process
15 years. From this area, one has to subtract the existing undeveloped housing zone.
Undeveloped surfaces smaller than 500 m2, plots with complex geometry, banks of
trees as well as buildings, are not considered as reserves. In Wiedlisbach, 7.7 ha
of the housing zone is currently undeveloped, of which 2.7 more hectares remain
undeveloped on partially developed plots. This results in an oversized building zone
of approximately two hectares. In this situation, cantonal practice is to match new
surfaces to be zoned in by an equal amount of surfaces to be zoned out (AGR, 2013a).
The other until now unused possibility is to develop these land reserves.
Priority development areas
Although located on a cantonal and regional development axis, Wiedlisbach does not No zoning bonus is
granted by economic
policy
enjoy looser development regulations, as only the centre (Niederbipp) of the priority
development areas do. Only a vast field between the motorway and the Aare, cur-
rently property of the federal army, has been designated by the canton as "strategic
working zone". Nevertheless, the development process in this area is under cantonal
supervision13 and does not concern communal zoning or development restrictions.
Cropland protection plan
Cantonal criteria applying to plots that are part of the cropland protection plan
require:
− a justification that the location is the best among others (implies a search for
alternative locations);
− a connection to public transport;
− an economic use of soil e.g. constructions with a minimum density coefficient
of 0.4 for rural communes (Kanton Bern, 2011).
Regional planning
The regional landscape protection plan defines landscape protection areas (their exact A rather flexible
landscape protection plandimensions and location are subject to communal interpretation). These protected
areas can also include regional urbanization limits and corridors for animals. The
current plan includes several landscape protection zones and urbanization limits, as
in the east of the Gerzmatt, precisely where the foreseen extension area of the housing
zone is located. Despite the plan, local authorities have a room to manoeuvre in
implementing the regional plan (AGR, 2013a): they can adapt the perimeter of the
protected area to fit their development aspirations.
The regional global transport and settlement plan locates regional housing and No regional compensation
possibilitiesworking centres, but Wiedlisbach doesn’t have any of these. When a commune wants
to create a building zone in such a regional centre, they have the possibility to com-
pensate zoning operations on regional level (another commune has to reduce its build-
ing zone at the same time), an unused opportunity for now14.
General considerations regarding constraints of superior law
The two building regulation revisions analysed lead me to formulate the following Cautious cantonal control
remarks: In 1989, the content of cantonal objections concerning zoning and density
was – at least in its written form – strictly advisory.Comments employed the con-
struct, "in our opinion," or diverted responsibility for the decision to the commune by
relying on its discretionary power in terms of land use planning (AGR, 1988, 5). For
12The density coefficient is the ratio between the gross floor area and the total surface of a plot.
A minimum density coefficient of 0.3 requires that for a 500 m2 plot, at least 150 m2 of the gross
floor area are developed
13Use of a cantonal development plan as zoning instrument.
14See regional governance structure in section subsubsec:regional governance.
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example, the prohibition of apartment buildings written in the construction prescrip-
tions (family homes with more than two flats) was criticized but accepted without
further comments. Further, a 50% population growth potential in the building zone
reserves "blasts any demographic growth prognosis" (AGR, 1988, 2), but does not oth-
erwise hamper the approval process; additional artificial reduction of capacity through
the lowering of density, and prohibition of several family homes in certain zones were
criticized, but did not block the review process .
During the approval procedure15, the office of agriculture criticized the size of theNo veto from other
cantonal offices building zone, but acknowledged that it is mostly located in already built areas and
thus probably serviced. The office of economic development supported the extensions
of the working zone and pushes to extended zoning close to the motorway as well
as a more "active land use policy" in order to gain control over the effectiveness of
regulations (AGR, 1988).
During the 2013 revision, an extended building zone calculation method was usedIncreased technicality
with potential for new
loopholes
where (partially) undeveloped plots were individually listed with their respective con-
structible surfaces. The cantonal authority used the results, along with their demo-
graphic prognosis, to approve or reject building zone extensions. Additional criteria,
in particular the connection to public transport, is another means (used by both
sides) to either justify the acceptability or the irrelevance of a new building zone.
However, as the example on building zone transfer in subsection 3.2.4 shows, tighter
criteria for defining building zone reserves leads to more precise building zone defin-
itions, which in turn increases the technicity of the legal process, and opens up new
potential loopholes.
The 2013 preliminary exam of building regulations by the canton provides a set ofAn involvement with
limited effectiveness elements that contribute to revealing the nature of power relations that exist between
the actors. In the reports of the cantonal offices involved in the procedure, the ag-
ricultural office focussed on the future zoning extension in the Gerzmatt, part of
the cropland protection plan. The office deplored the "very rudimentary balance of
interests" made by the commune, in particular the absence of consideration of agri-
cultural interests and the approximate consideration of federal criteria (AGR, 2013a).
The agricultural office appears resigned to accept the loss of agricultural land: they
do not set any additional requirement (for example in terms of density) nor oppose
the zoning process. The office in charge of economic promotion, part of the same dir-
ectorate, was, as opposed to the 1989 revision process (AGR, 1988), not involved in
the consultation procedure. The nature protection office pushed also towards a more
detailed zoning plan including all types of natural elements worthy of protection such
as hedges, shore groves, individual trees and groups of trees.
3.2.4 Local use of instruments
Legal and contractual building obligation
In order to overcome the problem of land hoarding, during the 2013 revision of itsCommunal
implementation of
contractual building
obligation
building regulations, the commune introduced the notion that the development of
undeveloped plots in the building zone were of public interest16. After a period
of fifteen years, landowners do not have the right for their plots to remain in the
building zone. Using new legal basis, the commune negotiated with landowners who
do not want to develop their plots. In certain cases, a contractual building obligation
arose between the commune and landowners: several owners promised to build their
land within the next ten years. However, the implementation of such a rule has
been contractual; its signature by the two parties relied on the landowner’s will to
cooperate, or accept to be put in the green zone. Some owners, resistant to both
solutions, asked for a building permit in order to keep their plot in the building zone
and gain some time, although they did not intend to build17.
According to communal and cantonal authorities, the building obligation had untilEnforcement of building
obligation for previously
zoned plots
the implementation of the revised federal law limited validity in a court, but this is
now very likely to change: according to art. 15a of the federal spatial planning
act, cantonal legislation must, in case of public interest, find a way to ensure that
15Only the offices taking position on building zone issues were mentioned.
16Art. 3 al. 2 of the Building regulations of 30 July 2013 of the commune of Wiedlisbach.
17R. Grogg, journalist for Berner Zeitung, interviewed in Langenthal 25 March 2014.
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a plot is constructed within a defined period of time. In the future, the commune
could rely on the signed contracts in order to force development. But in case the
landowner fights the communal decision, the commune would need to prove that the
plot’s development is of public interest. Despite its communal recognition, is is not
certain to be recognised as such by a court for single plots in Wiedlisbach.
This tricky situation only applies to plots already in the building zone. With plots Building obligation for
plots to be zonedremaining in the agricultural or protected zone, the commune has the possibility to
use an emption right. An example of the exercise of this emption right would be
commune acquisition of land at a predetermined price if it is not developed within a
given time span. In the case of the Gerzmatt perimeter, adopted by the commune
as a new building zone, the commune has negotiated this change of status with the
landowner18.
Transfer of building zone
The main instrument studied in the commune of Wiedlisbach is zoning. The commune "On the border of
legality"uses the instrument in an innovative way that aims towards the spatial transfer of
development rights. The cantonal authority qualifies this strategy as “on the border
of legality"19. The strategy behind the building zone transfer is to reduce the building
zone in the inner village on (partially) undeveloped plots and use the “development
credits” gained through this reduction in order to zone an area outside of town.
Step 1: Temporary suspension of development rights
Operation of the building zone transfer occurred in two steps. The first step was
to conduct individual negotiations with all landowners who owned undeveloped or
partially developed plots considered building zone reserves by the canton. The aim
of these negotiations was to obtain landowner consent to remove (a portion of) their
unused plot from the building zone20. The owners who agreed to the communal
proposal were placed in what was referred to as a "green space and garden zone"21.
According to the building regulations, this zone aimed to “ensure the existence of
green spaces, gardens and orchards within the settlement area"22. The zone change
was comprised of three main components, all mentioned in art. 54 of the communal
building regulations:
1. a removal of their development rights for a minimal period of 8 to 10 years, or
until the next building regulations revision process;
2. a priority right to be zoned when the commune begins subsequent revisions of
its building regulations;
3. an exemption from the tax on added land value created by zoning when the plot
is put back in the building zone.
The underlying objective of this green zone was to reduce the amount of communal
building zone reserves 23. As mentioned in section 3.2.3, the size of the building zone
reserves do not allow for further zoning procedures.
In terms of usage, the green zone allows for underground construction, whereas An instrument lowering
density temporarilysurface construction can only occur if linked to the care and use of a garden or orchard.
The new zone does not affect the use rights of third parties: for example, public access
is not granted to these areas. It merely ensures that very limited development will
take place . In fact, the green zone can be considered a de facto regulation for the
lowering of density. In the future, when the zoning plan will be revised, ( at least eight
18M. Allemann, president of the commune of Wiedlisbach, interviewed in Wiedlisbach 24 June
2014; D. Ott, architect and planner, member of the executive committee of Badner Partner AG,
interviewed in Solothurn 1 April 2014.
19A. Schnyder, head of communal and regional planning, S. Bleuel, head of main development
centres, R. Siegenthaler, urban planner, Amt für Gemeinden und Raumordnung, Justiz-, Gemeinde-
und Kirchendirektion of the canton of Berne, interviewed in Berne 24 April 2014.
20One alternative mentioned in the previous paragraph was to make them sign a contractual
building obligation.
21Art. 54 of the Baureglement der Gemeinde Wiedlisbach vom 30 Juli 2013.
22Ibid.
23D. Ott, urban planner, co-director of Baderpartner, interviewed in Solothurn the 1st April 2014.
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to ten years after a zone change), owners of plots in the green zone willing to build
(or to sell) will have rezoning priority over landowners outside the building zone.
The potential consequences for landowners of plots in the green zone should beTrivial consequences for
long term hoarders? addressed. For those whose plot has been placed entirely within the green zone
and have no intention to build or to sell in the medium term, there are almost no
consequences. Subsequent revisions arise every 10 to 15 years, and owners can ask
to be zoned back in and, after modification of the zoning plan, development rights
are restored. In case of communal refusal, owners can oppose the decision during
the revision process and have the possibility of seeking compensation for material
expropriation. However, as this phenomenon has not yet been observed it seems likely
that the landowner will have to prove their intentions to build prior to rezoning.
For the owners of plots located partially within the green zone, their zone changeTemporary development
rights reduction traded
against additional
development rights
involved (in most cases) a reduction of the unused development rights. However,
the reduction depended on which part of the plot had been put into the green zone.
In certain cases, the green zone was located where no construction was permissible
(e.g. if accessibility from one side did not meet necessary requirements, or if a forest
or river bordered the plot). Thus, the use right restriction equaled zero. However,
certain owners were effectively restricted in their rights. Among these owners, some
negotiated with the commune for looser building regulations regarding the timeframe
for when their plot could be rezoned24. Thus authority cedes their legal resources
for the landowner consent on and support to the zoning plan revision. The result is
change in the communal building regulations and zoning plan and contracts signed
with the green zone landowners that negotiated specific in kind compensation.
For the communal authorities, the green zone permits influence over the amountDiversion of the zoning
instrument of building zone counted as reserve. According to current cantonal practice (AGR,
2013a), the number of square meters taken from the building zone and designated
as green zone can then be used to zone in new land somewhere else. Along with
this ability to transfer land, another subtlety has been exploited by the commune:
undeveloped plots or part of plots smaller than 500 m2 are not counted as building
zone reserve. Thus, any reserve bigger than 500 m2 that can be reduced through
green zoning to less than 500 m2 no longer counts as a reserve, which allows for
further reductions of excessive communal building zones (see section 3.2.3). This
technique was applied to several owners’ backyards: one owner had, for example, a
700m2 of building zone reserve in his backyard that counted as 700m2building zone
reserve for the commune. The commune put 250m2 of the backyard’s reserve in the
green zone. This left the owner with a building zone reserve of 450m2, but reduced
the commune’s building zone reserve to 0m2.
Step 2: Transfer of building credits
In Wiedlisbach, the building zone surface gained through the green zone was thenConflictual transfer at
the settlement border transferred to the perimeter Gerzmatt on the northeastern communal border. In fact,
prior to the transfer, a smaller part of the perimeter was already defined as building
zone. But because its shape did not suit proper development (and was not serviced
yet), the communal executive body and the landowner negotiated the definition of
a new, broader perimeter. As the parties could not agree on a compromise prior to
the end of the building regulations revision (ended July 2013), the extension of the
building zone was postponed (AGR, 2013a).
In December 2013, after having signed an agreement with the landowners, the
communal executive body proposed to zone two perimeters: Gerzmatt and Moselen.
But the public inquiry proved too contentious25. In the end, the subject was with-
drawn from the communal legislative body’s agenda.
In June 2014, the communal executive body made a second legislative attempt,
and submitted just the zoning of Gerzmatt for adoption. The communal assembly
24As the analysis of oppositions of individual landowners to the zone change and the transcriptions
of negotiations with the commune have shown (AGR, 2013b), simple persuasion is not always enough
to gain owner approval. Compensation in the form of higher density or a reduction of the perimeter
of the green zone has been conceded by the communal authority.
25Criticisms were made regarding the additional traffic that the new construction would gener-
ate, and on the potential obstruction of neighbours’ views (Commune of Wieblisbach, 2013; Berner
Zeitung, 2014).
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approved the modification – 38 persons in favour, 20 against (Commune of Wieb-
lisbach, 2014). One opposition against the cantonal authority’s decision to approve
the zoning was made, and is currently being examined by the cantonal supervisory
authority.
In the meantime, with the entry into force of the revised spatial planning law, a Federal moratorium
suspends approvalfederal moratorium on uncompensated zoning decisions has entered into force26. This
moratorium is valid until the cantonal act is revised and the cantonal structure plan
approved by the federal government. Thus, the approval of the zoning operation in
Gerzmatt might be delayed, as federal law requires that any extension of the building
zone must be compensated by an equivalent amount of surface rezoned as agricultural.
In the case of Wiedlisbach, the recognition of the transfer as proper compensation
has been called into question.
One might ask why the commune wanted to put new land in the building zone. Costs reduction through
urban expansionThe official response was that the commune intended to overcome the general land
hoarding phenomenon and make land available for development. If one looks at the
numerous negotiations conducted with the landowners during the 2013 revision of
building regulations, (as well as those begun already in the 1990s), this official argu-
ment certainly provides part of the explanation. But then why does the commune
want to make land available for new development? This question can in turn be ad-
dressed with a complementary hypothesis: the commune hopes to raise revenues and
lower infrastructure costs per inhabitant through the zoning of land for development.
The subsequent arrival of new inhabitants will further lower these infrastructure costs
(Commune of Wieblisbach, 2014). As the discussions prior to the adoption of the zon-
ing plan show, Wiedlisbach has had financial issues for several years. According to
the regional press (Berner Zeitung, 2011), Wiedlisbach is not the only commune in
the region to pursue such a strategy. Its fiscal effectiveness has still to be proven, as
new inhabitants also require additional services such as kindergartens, schools and
sports facilities.
Implementation of the tax on added land value created by zoning
Since the 2013 revision of building regulations, the tax on added land value created No fixed taxation
percentageby zoning has been part of the communal "tool box". The regulations state that the
communal executive body is obligated to negotiate restitution with the landowners,
seeking an "adequate amount" of the added value created through zoning27. As re-
commended by the commune’s urban planner28, the legal dispositions do not foresee
a fixed tax level. Thus, the local authority keeps a wider margin of negotiation in the
amount of the added economic value it captures.
The above mentioned transfer of development rights in Gerzmatt was the first oc- Tax on added land value
and land service in one
single contract
casion to apply the instrument. The commune signed an agreement with the landown-
ers (the so called Infrastrukturvertrag) including the amount of tax on added land
value created by zoning and detail land service costs to be paid by the owner. As
foreseen by law (109 BauG), the portion (infrastructure: i.e. roads and pipes) of the
land that has been serviced becomes ownership of the commune once realised. In
order to ensure the development of the new area, a purchase right was also included
in the contract: the commune has an emption right on the land for ten years at a
fixed price. However, the commune’s ability to buy the land if the owner does not
meet their obligations after the fifteen year period remains an open question.
The applied tax rate was 20 % (Commune of Wieblisbach, 2014). It would have Commune has an
important discretionary
power
been necessary to access the contract in order to see if the land values used for taxation
correspond to market price values and to determine the proportion of land service
costs that has been passed on the landowner. The study of other contracts between
communal land authorities and landowners has shown that even with a fixed tax
rate, the effectively taxed amount is still variable and tends to be in the landowner’s
interest (see section 3.4.4). As a matter of fact, the fixation of land price before and
after the zoning operation lies entirely in the discretionary power of the communal
authority and their negotiation partners. Further, as land service costs, and the
tax on added value created by zoning (in case the instruments are implemented) are
26Art. 38a of Federal spatial planning act of the 22 June 1979, SR 700.
27Art. 69 of the Building regulations of 30 July 2013 of the commune of Wiedlisbach.
28D. Ott, op. cit.
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negotiated together, the amount of taxes levied is used to pay for land service that
directly benefits the landowner (see also section 3.3.4).
The wide margin of manoeuvre granted to communes in the implementation ofDiversion of the tax on
added land value created
by zoning
both the land service tax and the tax on added land value created by zoning allowed a
diversion of the instrument from the purpose that it was conceived for, that is the pay-
ment of compensations due in cases where a material expropriation took place. The
Bernese cantonal construction act defined two distinct instruments, but left a wide
margin of implementation to local authorities that frequently favoured a lump sum
taxation and simultaneously recovered the costs of land service (Metropolitankonfer-
enz Zürich, 2013).
Mortgage as payment guarantee for infrastructure
The eastern part of Wiedlisbach called Weiermatt is a rather important working zoneLong standing non
serviced working zone (2 hectares) that remains un-serviced and un-built. While the first portion was zoned
in 1979, and a second in 1989, the owner did not service the land in that lapse of
time.
After negotiation with the landowner and approval of the land service plan of theCommune takes over to
unblock situation. . . working zone by the communal legislative body in June 2010, it was agreed that the
commune would finance the land service and be reimbursed no later than ten years,
or in the event of a sale of the land. Currently, further proceedings are temporarily
blocked by opposition (Commune of Wieblisbach, 2013, 2014).
The signed contract between commune and landowner foresees that the public. . . and ensures
reimbursement through
mortgage
authority will, with public money, service the whole area in one go. This will occur
after having recorded in the land registry that the amount of money paid for land
service is due as a first rank mortgage or, at the latest, ten years after the land has
been serviced.
This financing method has advantages for all the involved parties. For the landowner,A win-win situation for
both the commune and
the landowner
it is convenient because there is no need to take care of land service. There is also a
strong incentive to sell the land, as in the medium term, a large amount of money is
due. Companies are the ultimate beneficiaries of this policy, because they can move
in more quickly and easily; further, they look for already serviced land29. The com-
mune finances the project through the leverage that the mortgage they impose on
the concerned plots provides. They also have a guarantee that they will recover the
investment, because the mortgage contract expires in case of sale, development or at
the latest after ten 10 years. Further, the commune can decide upon the schedule of
land service.
Revocation of local development plans
The interviewed mayor30 mentions that during the 2013 building regulations revision,
several local development plans were abolished: the development they planned in-
volved a betterment of land that could not be done any more, because some of the
plots they regulated had been developed in the meantime. As a consequence, the
local development plans lost most of their relevance.
In other cases, the abolishment of local development plans aimed to reduce theLow rent as critical
factor? restrictions to development, i.e. on the type or aesthetics of constructions, garden
trees and hedges, specific measures for cars, bikes or pedestrians, etc., because they
were perceived as impeding construction. Officials and planners mention several times
the inadequacy of the types of building considered in the local development plans with
current housing demand31. From the landowners’ viewpoint, the low construction
activity can also be explained by an insufficient added economic value that the sale of
land would grant . As shown in the next case study, solutions to the economic value
issue can be an increase of the land use coefficient in order to gain a higher return –
this has to be in accordance with aesthetic considerations and is subject to approval
by local inhabitants (section 3.3.4), or a reduction of the expected economic return
(section 3.3.4).
29M. Allemann,op. cit.
30M. Allemann, op. cit.
31M. Allemann, op. cit.; M. Jampen, head of the communal administration, and H.-J. Muralt,
mayor of Huttwil, both interviewed in Huttwil the 13 August 2014; R. Suter, head of planning in
Niederbipp, interviewed in Niederbipp 8 July 2014.
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3.2.5 Impact on value redistribution
The case of Wiedlisbach has shown a value redistribution process that goes against Value redistribution leads
to urban expansionthe constitutional land use planning principle of an economic use of soil. The trans-
formation of undeveloped plots in the village centre into unbuildable green zones,
allows the commune to reduce two hectares of surface counted by cantonal author-
ities as undeveloped building zone. The withdrawn surfaces are either entire plots,
parts of plots, or remaining reserves. Remaining reserves are reduced to surfaces
smaller than 500m2, which allows complete subtraction from the building zone calcu-
lus. As a counterpart to this reduction, additional development rights are negotiated
by specific landowners, including additional constructible surfaces or garages. This
micro-zoning approach leads to a (temporary) crystallization of "construction holes"
within the building zone.
In 2014, the commune has gained through the subtraction of unused building Reduction of ecological
value in the middle runzones a margin of manoeuvre towards the canton. Afterwards, it launches a new
zoning process of approximately one hectare outside of the current settlement limits
where it reuses part of the “economised” building zone. Such an operation results in
small scale urban sprawl. The ecological value of non built plots in the village centre
(some of which are orchards) preserved through the green zone is compensated by the
development of agricultural land outside of town.
As seen in section 3.2.2, market conditions have been more favourable for the A rather favourable
market after all?construction and sale of individual houses: there has been a significant price drop for
single family homes over the last 20 years. But this value change does not stop the
village’s expansion process, as the landowners concerned by the new zoning process
pressure the commune to be included in the building zone (many are even willing to
sign an emption right on the zoned land). This fact limits the explanation provided
by the supposedly unfavourable housing market.
The economic outcome of the building zone transfer creates two distinct economic Creation of medium-term
economic valueeffects:
1. a partial and a priori temporary reduction of value on the plots in the green
zone. It is partial, because for some landowners zoning does not modify their
construction potential (no effective reduction of the plot ratio), others have
negotiated a compensation in kind (an effective extension of the plot ratio) that
will apply when their plot will return to the building zone. The value reduction
is temporary, because if the landowners of the green zone want to build in the
future, they can ask the commune to be put back into the building zone when
the next revision of building regulations occurs (approximately every ten years).
2. an increase of economic value in the new building zone of the Gerzmatt: (1
hectare * 260CHF/m2)–20%32= 2,000,000 francs33. Therefore, an overall added
economic value takes place.
In terms of ecological value, the building zone extension creates a net loss of 1 Reduction of
medium-term ecological
value
hectare of fertile land protected by the cropland protection plan. The effects of the
green zone are considered equal to zero, because the green zone only maintains the
existing ecological value of the orchards. In the middle time frame, part of the plots
in the green zone will be developed and the ecological value of these plots will decrase.
The case has shown an extensive exchange of resources between the involved act- Extensive use of
resourcesors (law, consensus, political support): through the negotiations conducted with the
landowners and the instruments created in the 2013 building regulations, a consensus
was achieved on a temporary suspension of development rights. However, the polit-
ical support of the inhabitants was obtained only after a reduction of the commune’s
zoning ambitions. Nonetheless, the commune managed to pass on all land service
costs linked with the extension of its building zone to the landowner and capture part
of the added value they had created.
In order to achieve its building zone extension strategy, the commune combined the Combination of public
and private law
instruments
use of public and private law instruments: they traded new legal obligations created
by the green zone against additional development rights and several “guarantees”
32Tax on added land value created by zoning applied according to M. Allemann. op. cit.
33Land price estimation based on Wüest and Partner (2014); a plot ratio of 0.4 and an initial land
value of 8CHF/m2 are hypothesised; land service costs and benefits are not considered.
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(an exemption from the tax on added value, priority zoning rights). The commune
proposed an innovative solution: a voluntary development obligation to landowners
reluctant to be included in the green zone. Further, the commune used the added
value created by the building zone extension to ensure payment by the landowner of
(1) the land service and of (2) the tax on added value created by zoning. The commune
also secured the area’s development through the signature of an (3) emption right.
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3.3 Reduction of oversized building zones in Hut-
twil
Located in the southern Oberaargau, Huttwil is, along with Herzogenbuchsee and
Niederbipp, one of the three regional centres. It is located in the upper Langete valley,
15 km southwards of Langenthal and at the western border of the Canton of Lucerne.
The communal territory is marked by a river bed, along which the settlement area
is developed, but also by various smaller valleys and other tributary rivers. The hills
around Huttwil do not exceed 750 meters, and are mostly dedicated to agricultural
use. The train line that crosses town connects the commune with Langenthal in the
north, and Lucerne in the east. The canton’s main road connects to Burgdorf in the
west and Sursee in the east.
Over the past twenty years, Huttwil has experienced moderate urban growth and
maintained a high ratio between employment and inhabitants despite a small demo-
graphic decline. The limited regional attraction of Huttwil makes it hard for the
commune to compete with more central locations as well as to retain inhabitants.
Observed through the lens of land use planning policy, the commune deals with a
lack of available building zones, a need to reduce oversized building zones, and the
difficulty to pass on development costs to landowners. In fact, for a long time, land
service was entirely paid for through public funds. Landowners expect a higher rent
from their land than what the land market offers34, so they block development in
existing building zones. However, one semi-public landowner shows that despite un-
favourable market conditions, the acceptance of reduced rent contributes to communal
objectives of fighting demographic decline (Commune of Huttwil, 2009b, 7).
Figure 3.4: Overview map of Huttwil and its neighbourhoods. Map: Swisstopo (2014a).
3.3.1 Evolution of land use planning and land use
Zoning changes in 1977 and their effects from 1977 to 1994
The oldest available zoning plan dates back to 1977, and shows a series of slight modi- A farmer’s desire to get
their plots zoned out. . .fications made until 1981. The approval procedure was subject to major negotiations
between landowners, the commune and the cantonal planning office (AGR, 1977),
because important land surfaces at the limits of the urbanized area were zoned out
34C. Schneider, architect and urban planner, Schneider Partner, interviewed in Burgdorf 16
September 2014; M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
35The first trace of a local development actually dates back to 1961 (AGR, 1977), when a common
development plan was established for Sonnhalde and Thomasbode (AGR, 1985, 1998b, 2011b).
36Decision of the 18.09.1997 (AGR, 1997)
37Revision dates collected from overview table established by the cantonal planning office. The only
accessible decision was the Decision of the 10.12.2012 (AGR, 2011a), which foresees the development
of the still undeveloped upper part of the zone.
38Decision of the 07.08.1998 (AGR, 1998b).
39Revision dates collected from overview table established by the cantonal planning office. Only
accessible decision was the Decision of the 18.09.1997 (AGR, 1997).
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When Land use planning changes Land use changes
1977 Approval of the revised building regulations and
repeal of the provisory protected areas established
by the emergency federal decree in 1972. Revision
of the local development plan of Thomasbode35
Part of Dänechnubel
already developed
1979 Adaptation of zoning plan in Chrummacher and
Rüttistalden (AGR, 1979a)
Partial development
of Chrummacher
and Rüttistalden in
the following years
1985 Approval of the revision of the local development
plan Thomasbode
–
1994 Approval of the revised communal building regula-
tions (AGR, 1994a)
–
1995 Extension of the local development plan Dälechnu-
bel;
Development of
Dälechnubel in the
following years
1997 Approval of revised local development plan for
Sonnegg36; approval of revised local development
plan for Sonnhalde east (AGR, 1997); revision of
the the local development plan for Dälechnubel37
Development of Son-
nhalde east in the
following years
1998 Revision of the local development plans of
Sonnegg38 , Revision of the local development plan
for Dälechnubel; revision of the local development
plan for Thomasbode
–
2000 Revision of the local development plan of Dälechnu-
bel.
Progressive develop-
ment of Dälechnubel
2001 Approval of local development plan for Sonnhalde
west
–
2002 Revision of the local development plan for Son-
nhalde west39.
Development of Son-
nhalde west
2011 Approval of the revised building regulations; fol-
lowing adaptation of local development plans of
Thomasbode, Sonnegg and Hohlen
–
2014 Revision of the local development plan of Sonnegga –
Table 3.2: Main land use planning and land use changes in Huttwil since 1977.
aThe revision has yet to be approved according to the interview of communal representative M.
Jampen, op. cit.
(not shown on the map). This reduction of building zone happened at the request of a
single landowner who cultivated his land, had no intention to develop it, and therefore
asked the commune to pu this plots out of the building zone. The commune, under
pressure from the canton as well as the Confederation (due to the enactment of the
emergency federal decree in 1972), negotiated a 15 year building prohibition easement
on the plots of several landowners in the building zone.
According to the cantonal planning office, the use of building prohibition easements. . . used as argument to
zone other owners out is limited by the cantonal legislator for the fulfillment of planning purposes. Its use
should remain temporary and exceptional. The cantonal office judged the communal
implementation of the instrument for a 15 year period inadequate and asserted that
a zone change to agricultural zone is more opportune. They removed several plots
at the border of the settlement area from the building zo based on the following two
arguments (AGR, 1977):
1. land in the building zone should be used within the next 10 to 15 years;
2. one of the concerned farmers refuses to keep his plots in the building zone;
for reasons of equal treatment between landowners, other plots in a a similar
situation also have to change zone.
As a counterpart to this decision, the canton cancelled all reserved zones estab-
lished by the federal emergency decree. For the landowners, this meant a removal of
use restrictions on the concerned plots and for the commune, it meant regaining its
planning autonomy.
Despite these important zoning operations, huge building zone reserves still existImportant housing and
industrial development
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(numbered "1" on figure 3.5). These reserves date back to a time of tight inter-
relatedness between communal and landowners’ interests40. These reserves allowed
several developments between 1975 and 1994: one can notice the construction of
the industrial zone that occurred in Rüttistalden. Further, entire housing neigh-
bourhoods were erected in Weieracher, Lochmüli, Neuhuus, Dornacher and between
Rüttistalden and Chrummacher. Most construction was single family homes, except
in Weieracher (east) where single family homes and three storey apartment buildings
are interspersed. Development of building
zones depends on
landowner
Not all building zones are developed, and a gap between zoning and effective land
use persists. This hoarding is seen in the case of four wide housing zones, designated
at the end of the 1970s, and undeveloped at the time of data collection in 2014
(numbered "2" on figure 3.5): Sonnegg, Hohlen and Thomasbode in the centre north;
the fourth area is the Hueb in the centre west of the commune. But this hoarding
is not a general phenomenon: in the area of Weieracher in the east, where the land
is owned by the Herdgemeinde, a semi-public owner, one can observe only a single
undeveloped plot remains – the wider free plots in Weieracher are part of the working
zone.
Building regulations revision of 1994 and land use changes from 1994 to
2011
The 1994 revision aimed to coordinate landscape, development and transport infra- Availability already a
central issue. . .structure by "simple land use planning means" such as building regulations and zoning
plans (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 20). As mentioned in the objectives regarding to
land development, the availability of undeveloped building zone is a central issue, as
well as the parsimonious use of land (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 21). Similar to the
other case studies, the revision is also conditioned by the new cantonal construction
and land use planning law, in particular the mandatory participatory mechanisms41.
Willingness to increase densification was also central, as the occupation coefficients
have been elevated in each zone, and the minimal distances between buildings have
been reduced. The introduction of the ZPP in the new building regulations and
the creation of seven zones alike indicate a shift towards enhanced coherence and
aesthetics, and reduced land consumption of new housing zones.
The Huttwilberg (ZPP Holen, Sonnegg and Thomasbode – numbered "2" on figure . . . that remains
untackled3.5) and the area of Dälechnubel (numbered "3" on figure 3.5) were considered the
most promising locations for future housing, as the land has a low agricultural value
due to its steepness, and immissions (i.e. street noise) are low (Commune of Huttwil,
1992). However, the determining factors remained the willingness of landowners to
develop their land. Although this fact was acknowledged as a central issue in the
revision documents, no remedy was proposed or suggested (Commune of Huttwil,
1992; AGR, 1994a). Nevertheless, the 1994 revision brought the following changes: No extension of the
housing zone
− firstly, the land located in the Allmend/am Berg is unzoned (numbered "4" on
figure 3.5 – light purple). This zone change is similar to the other important
unzoning processes of 1977 where the land was still used for agriculture42;
− secondly, the zoning plan is defined more in detail: protected areas and certain
danger areas along the Langete river are now recorded into the map, and specific
areas less fit for development have been placed within a green zone;
− thirdly, other modifications around the industrial zone were made (numbered
"5" on figure 3.5): the southwest part belonging to the housing zone was unzoned
because it was considered too exposed to noise. Further, important extensions
of the industrial zone were made on land owned by the Herdgemeinde, one of
the town’s statutory corporations.
− fourthly, a wide area in the south west is zoned in as institutional zone for a
school and a sports centre (numbered "6" on figure 3.5);
In matters of construction, when compared to the period 1974–1994, a clear re- The Herdgemeinde as the
only active landowner
40C. Schneider, op. cit.; M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
41Art. 58 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
42However, no information could be found in regard to the underlying negotiations.
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duction in building activity is observable: only two new neighbourhoods were erected:
Sonnhalde and the first part of Dälechnubel (respectively numbered "7" and "3" on
figure 3.5). All plots are owned by the Herdgemeinde. Three plots currently remain
undeveloped and, at the time of writing, available on the housing market. Further,
several non built plots scattered across the urbanized areas were developed, but there
are still important differences between zoning and land use:
− the extensions of the industrial zone remain undeveloped until 2014 (beige
squares)
− the three zones on the Huttwilberg and the one of Hueb remain not built
(numbered "2" on figure 3.5).
Building regulations revision of 2011
During the 2011 revision of the building regulations, several small changes occurred:Limited changes in terms
of zoning The first was the extension of the industrial zone in Galgemoos (light yellow on the
map). The second change concerned two zoning out procedures (numbered "8" and
in dark purple on figure 3.5): the first zoning out concerned the plot north of the
Langete, that has become part of the institutional zone. The adjacent construction
up north is the town’s hospital. Therefore, no compensation was due. The second was
the a plot in Neuhuus, but no further information could be obtained on this matter.
The third change concerns the local development plans of Thomasbode, HohlenLocal policy change
passing on land service
costs to landowners
and Sonnegg (numbered "2" on figure 3.5). The underlying development plans and
prescriptions for these zones have been revised because communal regulations now
anticipate passing all land service costs on to landowners. Additionally, the ground’s
steepness makes land service difficult. Communal authorities raised the density coeffi-
cient of these three zones in order to compensate for the additional costs for landown-
ers and the reduced constructible surface of Thomasbode. This case is analysed in
section 3.3.4.Tax for advantages
conceded through zoning The commune is granted the possibility to ask landowners that benefit, via zoning,
from increased land value to contribute to land service costs43. The adopted solution
grants a wide margin of negotiation, as it does not fix a minimal amount, and prac-
tically returns the taxed amount to the landowner in the form of land service and
improvements. The creation of added economic value is contractually redistributed
to the landowner.Voluntary obligation to
build In order to foster land availability, planning documents refer to the possibility
of signing agreements with landowners in anticipation of an emption right if the
landowner does not develop their plot within a certain timeframe (Commune of Hut-
twil, 2007, 21ff).
43Art. 27-4 of the Building regulations of 8 December 2010 of the commune of Huttwil.
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3.3.2 Contextual factors
Demographic evolution
The case of Huttwil is of particular interest to the research, because it is a communeSlightly shrinking
population whose demography is in decline, yet whose settlement area continues to grow. Over the
last 21 years (1992-2013), Huttwil’s population has shrunk by 55 inhabitants, (from
4757 to 4702), a reduction of 1,2% (BFS, 2015). Compared to the neighbour com-
munes, Huttwil shows stronger resistance to population emigration than Wyssachen,
Eriswil, Rohrbachgraben or Gondiswil (these communes lost, on average, 10% of their
population).
Compared to regional, cantonal and Swiss averages, Huttwil is far below regional,Change goes against
regional and cantonal
tendencies
cantonal, and national growth rates (7%, 6.2% and 17.5% total growth or 0.34%,
0.28% and 0.8% annual growth, respectively).
Over the preceding 15 years considered for the revision of the building regulations
(1991-2006), nominal population decline of 108 inhabitants, corresponds to -2,2%.
Over the whole period, this represented an annual decline rate of -0.15%. These
numbers are under regional (3,46% overall and 0.23% per year), cantonal (5,75% and
0.38%), and national growth averages (13.28% and 0.89%).
In terms of housing, the communal vacancy rate between 2001 and 2011 increased
slightly, but remained rather low at 2.3% in 2011 (BFS and Kanton Bern, 2015). This
low occupancy rate contrasts with the demographic decline, and may be explained
through the progressive vacancy of existing homes, as well as a lower occupancy rate
of new homes. As shown for the case of Wiedlisbach (see section 3.2.3 and section
3.3.3 below), the cantonal building zone calculus takes into account the increase of
gross floor area used per inhabitant over time.
Economic and fiscal evolution
Compared to other communes of the region, inhabitants of the commune have fiscal ca-High concentration of
jobs pacity above regional average (910CHF per month compared to an average of 825CHF
per month). With approximately one job per two inhabitants, the job supply is also
far above average (30 jobs per 100 persons regionally). Huttwil hosts the electric bike
producer Biketec, which accounts for 125 jobs.
Tax rates for natural persons is slightly above the regional average (1.65 in HuttwilTax level above regional
average and 1.59 on average), like the rates of the other communes in southern Oberaargau
(FIN, VVYYa). Land tax rates are also slightly above regional average (1.2 instead
of 1.12) (FIN, VVYYb). Despite the fact that Huttwil has lowered both the revenue
tax (from 1.89 to 1.65) and the land tax (from 1.5 to 1.2) over the last decade, the
commune’s rates remain above regional average, which points to a lower competitive-
ness44.
In regard to the evolution of land prices, only a region wide analysis can be made.Relatively low land prices
Interviewees have confirmed the relatively low land prices estimated by Wuest and
Partner (VVYY): between 180 and 300CHF/m2 for serviced land intended for single
family homes. If I refer to other price data (SRED, 2014) that uses transaction prices
of single family homes, (between 2004 and 2013), there is a slight price increase from
620,000CHF to 700,000CHF.
Topographic and spatial characteristics
Located in a hilly landscape, Huttwil’s shape is profoundly marked by the LangeteA rather hilly landscape
valley in which it is located. The Huttwilberg marks the northern border of the
settlement area with a altitude difference of 100 meters between the river and the
plateau uphill. The slope on the southern side of town is less steep, and grants access
to two hills of similar height as the Huttwilberg.
In terms of access, Huttwil is crossed by a regional train line that connects toLonger commuting
distances than in
northern Oberaargau
Langenthal (20 minutes ride) every half an hour and to Lucerne (1 hour ride) almost
every half an hour. Thus, the center of Huttwil is classified as “C” in the cantonal
public transport access categories. In terms of individual transport, distance to the
closest motorway entry is about 30 km, which, compared to the other regional centres
44M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
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of Oberaargau, is far. Driving to Berne takes approximately an hour, Lucerne 50
minutes and Solothurn 40 minutes.
3.3.3 Constraints of superior law
Cantonal building zone calculus
The revision documents of 1994 (AGR, 1994b) mentions a growth objective of 0.75% Optimistic growth
objectiveper year, which corresponds to 36 additional inhabitants. This objective is based on
the population difference between 1960 and 1970, the difference being extrapolated for
the estimate (Commune of Huttwil, 1992). The 1980s were a decade of stagnation for
the commune, with the years 1988, and 1989, constituting an exception (2% growth
both years).
The building zone calculus of 2011 and 1994 are similar. Nonetheless, two elements Same building zone needs
as 20 years ago. . .change: the population growth estimate now relies on a canton wide estimate which
unifies the regional demographic disparities. Secondly, there is now a zoning bonus
granted to regional centres (such as Huttwil) designated as "strategic growth factor"
if they are willing to raise the minimum plot ratio of their building zones.
In 1994, the building zone needs were estimated between 11.7 and 12.8 ha with
a population growth of 11.25% over 15 years, which corresponds to a yearly growth
of 0.75% (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 26). Calculated with today’s formula (4%
population growth over 15 years, centrality bonus and higher gross floor surface per
inhabitant), the size of the needed building zone is approximately 11 ha, a surface
very similar to the results provided by the old calculation formula (11.7 ha). In other
words, if Huttwil were a rural commune, and had no higher density requirements, and
no centrality bonus45, it would be allowed almost as the same surface of new building
zone than 20 years ago. Consequently, the evolution of the calculation method has
only had a marginal impact on the Huttwil’s building zone quota, (between 0.7 to 1.8
ha less building zone is now allowed) despite an actually shrinking population.
In 2011, the building zone needs were still around 11 ha, despite a population . . . despite a shrinking
populationlevel corresponding to the one of 1988 (Commune of Huttwil, 2006; BFS, 2015) and
moderate construction activity (light grey surfaces on figure 3.5). The land that
has been developed between 1994 and 2004 corresponds to approximately one third
of existing building zone reserves (Commune of Huttwil, 2007, 12)46.
Position of the cantonal offices
Similar to the first Case study analysed, cantonal offices involved in the building Limited intervention in
communal policyregulations procedure rarely question the relevance of communal policy. As an ex-
ample, the agricultural office remarks that some building zone extensions (working
zone in Rüttistalde and cantonal sports centre in Schwarzenbach) occur on protected
cropland. Further, the office of economic development’s main purpose is to service
plots in the building zone and lower building restrictions in the working zone in order
to foster its development. The cantonal planning office notices that the commune’s
growth prognosis is optimistic and that the calculations in regard to building zone
capacity "are characterized by important imprecisions" (AGR, 1994b, 5f), but does
not interfere in the definition of the zoning perimeter.
In the 2011 revision, the other cantonal offices involved in the revision procedure
did not comment on building zone capacities or calculation (AGR, 2011b).
45According to the cantonal structure plan (measure C02), the regions define so called regional
centres of fourth level. These centres have the task of attracting employers, be multifunctional
suppliers (in terms of public services for the surrounding communes), and become central traffic
junctions (Region Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012, 5). These responsibilities usually lead to
them being granted a "wider margin of manoeuvre while determining the size and location of zones"
(Kanton Bern, 2011, measure C 02) which is then implemented in the form of a strategic development
factor part of the building zone needs calculus.
46The planning report of 1992 estimates 18,6 ha of housing zone reserves (Commune of Huttwil,
1992, 50). According to the 2007 planning report (Commune of Huttwil, 2007), 5.5 ha have been
built since then.
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3.3.4 Local use of instruments
Non implementation of the tax on added land value created by zoning as
land service tax
In the initial works linked to the revision of the building regulations of 2006, the mainConflict between growth
objectives and rent
capture
problem for communal authorities is the availability of building land (Commune of
Huttwil, 2006, 14). As interviewees47 and planning documents mention, communal
priority is to foster development, growth and construction (Commune of Huttwil,
2007, 21).
Interviewees argue that the introduction of a tax on added land value created by
zoning would have been a threat to these objectives, because it would have placed
additional financial constraints on the landowners (who are already resistant to land
service costs) 48. This difficulty is due to the fact that until the 2000s, land service
costs were fully paid by tax money. However, the worsening of communal finances led
to a change of practice: newly approved local development plans have been accom-
panied by a contractual agreement (Infrastrukturvertrag) that passed on part of the
land service costs to the landowners. Further since the revision of building regulations
in 2011, article 27 al. 4 states that the communal executive body can require financial
participation in land service from landowners who benefit from planning measures.
The commune uses added value created through zoning in order to pay for land service
that landowners benefit from.
This formal transfer of costs required the elaboration of new local development
plans for all remaining undeveloped perimeters. As the costs division between com-
mune and landowners are transcribed into a contract that both parties have to sign,
some of the landowners simply refused to approve them if they judged the conditions
of the new agreement not favourable enough49.
As the case of Thomasbode shows (see section 3.3.4 below), it is only through theChange of plot ratio to
ensure the pass on of
service costs
adoption of a higher plot ratio that certain landowners agreed to carry a major part
of the land service costs. But in order to lower the land service costs to be carried,
commune and landowner have agreed in two recently signed contracts that part of
the roads foreseen in the local development plans would remain in private property.
This allowed for the application of lower and thus cheaper construction norms than
if they were to be transferred to the public domain after development50.
Land hoarding and the case of Thomasbode
A central challenge for the commune was and is to deal with the availability of land
in the building zone (Commune of Huttwil, 1992, 11). The area of Thomasbode
illustrates the problem at stake. The areas of Sonnegg and Hohlen further west are
characterized by the same hoarding issue: land kept in the building zone for decades
and their owners making little effort to improve or develop it.
Located on the southern hillside of the Huttwilberg, at the northern border ofNo will to pay for land
service the settlement area, the area of Thomasbode was zoned in the 1970s. Since then, at
least two local development plans were approved, one in 1985 and one in 1998 (AGR,
1985, 1998a)51. The plan from 1998 was linked to a land service contract signed
between the commune and the landowners. The contract stated that the commune
would finance the major part of the land service. However, the landowners did not
engage in any planning measure until 2006, where one of the three owners launched
a planning procedure and formally asked the commune to fulfill its obligations and
service the land.Transfer of plots into
medium danger zone The land’s development was subject to two major difficulties. First, nine water
catchments (to which private and public use rights are attached) were located within
the designated perimeter, and the construction of the connecting road might have
destroyed several of them(Kellerhals and Haefeli AG, 2010). Second, upon imple-
mentation of the communal hazard map in 2009, the entire zone was defined as a
medium hazard area (level 2 out of 3) where construction is fundamentally allowed,
47M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
48M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
49C. Schneider, op. cit.
50C. Schneider, op. cit.
51It could not be confirmed that no previous plan existed.
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but subject to protection measures ensuring the safety of humans, animals, and major
valuables (art. 6 BauG). Therefore, the area of Thomasbode could not be developed
solely based on the local development plan from 1998.
As the revision of the communal building regulations went on, uncertainty on Potential zoning out
how to deal with Thomasbode persisted: the canton stood in favour of taking the
area out of the building zone, arguing that no compensation would be due because
of the hazard zone in which it was located. The local planning revision committee
disagreed: despite the legal restrictions imposed by the danger zone or the difficulty
to service the land, the commune had an obligation to compensate landowners for
their rights(Commune of Huttwil, 2011). The communal executive body, initially in
favour of removing the area from the building zone (Commune of Huttwil, 2009a), was
stuck in between the local planning committee and the cantonal authority’s opposed
positions.
In order not to delay the ongoing building regulations revision process, the com- Establishment of a
reserved zonemunal executive body decided, in 2009, to transform the building zone into a reserved
zone52. This zone change allowed to suspend planning and land service activities in
the concerned perimeter for a minimum of two years. This delay granted the commune
the necessary time to mandate a constructibility study that would confirm or infirm
the technical feasibility of developing the area of Thomasbode (Commune of Huttwil,
2011, 2). When the report was handed to the comune in 2010, the constructibility of
the perimeter was confirmed and the zoning out option vanished.
In 2011, the reserve zone was replaced by a smaller building zone with modified Third local development
planproportions adapted to the new future construction – conceived as so called Ter-
rassenhäuser. This new zone facilitates development, and guarantees a similar level
of return on investment, even with a new contract between commune and landowner
where the latter bears all land service costs53. The plot ratio has been raised in order
to compensate the surface loss, and transfer the costs of land service fully to the
landowner. What I observe here is the use of the commune’s legal authority to com-
pensate for the economic reduced value carried by the landowners and the commune’s
executive body aversion for fights with elected representatives and landowners, an at-
titude that is can be observed frequently in the canton of Berne when it comes to
building zone reductions54.
The underlying third local development plan is currently being elaborated, and
uncertainty about the actual development of Thomasbode remains. Indeed, no build-
ing obligation applies and the commune has no legal remedy to force the owner to
build.
Building rights
The case of the Herdgemeinde is an example showing landowners’ rent expectation as An important part of the
commmune’s territory in
semi-public hands
a factor of land development. The Herdgemeinde is a major landowner of the com-
mune and one of Huttwil’s two Burgergemeinde55. The Herdgemeinde has ownership
titles on the entire eastern part of the city, namely the entire industrial zone, the
neighbourhoods of Weieracher and Dälechnubel, and on most of the fields and forests
located north of town (for a total of approximately 300 hectares, of which 38 hectares
are part of the building zone) (Herdgemeinde Huttwil, 2014).
The land policy of the Herdgemeinde is to keep formal property rights on land and Cheap building land
availableto issue 60 year building rights on plots (Herdgemeinde Huttwil, 2014). This is true for
agricultural land as well as building zones. In terms of housing, current rent price for
single family homes and apartment buildings is around 3.25CHF/m2 per year, adapted
every five years to the Swiss consumer price index. The building right holder can sell
and transmit their rights to a third person. At the end of the contract, if not renewed,
the landowner buys the construction erected by the right holder at approximately 80%
of the average of capitalized income value56 and real value considered jointly. For
52A reserved zone is a non constructible zone used for a limited period of time in order to ensure
the fulfillment of planning objectives. See also art. 62 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
53According to M. Jampen, op. cit.
54S. Ghioldi, lawyer, communal and regional planning, Amt für Gemeinden und Raumordnung,
interviewed in Berne 27 July 2014.
55Basically a commune without territory
56Capitalized income value is the potential return in the form of rent that can be obtained from the
buildings; real value corresponds to the value of buildings over time, in addition to their improvements
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industrial land, rent price is 3.15CHF/m2 per year, adapted every five years up to
80% of the Swiss consumer price index. The contract is signed for a renewable period
of 60 years. If zoning plans have changed or new construction is anticipated, building
destruction costs are subtracted from the purchase price of the house, (effectively
carried by the building right holder/home owner).
However, the risk of a price drop, in case the house is sold, is carried by theLimited price fluctuations
landowner and not the building right holder, because the building right holder only
sells the produced part (the house and the land service) based essentially on effective
construction costs and not on land prices57. Table 3.3 shows the differences between
the acquisition of a building right and of a formal property title:
Building right Formal property right
Land property tax Paid by the Herdgemeinde Paid by land/home owner
Land service Paid by building right
holder/home owner
Included in total price if
plot is serviced
Land No transfer of property
title
Property title included in
price
Construction Paid by building right
holder/home owner
Paid by land/home owner
Duration of
ownership
60 years renewable Unlimited
Disposal Transferable and inherit-
able
Transferable and inherit-
able
Property
transfer tax
1.8% 1.8%
Rental costs/benefits
for 10 years
landownership
(based on a 500 m2
plot in Huttwil from
2004 to 2014 without
construction and
land service prices)
-16,300CHF, thus an
annual rent of 1.625%a
Based on regional land
prices (Wüest and Partner,
VVYY): -44,200CHF b
Based on constant land
prices: -9,200CHF c
Based on lake Geneva
prices: +516,8000CHF d
Table 3.3: Legal and economic comparison of the cost of land based on building rights
and formal property rights in the case of Huttwil from 2004 to 2014. Data: Commune of
Huttwil (2014); Wüest and Partner (VVYY). Own calculations. Calculations do not consider
building deprecation.
aBased on a land price of 195CHF/m2. This corresponds to the accumulated rent over the
60 years of the building right. It also corresponds to current land price estimates by Wüest and
Partner (VVYY).
b 95,000CHF (sell price 2014: 190CHF/m2*500=95,000CHF) minus 130,000CHF (ac-
quisition price 2004: 260CHF/m2*500=130,000CHF) minus 1,600CHF (land property
tax: 130,000CHF*1.2%*10 years=1,600CHF) minus 1,700CHF (property transfer tax:
95,000CHF*1.8%=1,700CHF) equals -38,300CHF
c 130,000CHF (acquisition price 2004: 260CHF/m2*500=130,000CHF) minus 130,000CHF
(sell price 2014: 260CHF/m2*500=130,000CHF) minus 1,600CHF (land property tax:
130,000CHF*1.2%*10 years=1,600CHF) minus 2,300CHF (property transfer tax:
130,000CHF*1.8%=2,300CHF) equals -3,900CHF.
d 825,000CHF (sell price 2014: 1,650CHF/m2*500=825,000CHF) minus 275,000CHF
(acquisition price 2004: 550CHF/m2*500=275,000CHF) minus 3,300CHF (land prop-
erty tax: 275,000CHF*1.2%*10=9,300CHF) minus 14,900CHF (property transfer tax:
825,000CHF*1.8%=14,900CHF) equals 516,800CHF.
Taking into consideration the lowering of land prices over the past ten (or twenty)Building rights as an
opportunity for middle
class families?
years in Oberaargau, the building rights model is economically more profitable than
the full property rights model. However, as soon as land prices stabilise, the full
property rights model is slightly more profitable. In comparison with the evolution of
land prices from around Lake Geneva, the instrument provides a good counterexample
of how the instrument building can neutralise rent. With the building right price of
3.25CHF/m2, the Herdgemeinde offers cheaper housing possibilities for middle class
(Federal Chancellery, 2014).
57In a central highly asked location, building right prices will also grow according to the demand,
but this growth will be more limited than in a full property model, because the building right ends
in the medium/long term, but not the property title.
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income families that can afford a 500,000 francs loan in order to build their house but
not a 630,000 francs loan. Further, the building right model is also financially more
stable and predictable, because it is unaffected or marginally affected by land price
variations. In the full property model, land prices can turn a household’s investment
into a financial black hole or a winning lottery ticket.
But perhaps more relevant are the different housing costs of various housing models Small price increase
favours the capital
intensive model
as shown in table 3.4: for a ten year period, without considering capital requirements
for contracting a loan, the building rights model as it is structured in Huttwil is the
cheapest solution. As soon as land prices slightly increase – the 1% price growth
chosen here is purely hypothetical, the full property model becomes economically less
costly. In comparison to the property models, the rental model is among the costliest
way of housing, but the only one that people with low savings can afford; renting is
the most prevalent form of housing in Switzerland (BFS, 2016b).
Housing model 10 years housing costs
Full property
(Oberaargau prices)
158,300CHF a
Full property
(1%/year price increase)
59,200CHF b
Building right 94,500CHF c
Rental housing 130,000CHF d
Table 3.4: Comparison of housing costs in rental, building right and full property models
over the 10 years between 2004 and 2014 in Huttwil. Data: Commune of Huttwil (2014);
Wüest and Partner (VVYY); BFS (2016a,c). Own calculations. Calculations do not consider
building e.
a 630,000CHF (acquisition price) minus 105,000CHF (mortgage interests based on a
420,000CHF mortgage (2/3 of 630,000CHF – 1/3 owner’s capital, 2/3 mortgage), which is com-
posed of the price of land (130,000CHF) and of the house with land service (500,000CHF),
at an average interest rate of 2.5%) minus 10,700CHF (property transfer tax 1.8%) minus
7,600CHF (land property tax 1.2%) plus 595,000CHF (sell price) equals -158,300CHF.
b 630,000CHF (acquisition price of land (130,000CHF) and of the house with land service
(500,000CHF)) minus 105,000CHF (mortgage interests based on a 420,000CHF mortgage (2/3
of 630,000CHF – 1/3 owner’s capital, 2/3 mortgage) at an average interest rate of 2.5%) minus
12,500CHF (property transfer tax 1.8%) minus 7,600CHF (land property tax 1.2%) plus
695,900CHF (sell price) equals -59,200CHF.
c 500,000CHF (acquisition price of the house with land service) minus 83,800CHF (mort-
gage interests based on a 335,000CHF mortgage (2/3 of 500,000CHF – 1/3 owner’s capital, 2/3
mortgage) at an average interest rate of 2.5%) minus 10,700CHF (property transfer tax 1.8%)
plus 500,000CHF (sell price) equals -94,500CHF.
dAverage 10 year rent for a five rooms flat in a rural commune of the canton of Berne between
2000 and 2014 (BFS, 2016a).
Through the ex-course on the emphyteutic lease, I wanted to show that a demand Various explanations for
land hoarding?for housing in the region of Huttwil can exist, as the land of the Herdgemeinde’s
building land has been largely developed. Therefore, if the landowners in the other
parts of town do not develop their land, other interests prevail, such as the will to
save land for their children (see Burgergemeinde of Wiedlisbach in section 3.2.1, or
the expectancy of a higher financial return58.
3.3.5 Impact on value redistribution
The case of building zone reduction in Huttwil illustrated the limited margin of man- Local factors as main
explanationoeuvre of the communal executive body when it comes to decide upon a withdrawal of
development rights. The communal executive body used the commune’s obligation to
establish a hazard map in order to suspend the planning process. It then depoliticised
the zoning issue by delegating the decision on the land’s constructibility to external
experts. Despite the legal feasibility of the outzoning operation – the plots were not
serviced, a withdrawal of development rights without compensation is not acceptable
for local actors. The communal authority does not risk to decide against its planning
committee (and the communal legislative body?) on the removal of the building zone
in Thomasbode (or Sonnegg, Hueb or Hohlen), despite the canton’s support on the
issue.
58M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. Cit.; C. Schneider, op. cit.
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The result of the building zone reduction is that a limited value redistributionDensification as value
compensation mechanism takes place where the commune resorts to an external expert in order to decide on
the land’s constructibility and elaborate an additional plan for the development of
Thomasbode. This renewed legal document brings two advantages to the commune:
the local authorities’ participation in land service costs is reduced and allows a reduc-
tion of approximately one third of the constructible perimeter (10,000m2), whereas it
keeps the economic value on the landowners’ side constant. In a future local devel-
opment plan, there will be a small ecological gain over previous plans, as a smaller
surface will be developed. Still, the probable destruction of water catchments that are
present in the area (see section 3.3.4) will be a net loss. An element that highlightsCollectivisation of private
costs the tight margin of manoeuvre for the commune, concerns the implementation of the
land service tax and the tax on added land value created by zoning. The shrinking
land prices over (at least) the past fifteen years59 worked against the landowners’
ambitions to value their property, despite the communal financial support. For a long
period of time, the commune financed the land service.
But as the building rights model has shown, a morose land market does not excludeLow rent favours cheap
housing development. It only reduces the rent that landowners can obtain from land. As
semi-public landowner, the Herdgemeinde managed to create an amount of added
economic value they deemed sufficient (annual rent of 1.625% of a land value around
200CHF/m2) as well as attract new inhabitants into town.
59I could even argue that prices have been constant or slightly declining for the past 25 years,
because of the real estate crisis in Switzerland during the 1990s.
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3.4 Reuse of polluted soil in Niederbipp
Over the past fifteen years, Niederbipp has experienced significant growth in terms of
both population and jobs. It is one of the three regional centres of Oberaargau (Region
Oberaargau and Kanton Bern, 2012). The development of a regional industrial zone
is, in this study, of particular interest, because it involves the case of a polluted
field – a former communal landfill – transformed into an important logistics centre
almost without public financial support. However, the fact that it does not require
remediation turns out to be the determining factor for the project’s success. Further,
Niederbipp provides another example of implementation of the Bernese tax on added
land value created by zoning, which is of particular interest, as it shows that the
applied land price is of central concern to the tax’s effective implementation.
Figure 3.6: Overview map of Niederbipp. Data: (AGR, 1984; Commune of Niederbipp,
1993b). Map: Swisstopo (2014a).
3.4.1 Evolution of land use planning and land use
Zoning changes in 1984
Figure 3.7 shows the evolution of zoning and actual land use. The first revision 1984 revision hardly
documentedtaken into consideration is from 1984, the previous one from 1956. According to the
canton (AGR, 1984, 3), main drivers for the revision are the reduction of the building
zone and the definition of a new industrial zone, the latter linked to the commune’s
connection to the N1 motorway. However, the only planning documents available
do not show where and how the building zone reductions occurred. Furthermore,
there is no calculus concerning the availability and needs of building zone60 nor in
the negotiations or opposition documents. The cantonal decree approves the zoning
plan without specific comment and only mentions that areas marked for placement
60By the time of approval of the building regulations, the Bernese spatial planning act had not
been revised according to the federal act yet.
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Year Land use planning changes Land use changes
1966 Construction of the
Tela Papierfabrik AG,
only industrial plant of
Niederbipp until 1997
1984 Approval of the revised building regulations, the old
ones dating back to 1968 (AGR, 1984)
Few housing and indus-
trial constructions
1993 Approval of the revised building regulations: minor
building zone reductions (AGR, 1993)
1996 Approval of extension of the industrial zone Indus-
triezone Ost (Commune of Niederbipp, 1996)
Progressive development
of the industrial zone.
Accidental fire and de-
struction of the paper
plant. Reconstruction of
the plant.
2004 Partial revision of the building regulations: intro-
duction of the tax on added land value created by
zoning and extension of the industrial zone
Development of hous-
ing, industrial and ag-
ricultural constructions
(greenhouses)
2005 Construction of the
Dentressangle logistics
centre
2012 Approval of the revised building regulations (Com-
mune of Niederbipp, 2012)
Extension of the green-
houses
Table 3.5: Main land use planning changes in Niederbipp since 1984.
into the building zone in the future are "generous" in comparison to the existing
building zones (AGR, 1984, 6): the extension of the industrial zone is planned in two
different locations, in the north where the existing industrial zone is located, and in
the south-east, along the motorway. Important extensions of the working zone in the
south-west are also foreseen. Besides the extension of institutional zones (hospital,
kindergarten), no important changes are discussed or subject to contest, which implies
that the previously mentioned reduction of the building zone has been settled during
the revision process.
Land use changes between 1984 and 1993
Land use evolution during the following decade is rather modest (dark grey on the
map), although the time period considered is short compared to the other two case
studies61. Changes occur mainly in terms of public infrastructure (schools, retirement
homes), light industry up north, as well as individual housing construction scattered
across the existing settlement.
Zoning plan revision of 1993
The building regulations revision of 1993 faced important issues: several perimetersSeveral zoning operations
were zoned, only one of the anticipated building zone extensions was realised, and
numerous opposition was formulated by landowners against the commune’s zoning
projects. Another important hurdle was the implementation of the cropland protec-
tion plan, a central concern for Niederbipp and its wide, flat agricultural plots.
The zoned areas, (light purple, numbered "1" on the map), consist of several
plots in Sandacher close to the motorway, one important plot in Grundacher up north,
four developed plots close to the Spital in the north west, a bigger plot in Hofacher
(centre south) and three smaller plots in the west.
The justification for placing the plots around Sandacher were put into the agricul-Outzoned plots hardly
constructible tural zone was that they are traversed by high voltage lines, which severely restrict
their development. There were two opponents to the decision. One opponent sought
only the reimbursement of the land tax paid in excess, and the other did not justify
his position, so the procedure came quickly to an end. The plot in Grundacher was
designated as agricultural zone after the canton inserted it into the cropland protec-
tion plan. As the owner had no intention to develop it, their opposition was rejected.
61The time periods are based on the time maps provided by Swisstopo (2014b).
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The plot in Hofacher is part of the institutional zone (extension of the cemetery) in
the former plan. It was therefore designated as agricultural zone without any demand
of compensation. The partially-built plots close to the Spital are part of an actual
farm, which makes their zone change unproblematic. In regard to the three smaller
plots in the west, one of the owners did not object to the decision. The two others,
who own plots on the boundary of the building zone, do not have the right to oppose
the communal decision, as their plots are not serviced and their lower constructible
parts towards the road have been already developed and sold in the past.
In matters of building zone extension (light brown, numbered "2" on the map), Minor adaptations and
first extension of the
industrial zone
one can observe several small peripheral extensions, mostly created to adapt planning
to actual use and release building and renovation restrictions in the given areas. In
fact, the construction changed from a protected zone with tight regulations into a
regular building zone. Wider extensions concern the industrial zone in the north,
which intends to welcome an additional building of the existing paper company Tela
(AGR, 1993, 10), and Geerenacher – close to the recently built school, which is zoned
as institutional.
Land use changes from 1994 to 2014
Between 1993 and 2014, construction in Niederbipp increased significantly: major Important development
of housing and industrydevelopment occurred in the northern part of the industrial zone (see section 3.4.4).
In terms of housing, entire neighbourhoods were erected: eight homes hosting several
apartments in Breitsteiacher, over 40 single family homes in Widenacher, about 20
single family homes around Galgacher, twelve double-family homes in Sagimatt, and
around 20 single family homes in Moosacher.
Zoning plan revisions between 1996 and 2014
Besides the massive extension of the industrial zone described below, there is no other
significant zoning change, except a slight reduction of the building zone in Stockacher
(dark purple on the map) – which was excluded from the local development of
Widenacher – and a minor extension near Scharnageln (yellow, numbered "3" on the
map). Further, the important changes linked to the creation of industrial zones were
made in specific procedures.
Gap between zoning and land use
Similar to Wiedlisbach, the building regulations revision of 1984 was approved with
a huge building zone reserve, which explains a significant remaining gap between the
use foreseen by regulations, and the actual land use. Construction occurs almost ex-
clusively within the building zone, demonstrating the efficacy of zoning as a means
of delimiting constructions. There are two wide grey squares in the east of the set-
tlement area (numbered "4" on the map): these are greenhouses used for hydroponic
agriculture, considered an agricultural land use.
Sudden fill of the building zone
Niederbipps development occurred in a shorter time span and more abruptly than
the previous two cases. In the 1980s until the end of the 1990s, nohousing investors
appeared. Between 1995 and 2000, Widenacher and Galgacher started to develop,
whereas the other construction essentially began in 2005 and is still ongoing. Accord-
ing to the communal head of administration of constructions62, a construction boom
began in 2008 and has not subsided.
Remaining not built plots
As one can read from the map, significant building zone reserves (in terms of housing) Hoarding remains an
significant phenomenonstill exist. The most important reserves are in Stockacher and Hofacher, both attrib-
uted to a mixed zone, the latter being part of a local development plan. With excep-
tion of the remaining undeveloped plots in Breitsteiacher, meant to host single-family
62R. Suter, op. cit.
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homes, most of the other building zone reserves are zoned as two or three storey res-
idential zone. The fact that construction activity recently experienced growth speaks
against the hoarding behaviour of landowners.This evidence alone, is not enough to
justify the remaining important gaps: discussions led by the communal executive
body to convince the landowners to develop were not followed by behavioural change.
Vehement opposition by landowners dissuaded the commune to take further legal
action against them63.
63R. Suter, op. cit.
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3.4.2 Contextual factors
Demographic evolution
Over the last 20 years (1993-2013), Niederbipp experienced a population growth of25% population growth
over 20 years 25.5% (from 3,482 to 4,371 inhabitants), an average annual growth rate of 1.28% (BFS,
2015). Compared with the neighbouring communes, it is in the upper tier of growth.
Over the same period, only Oensingen (5850 inhabitants) in Canton Solothurn, and
Schwarzhäusern (500 inhabitants) experienced high growth. Between 1993 and 2013,
Oensingen experience a population increase of 43.8% (2.19% per year on average)
and Schwarzhäusern 28.1% (1.4% per year on average). Oberbipp (1650 inhabitants,
18.0% growth or 1.0% growth per year) and Kestenholz (1750 inhabitants, 20.7%
growth, 0.9% growth per year) in canton Solothurn are also fast growing communes.
In comparison to these communes, other surrounding communes have a slow growth:
Balsthal 2.7% (5836 inahbitants), Laupersdorf 2.7% (1682 inhabitants) and Bannwil
0.9% (691 inhabitants).
Compared to regional, cantonal and Swiss averages, Niederbipp is far above re-1.28% yearly growth in
Niederbipp, 0.84% in
Switzerland
gional, cantonal and national growth rates (respectively 4.9%, 6.4% and 16.8% total
growth or 0.25%, 0.32% and 0.84% annual growth).
In terms of flat vacancies, the available data does not allow us to draw any con-
clusion, as there has been high construction activity over the last decade. In 2011,
the vacancy rate was around 3%.
Economic and fiscal evolution
Inhabitants of the commune have a fiscal capacity above regional average (932CHF perHigh job supply
month compared to an average of 825CHF per month). Since 2001, the number of jobs
increased from 1,450 to 2,250. With slightly more than one job for two inhabitants,
the job supply is also far above average (30 jobs per 100 people regionally).
Tax rates for natural persons have been lowered over the last ten years andLow taxes
are among the lowest in the region (1.35 in Niederbipp and 1.59 on average) (FIN,
VVYYa). These rates compete with those found in Schwarzhäusern (1.39) and Lan-
genthal (1.38). The land tax rate is also below average (1 instead of 1.12), as in
Schwarzhäusern and Langenthal (FIN, VVYYa). The communes further west (Ober-
bipp, Wiedlisbach) however, have a higher rate. It is difficult to directly compare the
tax levels with the neighbour canton of Solothurn. However, according to Brülhart
(2014), combined cantonal and communal taxes are, on average, higher in Solothurn
than in the canton of Berne. Nevertheless, as the commune of Oensingen has a tax
rate clearly under cantonal average (Amt für Finanzen, 2003, 2013), it has a higher
fiscal attractiveness than the neighbouring Bernese communes (Brülhart, 2014).
In regard to land prices, it was not possible to find data specific to industrial land,No price data available
which is the type of land use that is studied in the present case study.
Topographic and spatial characteristics
Located further east of Wiedlisbach, the commune is on the border of the canton ofAgricultural land ideal
for construction Solothurn. The commune’s northern border is delimited by the Jura mountains, and
its southern border by the Längwald forest. While the central and biggest part of
the communal territory is flat land of high quality, principally devoted to agriculture
(Swisstopo, 2014a), it is also where settlement and the entire industrial complex is
located.
In terms of transport, the train network grants direct connections to Olten ( 22
minutes away; departing every twenty minutes) and to Solothurn (15 minutes away;
departing four times per hour). Travel time to Zurich or Berne is approximately one
hour with connections every half an hour to Zurich and four times an hour to Berne.
In terms of individual transport, the N1 motorway crosses, approximately, the middle
of the commune, and has an interchange granting access to Berne in approximately
40 minutes and to Zurich in an hour.
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3.4.3 Constraints of superior law
Cantonal land use planning policy
Starting with the building regulations revision of 1993, the main constraints of super-
ior law become evident. In order to implement the federal cropland protection plan
and protect Niederbipp’s high quality agricultural land, the canton defined several
reserved zones on the the commune’s agricultural land zoned as building zone. The
removal of the reserved zones required the commune to revise their zoning plan and to
reduce their building zones in the most sensible areas (light purple, numbered "1"
on figure 3.7). Despite these building zone reductions, the building zone dedicated to
housing remains massively oversized (AGR, 1993, 8f). The commune has 16 hectares
that are zoned as housing zone an remain not built (in regard to a maximum of 11
hectares allowed), whereby the needs are calculated generously:
− maximum plot ratio of 0.4 – despite the fact that several local development
plans foresee higher ratios (up to 0.85);
− mixed use of the housing zone with up to 40% of non-housing uses, whereas
usual calculation standards foresee 20
− an average flat size corresponding to the 2014 standards;
Reasons mentioned for the difficulty to reduce the building zone are the numerous Limited zoning out
procedures"holes" within the settlement area. In the long run, agricultural production on nu-
merous plots is not sustainable. Further, the fact that part of these plots are serviced
hampers the zoning process. In addition, part of the landowners’ objections to the
cropland protection plan had been accepted by the canton in 1987. For matters of
legal consistency, the 1993 building regulations revision that implemented the cro-
pland protection plan, had to take into account the objections formulated in 1987.
Despite more than 40 oppositions voiced against the new building regulations, no
objection was filed against the planned extension of the industrial zone (AGR, 1990).
With the creation of the cantonal priority development areas program in 1989, the Economic development
about to beginindustrial zone of Niederbipp was about to become a cantonal priority. This policy
allows the canton to grant planning subventions to the designated areas, and facil-
itates specific measures and derogations to authorized street capacities, noise, and
pollution levels (ARE, 2003, 14). During the 1993 building regulations revision, the
office of economic development supported the first small extension of the industrial
zone (light brown, numbered "2" on the map) and underlined the cantonal polit-
ical support that the planned industrial development benefits. The future idustrial
development is extensively mentioned in the cantonal decision approving Niedrbipp’s
building regulations. Further, the cantonal decision approving the communal building
regulations is signed by the Minister of the Department to which the spatial planning
office belongs.
Remediation of contaminated sites policy
Because our case involves polluted soil, I briefly explore the main constraints set Extended ground
analyses requiredby environmental legislation in regard to these sites. Legally64, the remediation or
redevelopment of a brownfield is conditioned by the type of pollution, the level of
pollution of soil and by its spread through the nearby soil and groundwater. If the
legal pollution levels of soil are exceeded, extended analyses have to be conducted
to establish need for further intervention. If the toxic material is spreading and the
legal maximum values for one or several toxic substances is exceeded in the immediate
downstream of the plot, remediation becomes mandatory65.
The technical ordinance on waste66 distinguishes three types of landfills: landfills
for inter materials, land fills for stabilized residues and bioactive landfills. The landfills
have to be registered and an inventory of their content (types and quantities of waste
stored) must be kept up to date. In the case of the landfill Müllergrube presented in
64Art. 16 of the Federal ordinance of 26 August 1998 on the remediation of polluted sites, SR
814.680.
65Art. 9, 10, 11, 12 AltV, SR 814.680.
66Art. 22 of the Technical ordinance on waste TOW, SR 814.600.
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section 3.4.4, the content of the land fill was partially unknown and extensive analyses
had to be conducted to establish its content.
Remediation can be achieved in two ways (art. 16 AltV): either through remedi-Monitoring obligation
ation, (elimination of the environmentally hazardous substances), or through securit-
isation of the site, (the prevention and monitoring of the diffusion of environmentally
hazardous substances). In order to further secure the site, the pollution level around
the contaminated site (e.g. nearby soil, groundwater up- and downstream) must be
monitored. This obligation is part of the confinement prescriptions (art. 16 AltV).
Regional coordination of development
In terms of regional planning, the communes of Wiedlisbach, Oberbipp and Nieder-Regional policy
bipp, since the 1990’s, have been in the perimeter of the priority development area
policy, which means that the canton can subsidise planning activities, grant funds to
development projects and offer travel credits (AGR, 2000)67. Since 2007, under the
supervision of the cantons of Berne and Solothurn, an intercantonal study between
Oberbipp and Oensingen was launched, later extended to Wangen an der Aare. This
study led to the signing of an agreement between the five communes and the two can-
tons to coordinate development and establish a list of criteria that allows to evaluate
future settlement areas (Solothurner Zeitung, 2014). The agreement’s effects on the
implementation of land use planing policy, namely the inter-communal definition of
new housing, commercial and industrial zones could not be observed yet. In 2012,
Niederbipp was defined as a working area of regional importance by the regional struc-
ture plan, which obligated the commune and the canton to make land available for
development by the means they deem appropriate (Region Oberaargau and Kanton
Bern, 2012).
Building permit prescriptions
The central issue for the development of a polluted site that is not undergoing remedi-Length limit for piles
ation, is to prevent the spread of the hazardous substances.Prevention is especially
important during the construction phase, considered the most sensitive (AWA, 2005).
The nature of contaminated sites can make them a challenging place for construction,
particularly for landfills. The landfill ground consists of different types of wastes,
of various solidity, density and toxicity, all of which stands in contradiction to solid
basement requirements. In construction, a frequently used technique to ensure the
stability of a building is to put pillars in the ground to prevent movement. In the case
of a polluted site, this pillar technique is problematic, as it might pierce the waste
deposit, and facilitate the exfiltration of toxic liquids.
The building permit required an emergency plan in case pollution spreads duringAdditional planning
measures the construction process (Prefecture of Wangen, 2005). Further, a plan in regard to
the reuse of the excavated ground during the construction process must be submitted
(FOEN, 1999). In addition, an adequate permanent gas drainage system must be set
up in order to safely evacuate ascending landfill gas (Prefecture of Wangen, 2005).
3.4.4 Local use of instruments
Context of development and actors’ positions
Until the major extension of the industrial zone Industriezone Ost, one single fact-An industrialisation wave
coming from the east ory existed in Niederbipp: the Tela paper plant. However, the adjacent commune of
Oensingen, part of Canton Solothurn, has established a growing industrial zone over
the past decades. The success of their neighbour may have provided Niederbipp the
will to develop, and the will to shed their rural status. Interviewees68 mention a tem-
poral shift between the construction of the motorway in the 1960’s and development
pressure coming from the east, (Aarau, Olten and Oensingen), a transformation that
progressively takes over the Bipperamt.
67Travel credits are part of the Bernese Fahrleistungsmodell which is not presented fur-
ther here. Please refer to http://www.vol.be.ch/vol/de/index/luft/luftreinhaltung/verkehr/
fahrleistungsmodell.html for further information.
68R. Suter, op. cit.; R. Wyss, heritage and landscape activist, interviewed in Attiswil the 26 March
2014.
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The Industriezone Ost project was born in the mid 1990’s when the commune, Environmental
requirements induce
wider industrial
development
petitioned by Tela for their proposed expansion69, decided to extend the industrial
zone by 2 hectares. However, in order to comply with the requirements of the exten-
sion’s underlying environmental impact assessment, the construction of a new road,
and an underpass crossing the train tracks was required70. As these costs were high,
a general extension of the zone was put on the table by the commune and , which
would make it possible to divide land service costs among the different landowners71.
Ongoing discussions between the commune, the planning authority, and the can- Separation between
regular building
regulations revision and
industrial extension
tonal office of economic development on the current project’s maturity (negotiation
with landowners, land service plan, costs division, approval by the communal legislat-
ive body) lead to a separation between the ongoing revision of building regulations,
approved in 1993 (AGR, 1993), and the future extension of the industrial zone, ap-
proved in 1996.
Within the cantonal administration, the office of economic development strongly Political and
administrative supportsupported industrial development, and offered a credit of 1.5 million francs for ser-
vicing the zone, reimbursable within 10 years (AGR, 1990). The office of economic
development cited the high degree of commune accessibility to the motorway, prox-
imity to the existing industrial zone of Oensingen and Tela’s desire to expand, as
justification for the industrial development. The department of the cantonal spatial
planning office supported the development through the priority development areas
program mentioned in section 3.4.3.
As the totality of land taken into consideration is part of the cropland protection Agricultural
considerations politically
out weighted
plan, the agricultural office was opposed to any extension. However, the agricultural
office shares the same directorate with the office of economic development and was
aware that their opposition would not be supported by the responsible cantonal min-
ister72. In fact, the minister offered a 1.5 million francs credit for the land service
of the new zone and personally signed the support letter addressed to the commune
(Commune of Niederbipp, 1993a)73.
First stage of development of the industrial zone
The perimeter considered is composed of 15 plots located at the eastern border of Property fragmentation
the commune: they consist of flat agricultural land and include the former communal
landfill. Twelve plots are privately owned, one plot is owned by the Canton of Berne,
and one by the commune of Niederbipp. Another plot is property of the Flurgen-
ossenschaft Niederbipp, a cooperative composed of all landowners of the commune,
whose main function is to maintain roads and paths across the communal territory.
This cooperative is financed by the rent obtained from member’s properties. In re-
gard to the privately owned plots, the biggest is owned by Tela, the paper company
already present on site. Six further plots were bought by the company before the
actual development.
The total constructible surface is approximately 16 ha, the part north of the Wide, flat and optimally
connected arearail tracks 6 ha , and the southern part 10 ha ( the site of the Tela factory). The
SBB tracks connect Solothurn to Olten (Jurasüdfuss line) and the Aare-Seeland-Mobil
tracks connect Solothurn to Oensingen and Langenthal. The nearest motorway access
(N1 Berne – Zurich) is less than 2 km away.
At the heart of the development operation was a land service contract74 (Planungs- A detailed land service
contractund Infrastrukturvertrag) signed between the commune and the landowners. It pre-
ceded the zoning operation. In order to ensure that the zoned land will be effectively
developed, and that the commune does not bear all development costs, an agreement
defining the financial contribution of each landowner to the service of the perimeter
and ensuring the payment of these contributions was signed. The contract contained
69Tela is a paper company employing 300 people in Niederbipp since the 1960’s.
70Art. 2 of the Draft contract Planungs- und Infrastrukturvertrag zwischen der Einwohnerge-
meinde Niederbipp und den Grundeignetümern im Perimeter der Überbauung "Industrizone Ost".
71The contract signed between the commune and the different plot owners estimates road and
underpass construction at 4.5 million francs in total.
72It is not the same minister who approved Niederbipp’s building regulations!
73Letter of the 3 August 1993 from public economy directorate of the canton of Berne addressed
to the executive of the commune of Niederbipp concerning "Industriezone Niederbipp / Erweiterung
und Erschliessungshilfe".
74Contract of civil law, as defined in the Code of Obligations, SR 220.
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the following main elements:
− the local development plan (Überbauungsordnung) with building restrictions
such as type of use75, maximal building sizes, minimal distances to other build-
ings, a minimal "green coefficient" as well as the detail land service plan of the
plots;
− the amount charged to each landowner in regard to planning costs, base land
service costs and detail land service costs;
− the date of payment of these fees;
− the payment guarantee through first rank mortgages;
− the party bearing exceeding and additional costs (notary, geometer, land re-
gistry) which is in the present case the commune.
The contract foresaw that 100% of the detail land service costs would need to beTotal land service
amounts to
500,000CHF/ha
paid by landowners. These costs amounted to approximately 7.4 million francs and in-
cluded land service in terms of electricity, table water, sewer, rainwater drainage, and
the construction of small streets. The basic land service costs amounted to approx-
imately 3.6 million francs. Eighty percent of these costs were paid by the landowners
(20% by the commune); this percentage corresponds to the legal maximum76. The
planning costs amounted to 180,000 francs; 2/3 were paid by the commune, and 1/3
by the landowners (divided proportionally according to the amount of land they own).
Divided by the entire surface (approximately 22 hectares) that was serviced, the total
land service costs amounted to approximately 500,000CHF/ha.
Second stage of development of the industrial zone and tax on added land
value created by zoning
In 2007, the industrial perimeter was extended by 11.2 hectares on the northern side ofContractually defined tax
amounts to 30% the railway tracks. For the first time since the partial revision of building regulations
in 2004, the tax on added land value created by zoning was implemented on a large
scale. The formula was as follows: the original land price is set at 15CHF/m2, the new
land price at 90CHF/m2, which results in an added value of 75CHF/m2. This added
value is taxed, according to the signed agreement, at a 30% rate, which amounts to
22.5CHF/m2.
Communal building regulations do not specify the percentage of added value toVague regulatory
specifications be taxed. They mention that "equality in front of the law" and "specific cases" have
to be taken into consideration, and further, that the taxed amount should be "appro-
priated"77.
The zoned plots have basic service, but no detail service78. Based on the costEffective tax rate is
closer to 21% calculation made for the first part of the industrial zone, detail land service costs of
approximately 3.5 million francs would apply79, i.e. 35CHF/m2. If more realistic
land prices before and after the zoning process are taken into consideration – e.g.
5–10CHF/m2 for agricultural land and 150CHF/m2 for industrial land80, the actual
added value is as follows: 150CHF (new value) - 10CHF (old value) - 35CHF (land
service) = 105CHF. Therefore, the actually applied rate is more around 21%.
The calculation method for the tax on added value created by zoning presented
above shows the degree of manoeuvreability that the commune had in implementing
their new instrument. It also shows that the implementation of the instrument is
recent. With its introduction in 2004, the commune seized the opportunity to capture
over 2.5 million francs while adopting the second extension of the industrial zone.
If the instrument would have been implemented earlier, it could have been appliedNo earlier
implementation of the
tax possible 75Commercial centres exceeding 500m2 are prohibited. Certain areas closer to housing areas are
exclusively dedicated to tertiary uses (Commune of Niederbipp, 1998)
76Art. 112 al. 1 let. 2 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
77Art. 47, Building regulations of 11 June 2012 of the commune of Niederbipp.
78R. Suter, op. cit.
79As no access to the land service contract was given, I apply the detail land service costs per
hectare calculated for the development of the first part of the industrial zone.
80The industrial land price is the one applied to land during the development of the first part of
the industrial zone.
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solely to the first extension of the industrial zone (no other extension of buliding zone
has taken place since the introduction of the instrument in cantonal legislation in
1985). But the instrument’s use would have either required a specific revision of
building regulations in order to adopt the necessary legal basis, or its implementation
during the 1993 revision. Given the short time span between the building regulations
revision of 1993 and the elaboration of the land service contract in 1996 as well as
the high controversy of the last building regulations revision (on the implementation
of the cropland protection plan), both options seem highly improbable.
Development of the polluted plots
Several companies established themselves in the new industrial zone which served
to raise awareness of the location81. Different buyers were interested to develop
the former communal landfill, but their projects were checked by geotechnical and
financial constraints. The development of the plot could be authorized by the cantonal
waste and water office (AWA) only after detailed ground analyses were made (paid
by the future developer) and the definition of a precise construction technique set.
The cantonal land registry provides the following information in regard to the Entry into registry of
polluted soilspolluted site: the Rotboden/Müllegrube, object number 09810014, is currently divided
into six plots82 for an approximate surface of 79,003 m2. The volume of the contam-
inated material buried in the ground is estimated to 1,550,800 m3. The landfill was
opened in 1960, and closed in 1992; the first presumptions that the site was polluted
were reported in 1995 (AWA, 1995); the entry in the registry of polluted sites was
made on 29 September 2005. As sample analyses show, the site contains (in addi-
tion to excavation residues and rubble), the following toxic elements: organochloride,
chemicals, solvents and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (AWA, 2014).
According to the AWA and the Geotest AG (AWA, 2005), several development Unstable soil structure
and proximity of a water
catchment
projects were already in line before, but cancelled for financial and geotechnical reas-
ons. In fact, two issues are problematic for the development of the site: the soil
structure and the proximity of a water catchment:
− the soil structure is unstable in the sense that the deposited waste varies in
terms of density and consistency within the deposit volume. The litter is some-
how dispatched across the landfill and subsequently threatens the construction’s
stability;
− the proximity of a major water catchment83 (700 meters) makes potential drain-
age of waste liquids into the groundwater highly problematic, as this would
pollute the water and severely restrict the catchment’s use. Two main external
factors can lead to such infiltrations: the drainage of water from the surface
through precipitation, and a physical intervention into the landfill through the
construction of foundations, particularly deeply-rooted pillars, greatly facilitate
the spread of liquids, as they hold the potential of piercing the entire mass of lit-
ter (which would greatly facilitate the spread of toxic liquids into the ground)84.
From a legal point of view, the owner has no obligation to remediate a plot, as Cover to prevent future
infiltrationslong as the thresholds of pollutants in nearby waters do not exceed legal boundar-
ies. Therefore, in order to minimize changes in the deposit’s structure and prevent
infiltration into groundwater, one solution is to cover the concerned perimeter, ren-
dering it impermeable to potential infiltration. As no intervention is legally required
by the current situation, the construction of a cover would only be effective in case
of development.
In 1998, first analyses were conducted by the cantonal water protection office Limited risk of
exfiltrationsshowed a low level of pollution in the groundwater downstream of the landfill (AWA,
2005). In 2000, further analyses produced similar results, once even exceeding the legal
limits, qualifying, in theory, for remediation. In order to determine if there is an actual
81According to the communal planner, Zellstoff-vertriebs-GmbH, Ophardt, and Ducati were the
first companies to establish themselves in the industrial zone.
82Plots number 282, 984, 2108, 2092, 2091 and 2072 (AWA, 2014).
83The catchment provides an important part of the drinking water for Oensingen; between 1,000
and 5,000 liters per minute are subtracted from the groundwater.
84J.P. Clément, Head of the Research Department on groundwater and contaminated sites, inter-
viewed in Berne 14 Max 2014.
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Figure 3.8: Constraints of construction on the landfill Müllergrube. Own representation.
need for remediation, and if the plot could potentially be developed, an extensive study
had to be conducted including dozens of boreholes and various sounding techniques
(AWA, 2005, 66). Further, an exfiltration model was conceived in order to calculate
the probability of exfiltrations in case of development. These analyses showed that
the risk of pollution was low, and that the chances for groundwater contamination
were rather low and temporary.
The construction of a logistics centre on top of the landfill is a suitable cover forA logistics centre as lid
the waste pit, as its surface (30,300 m2) covers more than a third of the landfill’s
estimated surface. The weight it has to support and the depth of the pillars can be
problematic: the pillars cannot exceed the height of the buried waste, as otherwise
toxic liquids would drain through and spread. The cantonal office sets a minimum of
5 meters between the bottom of the pillar and the bottom of the landfill (AWA, 2005).
Contrary to other, higher precision industries, soil instabilities are less important for
a logistics centre. In order to support the building weight, 8,000 pillars of concrete,
combined with gravel columns on top, are drilled into the ground.
In order to reduce risks in case of groundwater contamination, an emergency10 years financial
guarantee against
potential contamination
plan with intervention measures had to be elaborated by the new owner. As the
groundwater is located at a depth (25-30 meters from the surface), and the aquifer
is composed of significant quantities of water (the standing water can reach a height
of 40 meters), intervention measures are technically and financially limited to the
securitization of the existing catchment. For this purpose, the developer deposited,
for ten years, a significant financial guarantee (AWA, 2005, 66). If contamination does
occur after the 10 year warranty, or within the 10 year warrants, and the remediation
costs exceed the owners deposit, public authorities bear the additional costs.
The analyses conducted to assess and minimize risks, the boreholes and soundingAnalyses and additional
construction costs passed
on in transaction price
techniques used and the additional construction costs that the developer had to sup-
port were passed on to the former plot owner through a discount on the land price.
Instead of a price approximating 150CHF/m2 as for the other plots of the industrial
zone, the price of the landfill was set at approximately 120CHF/m2. The difference of
30CHF/m2 was supposed to cover the additional expenses supported by the logistics
company and the fact that the plot was not sold but leased throug ha building right.
The initial sale price of 150CHF/m2 has been recommended by the commune to the
various owners in order to ensure a quick development of the area85.
3.4.5 Impact on value redistribution
Considering the analysis of the past sections, I can draw a set of conclusions, specific-Costs of analyses as
hurdle to development ally regarding the value redistribution process implied by the polluted site’s develop-
85R. Suter, op. cit.
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ment.
Conducting in-depth studies to assess the risk of contamination is a hurdle for The costs of analysis as
hurdle for redevelopmentthe reuse of polluted soils, as potential developers bear additional costs of analyses,
impact assessments, and further securitisation and prevention measures and pass on
part of it to landowners. This follows the general legal principle that the polluter
should bear the costs of their pollution86, but can block the site’s redevelopment.
The potential reuse of a polluted plot is tightly linked to both the remediation Either everything or
nothingobligation and the underlying costs: if there had been an obligation to remediate the
landfill, the remediation costs would greatly exceed any profit use87. In the case of
the landfill, the creation of a lid on the landfill solved the cost issue via a 20% price
reduction on the lease (compared to other land sale prices in the industrial zone). This
reduced transaction price only reflects the costs linked with the ground analyses, the
financial guarantee in case of pollution spread, and the development of the plot, but
is minimal compared with what a a remediation would cost. In the end, the added
economic value created through zoning remains mostly in the hands of the landowner.
In matters of ecological value, the lid reduces the probability of water infiltration and
limits potential future value loss, but also limits any future remediation measure, as
it seals a wide part of the area.
Local geophysical constraints make the management of the each contaminated site Specificities of the case
determinanta specific case: the case of Niederbipp is particularly sensitive, because of groundwater
and the nearby water catchment’s proximity. The water pollution act of 1972 forbade
the establishment of landfills close to catchment locations (Dupuis and Knoepfel, 2015,
93), but the Müllergrube was already in use by that time. The fact that the maximum
legally allowed value for ammonium was only exceeded once seems fortuitous. If other
exceeding values would have been measured, remediation would have been mandatory,
and the private redevelopment of the site would not have been possible.
The present case has shown how development of polluted soil can be a good deal Land sold four times
for both the buyer (if willing to bear a temporary risk), and the seller (who keeps the
major part of the added value). Reflecting on the land’s uses over time, it is possible
to state that the seller is paid by the land in four ways: they rented the land surface
to a farmer for agricultural production, they sold the gravel excavated from the soil,
they sold the storage volume for the landfill, and finally they leased the plot itself to
the logistics company.
Further, the obligations set by the environmental assessment report required im- Environmental legislation
leads an extension of the
industrial zone
portant investments in land service. In order to reduce the land service costs (that
would otherwise exceed the value of the land intended for zoning), the commune de-
cided to extend the perimeter of the industrial zone, distributing the costs among a
wider number of landowners. This decision shows how the constraints set by envir-
onmental legislation have contributed to an extension of the industrial zone.
The fact that the main employer (who is also the main landowner) planned to ex- Emergence of a growth
coalitiontend their activities was, for the commune, a sufficient reason to orient its communal
strategy towards industrial development. Together with the canton’s legal and finan-
cial support for economic development, a growth coalition which included communal
and cantonal authorities, as well as the landowners was created. The land sale price
negotiated between commune and landowners made rapid development of the indus-
trial zone possible. A noticeable fact is, at the time of writing (2014), the plots that
the paper company initially intended to develop, the starting point of Niederbipp’s en-
tire industrial development, remain undeveloped. One explanation could be the 1996
paper plant fire. This fire likely had a financial impact on the company’s strategy.
Additionally, the company was bought by Kimberly-Clark in 1999 (Kimberly-Clark,
1999). The change of ownership from a Swiss company to a multinational owner likely
led to organisational changes.
86Art. 2 of the Federal act of 7 October 1983 on the protection of the environment, SR 814.01.
87J.P. Clément, op. cit.
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Chapter 4
Redistributive capacity of
current institutional regime of
soil
The present chapter analyses the results gathered in the previous parts of this working
paper – the analysis of Oberaargau on a regional scale, the analysis of the institutional
regime, and of the case studies – and places them in a general perspective with the
aim to evaluate the redistributive capacity of the current Swiss, and in particular, the
current Bernese institutional regime of soil. The weaknesses identified in this regime
are subsequently discussed, along with anticipated cantonal legal changes currently
being discussed, in order to determine if and how these changes contribute to a better
redistribution of economic and ecological values.
4.1 Typical issues of peri-urban spaces confirmed
The above analysis shows that several characteristics typical of peri-urban spaces
are confirmed in the case of Oberaargau. The studied building regulation’s revisions
show that these post-rural communes possess the general will to outsize demographic
and economic growth by making cheap land available for development through zoning
operations, but mostly without control on land ownership. This policy results in more
or less oversized, fragmented, and spatially dispersed building zones, and unrealized
development objectives. However, ex-post reduction of oversized building zones is
hampered by Swiss property rights and the underlying risks of compensation for
material expropriation. Out of fear of conflict and respect for previously acquired
rights, communes show great reluctance to implement such reductions and prefer to
maintain consensus. Therefore, agricultural land that is in the building zone is hard
to protect and is subject to an increased risk of urban sprawl within the building zone
shows up. This risk is accentuated by the general communal tendency to simplify
building regulations in order to foster the development of these building zones. The
consequences are an increase in land service costs, and suboptimal development of
the building zone. The paradox is that recent land service costs tend to be borne
by landowners, which creates a disincentive for the communes to correctly dimension
their building zones.
In regard to the reuse of polluted soils, although only one case has been analysed,
there are significant difficulties in the reuse of contaminated sites, because remediation
costs greatly exceed industrial land prices, severely limiting economic reuse of these
soils. Further analysis of other cases is required in order to make more detailed
assertions.
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4.2 Subregional disparities allow the test of redis-
tributive instruments
Regional analysis shows that Oberaargau deals with important subregional disparit-
ies: the north of the region, and the centres around Langenthal and Herzogenbuchsee
are more developed and highly urbanized: they encounter higher demographic and
economic growth than the rest of the region. The south remains oriented towards agri-
culture, and most of these southern communes fight to maintain population and jobs.
Proximity of transport infrastructure, like the motorway and national train lines, plays
a major role in economic and demographic development. These regional disparities
make Oberaargau’s regional perimeter particularly relevant for testing instruments
which redistribute economic and ecological values created by land use dynamics and
land use planning policy.
4.3 Opposition between the use of redistributive in-
struments and communal attractiveness
A contradiction within communal policy can be evidenced with regard to the im-
plementation of redistributive land use planning instruments, and the commune’s
attractiveness for landowners or investors: Redistributive instruments (such as the
land tax) allow the commune to generate rental income from the land, which makes
private land possession less attractive than in other surrounding communes that do
not use the instruments or apply lower rates. The contradiction is found in the fact
that the communes that need the most such redistributive instruments (because of
tight financial budgets, hoarding issues, oversized building zones, etc.) are precisely
those that lack sufficient locational attractiveness for land buyers and investors. As a
consequence, the implementation of redistributive instruments in "unattractive" com-
munes effectively works contrary to betterment of the situation. This displays the
underlying issue of scale in the implementation of the land tax.
The situation does theoretically not apply to the tax on added land value created
by zoning, because it is essentially the landowners (those who already own land in
the commune) who carry these additional costs. In fact, it is their rent that the tax
on added land value created by zoning captures and not the investor’s or the buyer’s
rent. In a declining market, if landowners want to sell their land at a price that
no investor is ready to pay, they cannot pass on the "rental loss" that the tax on
added land value created by zoning imposes to them on the investor, because their
sell price is already too high. The situation is comparable in a rising market, because
the buyer will usually only pay a price in accordance to the benefits they can obtain
from land in the near future. Landowners can pass on the tax on the buyer only if
prices will continue to rise, which is never certain. As the use of building rights in
Huttwil has shown, it is only through a reduction of the landowner’s rent pretensions
that development can occur. The tax on added land value created by zoning only
taxes a potential price difference between a former and latter legal state of rights on
land. If there is no price difference between the former and latter state, for example,
because there is no buyer, then there is no tax!
Notwithstanding this fact, communes tend to procrastinate in the implementation
of voluntary cantonal instruments (like the tax on added land value created by zoning
or the land service tax), or to use them restrictively. This may be explained by the
fact that such instruments add additional hurdles to the decades of negotiations with
landowners. Thus, the communes use them as a reaction to the problems that these
instruments were intended to solve: instead of having anticipated the difficulty of
forcing landowners to develop their land and the costs linked with the service of land,
the communes have inherited a blocked situation and now try to regain some margin of
manoeuvre by capturing value and passing on costs to the landowners. This situation
can be often explained by former interlocking interests of communal authorities and
landowners1.
Moreover, when trying to regain room to negotiate, reducing excessive building
zone reserves is an option used only marginally, because it arises a conflict that is
1C. Schneider, M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt, op. cit.
112 of 127
Lack of building obligation
unlikely to born politically.
4.4 Lack of building obligation
In the three case studies analysed, important building zone reserves, often in the
form of single plots, have been identified. The lack of an instrument or means of
forcing construction is also mentioned by the local political administrative actors.
The only current option works with land that is not yet zoned. It consists of a
contractual agreement done on a voluntary basis, and includes a purchase right for
the commune. Current cantonal legislation does not regulate the matter; however,
the current proposal foresees integration of three instruments into the cantonal law
(art. 126a ff nBauG):
− contractual (public law) building agreement with a purchase right for the com-
mune. For the reasons mentioned above, this instrument is almost exclusively
dedicated to new zoning operations;
− conditional zoning in: if the zoned in land is not built within a defined time
span, it is transferred back into the agricultural zone without compensation;
− imposed building obligation: in case of dominant (überwiegend) public interest
(scarcity of available building land or central character of the plot), an obligation
to build can be set by the communal executive as subsidiary measure when the
plot remains undeveloped for at least five years. This obligation can be applied
to newly zoned plots, or plots already zoned. It is recorded in the land registry.
In order to implement this obligation, the commune:
– can levy an incentive tax after having defined the necessary legal provisions
in its building regulations and
– is granted a right of expropriation as a last resort measure.
Compared to the current situation, the main change is that the commune has
the option of introducing the incentive tax. The expropriation right functions as a
threat that – at least in today’s situation – is not exercised. However, as the incentive
tax is voluntary, its effectiveness depends on, if and when the communes introduce
it, and how much value the tax effectively captures. If a parallel is drawn with the
implementation status of the communal tax on added land value created by zoning,
its effectiveness might be very limited as communes might simply not implement it.
Nevertheless, if one takes into consideration the excessive communal building zones
and the subsequent limited communal margin of manoeuvre during building regulation
revision, the implementation of the incentive tax might constitute a strong incentive
for the communes themselves to increase conformity of land use to the zoning plan and
thus be able to regain some planning autonomy. Furthermore, the implementation of
a building obligation has also to take into consideration the current housing market,
as the profitability of the new constructions would require detailed investigation.
4.5 Diversion of the tax on added land value created
by zoning
The fifth finding concerns the use of the tax on added land value created by zoning.
In Oberaargau, its application is limited to 18 communes out of 47 and the majority
of these communes have introduced it during their last building regulations revision,
that is to say less than ten years ago. It is not possible to find out how much money
authorities cashed in through the tax on added land value created by zoning, but in
practice, I found out that its implementation is subject to two main limits:
1. Some communes divert the funds gained from the tax on added land value
created by zoning from public purposes2 to finance land service. They use the
legal argument and provisions of the tax on added land value created by zoning
2Art. 142 BauG, SR-BE 721.0.
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together with those of the land service tax in order to ensure payment of land
service by landowners. As both elements are part of the same contract, they are
merged into one unique negotiation. Thus, the instrument cannot fulfil its aim
to capture land value increase created by zoning, but merely ensures a higher
pass on of land service costs on landowners. It redistributes the captured rent
directly to the landowner. This mix of tools is due to the difficulty for the
communal authorities to pass on land service costs to landowners (in the past,
these costs were paid by public funds)3.
2. Other communes bypass the implementation of the tax by lowering the effective
taxed amount, or, in other words, they estimate agricultural land price higher
and zoned in land price lower than market value and thus reduce the amount
of tax levied in comparison to the contractually foreseen percentage. As a con-
sequence, even with a taxation percentage written in the building regulations
(e.g. 30%), the effective taxed amount remains part of the communal discre-
tionary power.
Another difficulty of the current legal provisions is that the gains received by theNo redistributive
mechanism on regional
level
commune through the tax on added land value created by zoning hinder any proper
redistribution of value between a wider circle of landowners and territories, as its
application perimeter is limited to communal borders.
As the tax on added land value created by zoning is deducted from the real estatePossible cantonal fund
circumvents the problem gains tax: a mandatory systematic tax in the form of a cantonal decision instead of a
contract would result in an actual income loss for the canton. In fact, cantonal fiscal
authorities have calculated (using the year 2012 as an example) a cantonal reduction
of income through the real estate gains tax of approximately 10% (FIN, 2013). The
new legal proposal (art. 142e nBauG) foresees a division of the gains of the tax on
added land value created by zoning between commune and canton of respectively 70%
and 30%. This should allow the creation of a cantonal compensation fund intended
for funding, in cases of material expropriation, measures of land use planning (defined
by art. 3 RPG), public infrastructure, archaeological sites, or even purchases of plots
to develop housing or work sites in areas of cantonal importance (art. 142e nBauG).
Further, the legal proposal foresees that the tax payment by the landowner isPayment time of tax on
added land value created
by zoning is taken into
consideration
due when the zoned in plot is constructed or sold (art. 142b nBauG), its perception
depends on the building delay specified in the contract between the commune and the
landowner. Nevertheless, an incentive to develop the land quickly is set by art. 142a
nBauG, as the percentage of tax on added land value created by zoning increases with
the number of years during which the concerned plot remains unsold or undeveloped.
Moreover, the new legal proposal (art. 142a nBauG) includes a tax on added landFurther economic value
creation also taxed in
current proposition
value created by zoning for zoning up, excavation authorizations (e.g. gravel pits,
wood cutting) and deposit areas (e.g. landfills), which is not mandatory according
to federal law. Further, the payment is guaranteed by mortgages held by the canton
and/or the commune (142d nBauG).
At last, the price calculation should now be unified and correspond to calculationPercentage of tax
payment should be
unified
methods (art. 142a BauG) used by the fiscal administration, as the tax on added
land value created by zoning is now levied by the cantonal authority.
4.6 Calculation method of building zone as central
issue
As the analysis of various building regulations revisions has shown, the calculation
method for the correct dimensioning of the building zone is a central issue. Over
the time period studied, calculation criteria have been unified and adapted to the
new living habits of individuals. However, they do not lead to effective restriction of
building zone needs.
With the new federal calculation method, a cantonal land use coefficient (the ra-
tio between the sum of communal building zone capacities and demographic and jobs
forecasts4) is used for determining future construction zoning needs. It is similar to
3M. Jampen and H.-J. Muralt op. cit.
4One job is considered to be equivalent in terms of surface as one inhabitant.
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the Bernese calculation method in the sense that it relies on a median value of surface
use per inhabitant, (which is in fact a density coefficient based on the socio-economic
characteristics of the commune), as well as federal demographic prognostics. However,
this technique creates the possibility for cross-communal and cross-cantonal compar-
ison, which is supposed to provide incentives for cantonal and communal authorities
to conform to legislation (Flückiger, 2014, 49). Based on the author’s analysis (Flücki-
ger, 2014, 90ff), the directives can be appraised as follows:
− only three types of zones are taken into account in the calculation of the correct
building zone dimension5, which excludes land consuming activities (economic
development areas, tourist areas) from the calculus;
− the cantonal land use coefficient as sum of communal host capacities in the three
different considered zones does not reflect the real size of building zones, nor
the relevance of their location;
− a wide margin of manoeuvrability is left to the cantons, as no absolute limits in
terms of surface or density are determined by federal law (e.g. minimum density
coefficient). Only the median density of each category of communes6 is used as
a relative limit;
– in this sense, the current Bernese calculation method is stricter, as it fixes
an absolute minimum density coefficient (for example, one could have also
taken the top quartile as a reference value);
– no solution is provided for the problem of the location of building zones;
− the cantons are free to opt for optimistic demographic scenarios, leaving a wide
margin of manoeuvrability when calculating the correct size of building zones;
– as the case studies’ analysis has shown, the use of a single cantonal growth
scenario is also problematic, as it attributes equal zoning rights to com-
munes with opposite demographic evolutions;
− the restriction of urban sprawl is limited to the reproduction of past urbanization
patterns: low density communes will remain low density, whereas a densification
process in the centres could be applied to most communes;
– Still, urbanization limits, valid for 20 to 25 years, have yet to be defined
in the cantonal or regional structure plan.
4.7 Communal creativity in order to solve land avail-
ability issues
The case studies’ analysis has demonstrated a high level of communal creativity in
attempting to solve land use planning and other land-related problems they face.This
leads to the creation of strategies that realise, divert, or bypass land use planning
goals:
− the green zone of Wiedlisbach is of particular interest, as it is used to divert the
instrument of zoning. Through a zone change applied to plots in the building
zone, the available surface for development has been temporarily reduced. Thus,
these plots are not counted as reserve in the building zone calculus, which in
turn allows for further building zone extensions;
− the emption right used for the extension of the building zone in the Gerzmatt in
Wiedlisbach is an innovation in the current institutional regime of soil, because
it substitutes the lack of building obligation with a contractual agreement to
sell the land if specific conditions, such as development, are not met within a
given time period;
5Nevertheless, these three zones account for 70% of all building zones and host 79% of all inhab-
itants and jobs.
6Categories defined by the typology of the communes used by the BFS
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− the use of building rights by semi-public organisations in order to contribute to
communal demographic objectives;
− the implementation of a tax on added land value created by zoning on an en-
tirely voluntary basis in Niederbipp: the commune has successfully used the
value capture mechanism, although the intended rate of 30% value tax is not as
effectively implemented as it would be if effective land market prices had been
used as a reference;
− on also acknowledges the extensive use of contracts between authorities and
target groups in order to implement land use planning policy. Bernese legislation
allowed, in particular for the tax on added land value created by zoning and
land service tax, and the elaboration of private arrangements specific to each
land use project that are in the centre of value redistribution issues.
4.8 Redistributive capacity of current institutional
regime
Although the institutional regime of Oberaargau has innovative land use planning
instruments (tax on added land value created by zoning, contractual arrangements),
redistributive effects have been very limited until recently, due to:
1. Instruments that capture and redistribute value are optional, and the communes
frequently do not implement them. Those communes implementing them still
have an important margin of manoeuvrability (creation of specific zones, use of
tax on added land value created by zoning for no foreseen ends);
2. Current Bernese tax on added land value created by zoning is quite different
from the original (1976) and current (2013) conception in federal law; thus, it
does not allow them to anticipate the potential effects of the revised federal law;
3. There is no obligation of construction, although land hoarding is a recurrent
and quantitatively important issue;
4. In the cases where an implementation of the instrument occurred, it took place
lately and as a reaction to already existing problems. However, authorities
attempted to extend the redistributive capacity of the institutional regime after
experiencing the negative consequences of spatial development dynamics;
For now, the question of redistributive instruments allowing the transfer of build-
ing rights from oversized areas to center regions, or close to transport infrastructure,
is not covered by the new legislative proposal.
The question of the financial compensation in case of material expropriation is
partly addressed by the new law, as it allows the communes with oversized building
zones to rely on the probable creation of a cantonal compensation fund (art. 142e al.
4 nBauG). However, given the reluctance of communal authorities to use their legal
resources to proceed to building zone reductions, along with the time gap between the
extension of the building zone in the 1970s and the fund’s creation in the 2010s, the
actual use of the fund’s money to compensate material expropriation remains open.
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